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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND ORGANISATION 
1.1 ORIENTATION 
This dissertation presents a variety of empirical 
studies in financial accounting with an emphasis on 
the association between published accounting data and 
share prices. These studies are the first attempt 
at empirical research in accounting in South Africa. 
There has been an alarming lack of research in this 
discipline in this country and only 14 doctorates in 
the accounting field have ever been conferred by South 
African universities. 
The major aim of the dissertation is to contribute to 
the understanding of (1) the usefulness of accounting 
data and (2) the effect that certain financial 
disclosures (and non-disclosures) have on share prices 
and consequently on the wealth of the users and 
potential users of these data. 
An essential premise of this thesis is that the primary 
purpose of financial reporting is the provision of 
information useful for economic decision making. 
2 
This seems a reasonable point of departure and is well 
supported in the literature (see Beaver (1981)). 
1.2 THESIS ORGAl~ISATION 
The thesis has been organised into the following three 
parts : 
Part 1 
Part 2 
Introduction and Background 
The Association Between Company Information 
Releases and Share Prices 
Part 3 On Information and Risk 
Part 1 Introduction and Background 
Part 1, comprising Chapters 1, 2 and 3, constitutes an 
essential background to Parts 2 and 3. 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis and describes its 
organisation and structure. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief background to the contextual 
setting for financial reporting and describes in broad 
terms state-preference theory, mean-variance portfolio 
theory and market efficiency. Although emphasis is 
placed on the implications for financial reportinq, 
3 
the analysis does not purport to be exhaustive. 
Chapter 3 surveys all the published (and some un-
published) research on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
( JSE) . Virtually all the research has addressed the 
question of market efficiency. This chapter is 
introduced by a very brief description of the origin 
and functioning of the JSE. 
Part 2 The Association Between Company Information 
Releases and Share Prices 
Part 2 reports the results of four separate studies 
on the association between specific information 
releases and share prices. These studies are 
organised into five chapters (4 through 8) with an 
additional synopsis chapter (Chapter 9). 
The chapters have been designed in such a way that 
each constitutes a separate study and retains a 
certain independent character. Chapter 4 is an 
'umbrella' chapter and introduces the general rationale 
for such studies. It describes the various method-
ologies and models common to all studies. Note that 
the latter are specified in terms of the study 
presented in Chapter 5. 
A certain degree of repetition has, however, been 
4 
incorporated into Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in order to 
enhance their continuity and coherence. A continual 
cross-reference to previous chapters is thus avoided. 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical evaluation of the 
information content of annual earnings releases 
through company announcements using a variety of 
research designs. 
Chapter 6 extends the work on annual earnings to half-
yearly earnings. The incremental information content 
of half-yearly earnings releases is empirically 
evaluated. 
Chapter 7 investigates the information content of 
dividends employing a number of dividend expectations 
models. This study, although also of interest in 
itself, is a vital corroboration of the conclusion 
drawn in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Chapter 8 examines the market reaction to the account-
ing policy change from FIFO to LIFO. While a knowledge 
of the market reaction to such a change should be of 
considerable interest to investors and policy makers 
alike, an additional purpose in reporting this study 
is its confirmation of certain phenomena displayed by 
the (different) data set used in the previous three 
5 
studies. 
Chapter 9 contains a sununary of the conclusions drawn 
in the previous four chapters. This is not repeated 
in this chapter and the reader is referred directly 
to Chapter 9. 
Where appropriate, literature surveys and background 
discussions are dealt with in the relevant chapters, 
rather than separately in the dissertation. 
Part 3 On Information and Risk 
Part 3 focuses on another aspect of the association 
between published accounting data and share prices, 
viz. the effect of certain voluntary disclosures 
and non-disclosures on market determined risk measures. 
This part consists of one lengthy chapter (10) only, 
which stands completely independent of Part 2. 
Applying the increased disclosure requirements intro-
duced by the 1973 Companies Act (South African) as a 
research tool, it was tentatively concluded that the 
voluntary non-disclosure of information may, of 
itself, increase the systematic risk of a share. 
For the benefit of the reader, it was felt appropriate 
6 
to repeat, to a limited extent from Part 2, the 
definition of certain risk measures. 
As with Part 2, the literature survey and background 
will be discussed in the chapter itself. 
A conclusion to Part 3 is provided in Chapter 10 
which likewise will not be repeated here. 
Finally, attention is drawn to the fact that all the 
studies reported in this dissertation are based 
exclusively on South African data. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
A CONTEXTUAL SETTING 
2.1 INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary 
contextual setting for the empirical findings reported 
in Parts 2 and 3. The chapter will also illustrate 
the importance of share price research for accounting. 
This chapter commences with a brief review of the primary 
objectives of financial reporting, followed by a review 
of the investor setting at both the individual and the 
market levels. At the individual level, time-state 
preference theory will be the general paradigm assumed 
within which mean-variance portfolio theory and 
specifically the market model will be introduced. 
The role of information in and the implications for 
financial reporting of such a setting will be reviewed. 
At the market level,the notion of ~arket efficiency will 
be defined and some of the implications of this condition 
for financial reporting will be presented. It must be 
emphasised that this does not purport to be an 
8 
exhaustive treatment of these topics. 
2.2 THE OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
In an economy characterised by the separation of owner-
ship and management of resources, one justification of 
financial reporting might be to facilitate the 
evaluation of the stewardship of management by the 
owners. In this sense management account periodically 
to the suppliers of capital for their performance over 
the preceeding period. Indeed, this retrospective, 
stewardship orientated view of the purpose of financial 
reporting has traditionally dominated the process in 
most countries. 
In the last decade, however, there has been a discern-
ible expansion of the perceived objective of financial 
reporting to a prospective, information orientated pers:i;:ective. 
This evolution, which some have even called a 
revolution, (l) has several implications for financial 
accounting and,consequently, research in the discipline. 
A publication by the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(1) Footnotes appear at the end of the chapter (page 30). 
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of England and Wales (ICAEW, 1975) does refer to this 
informational approach, (2 ) but the major impetus 
seems to be in the United States of America. Two 
publications by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) in the early seventies 
alluded to the 'decision-usefulness' or informational 
approach. ( 3 ) In 1978 the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) issued a statement on the objectives of 
financial reporting (FASB, 1978) which stated the 
objectives as follows: 
"Financial reporting should provide 
information that is useful to present 
and potential investors and creditors 
and other users in assessing the 
amounts, timing, and uncertainty of 
prospective cash receipts . 
Since investors' and creditors' cash 
flows are related to enterprise cash 
flows, financial reporting should 
provide information to help investors, 
creditors and others assess the amounts, 
timing and uncertainty of prospective 
net cash inflows to the related 
enterprise." (page (viii)) . 
This change of emphasis subsumes the traditional 
stewardship role and introduces some powerful implications 
for all associated with the process of financial report-
ing. This transition is not without opposition, in 
fact many practising accountants (particularly in 
10 
South Africa) are not even aware of the change. (4 ) 
Although the historic data produced by accountants may 
have a certain informational value, (S) under the 
traditional approach the objective of reporting was 
not to provide some optimal information set to a 
defined group of users. Consequently, it could be 
argued that in such a setting the accountant need not 
be concerned with the decision making processes of the 
investor. 
However, if the more ambitious decision-useful role of 
financial reporting is accepted,the role of information 
at the individual and market levels becomes significant. 
As will be suggested below, the wealth of an individual 
affects consumption/investment decisions. Changes in 
share prices affect wealth and thus any potential 
association between accounting data and share prices is 
of considerable relevance to accountants given the 
informational objective of their endeavours. 
In fact,a major proposition in this dissertation is that 
a fruitful way of investigating the usefulness of 
accounting data in decision making is by observing 
the behaviour of share prices contemporaneously with 
accounting information releases. 
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For a more detailed review of the changes in the 
objectives of financial reporting see Beaver (1981, 
Chapters 1 and 2). 
In view of the wider objective of financial reporting, 
it is considered appropriate to briefly review what is 
known about the investor environment (i.e. decision 
context) and the role of information therein. 
2.3 THE INVESTOR ENVIRONMENT 
There are at least two major roles of a capital (share) 
market. Firstly, it allows a separation of the owner-
ship and the management of resources in such a way 
that those agents with a comparative advantage in the 
deployment of these resources are able to take all 
relevant production decisions. Secondly, it provides 
a mechanism whereby individual investors are able to 
optimise the utility of their consumption patterns 
through the exchange of consumption rights (i.e. shares). 
The pricing mechanism in a share exchange ideally 
results in an optimal allocation of resources among 
producers and an optimal allocation of shares among the 
suppliers of capital. 
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Financial information can be viewed as having a role 
at two levels: 
(1) A role in the setting of prices (market level); 
and 
(2) A role in portfolio selection by individual 
investors (individual level). 
Although markets are an aggregation of individuals, 
it would be incorrect to translate evidence or 
conclusions from one level to another. The aggregation 
may be distortive and what holds at the individual level 
may not hold at the market level. These two aspects of 
the investor environment will be briefly described 
separately, emphasising the implications for financial 
reporting. 
2.3.1 The Individual (Single Person) Setting 
Time State Preference Theory 
Hirshleifer (1970) combined the multi-period/certainty 
approach of Fisher (1930) with the utility theory work 
of Arrow (1971) and Debreu (1959) to develop the most 
general framework of an individual's investment decision 
under uncertainty. This framework, called 'State 
Preference Theory' (or 'Time-State Preference Theory') 
13 
characterises the individual's investment decision as 
one where current consumption is exchanged for uncertain 
future consumption so as to maximise the expected 
utility of life-time consumption. The sole determinants 
of the investor's utility function are time-labelled, 
state-contingent consumption claims. The investor 
will determine all potential states of the world and 
the attendant payoffs, then, based on a unique 
preference determined probability assessment of the 
likelihood of each state occurring, take that invest-
ment/consumption decision which maximises his/her expected 
utility. In this setting there is only uncertainty 
about which state of the world will prevail. 
Therefore,the role of information is only to revise the 
probability assessments about future states. Naturally 
uncertainty about payoffs and possible states would 
extend the role of information. Information will thus 
only be worth, at a maximum, the increase in expected 
utility in transferring the investor from an uninformed 
to an informed setting. 
This framework provides extensive insights into the 
individual investment decision under uncertainty and, 
therefore,the potential role of information. 
Unfortunately, the theory is non-operative 
of potential states is unmanageably high. 
as the set 
Markowitz 
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(1952) and others have, however, with further assumptions 
developed a more operative framework to analyse the 
individual investment decision. This more specific 
set of state preference theory is termed mean-variance 
portfolio theory and is described below. 
Prior to leaving the general state preference framework, 
it is necessary to point out the following the 
investment/consumption decision is bound by the 
investor's 'wealth' which is defined as the present 
certainty equivalent value of present and future 
consumption. Thus,since current wealth includes all 
endowments including shares, share price changes will 
induce changes in consumption patterns. 
Clearly, the importance of share price behaviour forthe 
welfare of investors requires that accountants should 
be concerned with the association of their output 
with share prices. Given the informational objectives 
of financial reporting, the share price research 
constituent in any comprehensive programme of 
accounting research is indispensable. 
Mean Variance Portfolio Theor] 
The mean-variance approach suggested by Markowitz (1952) 
and others is an operational extension of the more 
15 
general state-preference theory. With certain specific 
simplifying assumptions, including that investor 
preferences are completely defined in terms of two 
parameters (the mean and variance of expected one 
period portfolio returns), a powerful framework was 
developed to characterise the individual investor 
decision under uncertainty. This framework provides 
interesting insights into thedeterminants of individual 
demand for information. This section briefly describes 
the basic tenets of portfolio theory, defines the 
market model and considers the role of financial 
reporting in this context. Excellent technical 
descriptions of portfolio theory are available and it 
is considered unnecessary to pursue these here. (
6 ) 
The most important impact of portfolio theory was to 
change the focus from the individual share level to 
the portfolio level. It implies that investors are 
only concerned with the risk/return attributes of 
portfolios of shares and not of the shares themselves. 
It can be shown that in a mean-variance world, the 
variance of expected returns of a portfolio is not 
merely a weighted average of the constituent return 
variances. Rather, the risk of a portfolio is a 
function of both the average variance of the 
constituent~ returns and a weighted average of all 
the covariances between each share and every other 
16 
share in the portfolio. 
notationally 
This is more easily perceived 
where 
o 2 (R ) p 
X· l 
a~ 
l 
a . . lJ 
= 
N 
I 
i=l 
a~ X ~ + 
l l 
N N 
I I 
i= 1 j =l 
i :/- j 
= the proportion of portfolio value 
invested in share i 
= the variance of share i returns 
( 1) 
= the covariance between the returns of 
shares i and j 
Two important points can be made at this stage. Firstly, 
the second term on the right hand side of expression (1) 
will tend to dominate as the number of shares in the 
portfolio increases. 
Secondly, the combination of shares with negatively 
correlated returns will reduce the portfolio risk level 
to below that of the weighted average of the individual, 
share-return variances. 
Note,how the expected return on a portfolio will always 
be a weighted average of the expected returns on the 
constituent shares. 
Clearly, these conclusions have significant implications 
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for investment managers. 
What are the implications for information demand? 
The investor, in a Markowitzian world, faces a formid-
able extent of parameter estimation; namely, the 
expected return and variance of the expected return 
for each share (i.e. 2n) and the covariance in returns 
between each pair of shares (i.e. (N 2 - N)/2). 
Having estimated all the parameters,the investor 
combines shares into a portfolio with the desired risk/ 
return characteristics to maximise his/her expected 
utility in terms of personal risk preferences. 
Presumabl~ information will have a role in this para-
meter estimation and the investor will demand firm 
specific information to that point where the expected 
increase in utility from knowing the implication of the 
information equals the estimated procurement costs. 
This, in itself, does not provide much additional insioht, but 
a closer examination of (1) may well do so. 
It is clear from portfolio theory that the attributes 
of the shares themselves are only of consequence to the 
extent that they affect the mean and variance of 
portfolio returns. Thus, consider from (1) the 
18 
contribution of each share to total portfolio risk. 
If a portfolio is sufficiently large the variance of 
the shares expected return contributes little. 
it can be shown that it affects portfolio risk by 
0 iA 
x. 2 ]. 0 A 
Yet, 
i.e. the proportion invested ITil.lltiplied by the covariance of 
the share i's return with the average returns of all 
other constituents over the average variance of all 
other constituents' returns. As a portfolio becomes 
larger, so the average variance of returns tends to be 
the variance of the returns of the market portfolio. 
Thus, the relation 
tends to determine the contribution an individual share 
makes to total portfolio risk. Thus,the total 
variance of a share is not important to the investment 
decision, only that portion associated with market 
risk. This has led to the familiar dichotomy of a 
share's risk into systematic (non-diversifiable) and 
unsystematic (diversifiable) components. This notion, 
suggested by Markowitz, was extended by Sharpe (1963) 
into what is known as the Market (Diagonal) Model. 
19 
Notationally 
= 
( 2) 
where 
E (Eit) = 0 
o(RMt' E it) = 0 
o(Eit' E jt) = 0 
Rit = return on share i in period t 
~t = return on
 market portfolio in period t 
E = individualistic factor it 
C\' s. = intercept and slope associated with the l linear relationship 
The return of a share is characterised as being composed 
of an element linearly related to the market return and 
a residual element independent of the market return. 
The respective variances of these elements are the 
systematic and unsystematic risks referred to above. 
Since the residual terms are by construction 
uncorrelated across firms,they tend to set off as 
shares are combined so that portfolio unsystematic 
return tends to zero. Thus, only the systematic 
portion of risk is relevant in the well diversified 
portfolio. 
20 
s.,in fact, is equivalent (under certain 
l 
assumptions) to 
The market model,therefore,provides a powerful 
simplification of the parameter estimation of the 
original Markowitz approach. 
The diversified investor must estimate only the expected 
return and S for each share, i.e. 2N parameters. 
Before discussing some of the implications of portfolio 
theory for financial information, a short digression 
on the importance of the market model ensues. 
An intuitive explanation of the market model is that 
the factors impinging on the firm may be categorised 
into two groups: (1) market-wide factors affecting 
all firms in some way, e.g. business cycle, etc.; and 
(2) individualistic factors peculiar to each firm. 
Therefore,the market model provides a mechanism to 
remove the effects of the first category and derives a 
series which reflects the effects of firm specific 
factors. This residual series provides a rich source 
of data for empirically evaluating the impact of certain 
events on the value of the firm. Furthermore,this 
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abstraction from market-wide factors allows the pooling 
of residuals through time and across firms, which 
increases the number of observations thus improving 
the power of certain tests. Finally, the market model 
is expressed in ex post terms which renders it amenable 
to empirical studies. This model provides the basis 
of much of the empirical work reported in Parts 2 and 
3 of this dissertation and will be reviewed there where 
appropriate. 
A review of certain implications of mean-variance 
portfolio theory follows: 
In the extreme case,the portfolio decision in a mean-
variance world is reduced to the selection of a portfolio 
with a desired B. This could be achieved by buying 
the market (e.g. via an index fund) and borrowing or 
lending to increase or reduce portfolio B to taste. 
There is no obvious role for firm specific information 
in such a setting. An investor who proposes to 
construct a portfolio, entirely of shares, with a 
certain B will,however,attempt to estimate B. Thus, 
he .may have some demand for firm specific information 
which will improve his assessments of 3 in a cost-
effective manner. However,his demand is likely to be 
low since in a portfolio context his uninformed 3 
estimate errors are likely to be uncorrelated across 
22 
firms and,therefore,his portfolio B estimate error will 
be considerably smaller than the average error at the 
individual B level. 
However,an investor may choose to remain undiversified 
for a number of reasons 
(1) Perceived transaction costs. 
(2) A belief that the market does not reflect all 
information, i.e. E(Eit) is non-zero. That 
is, an investor does not believe in market 
efficiency (see Section 2.3.2). 
(3) A belief that there is some relationship 
between a and B not specified in portfolio 
theory. 
Thus, it can be seen that different portfolio strategies 
and beliefs about the structure of share returns will 
determine the individual demand for information. 
The Market Level will now be introduced and the 
implications for financial reporting in that setting 
reviewed. 
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2.3.2 The Market Level - Market Efficiency 
There are a number of issues in the multi-person 
setting which have implications for financial report-
ing, but many of these are beyond the scope of the current 
work and will not be addressed. However, one aspect 
of the market level of the investor environment, 
market efficiency, is of some relevance to the 
dissertation and so the remainder of this chapter will 
deal with this issue and its importance for financial 
reporting. 
Fama (1970) presents a formal definition of market 
efficiency as that condition in which share prices 
reflect all relevant information. In order for this 
condition to hold at all times, it is necessary that all 
new relevant information be impounded into prices 
instantaneously. However, this rather loose description 
is acknowledged as being non-operative and thus most 
efforts to operationalise the concept and empirically 
test it have focused on a testable property of this 
condition - the fair game property. 
If the market is efficient vis a vis a particular.piece 
of information, all investors are said to play a fair 
game with respect to that information. 
Notationally: 
where 
= 
= 
= 
24 
price of share j at time t 
the period percentage return 
(pj,t+l - Pj,t)/pjt 
symbol for defined information 
set 
Three levels of the concept have been delineated 
depending on the set of information implied by ¢t. 
The weak form of efficiency defines the history of 
prices as ¢t, the semi-strong form expands this 
definition to include all publicly available inform-
ation and the strong form includes all information, 
i.e. including inside information. 
The most widely discussed implication of market 
efficiency is that investors cannot earn an 'abnormal 
return', that is, on average each investor will earn 
a return commensurate with the level of risk taken. 
( 3) 
There are of course difficulties in testing the ability 
of investors to earn abnormal returns as these returns 
are difficult to define. Portfolio theory and the 
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capital asset pricing model do, nevertheless, provide a 
mechanism to 'risk adjust' raw returns to establish 
abnormal returns. 
Beaver (1981a) advances a slightly different definition 
of market efficiency expressed in terms of universal 
access to information: 
"The market is efficient with respect 
to some specified information system, 
if and only if security prices act 
as if everyone observes the information 
system." (page 2 8) . 
This property implies the 'fully reflect' notion of 
the formal definition, and this definition has a 
number of important facets. Inter alia, it allows 
market efficiency in a world of heterogeneous beliefs 
and further,it allows individuals to perceive the 
market to be inefficient in some respects even though 
it is not. 
Note, it is not required that universal access holds 
literally; the 'as if' qualification is sufficient 
for the market to reflect the information system. 
There is a considerable amount of evidence supporting 
this relationship between information and prices on 
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the major stock exchanges, but there are a number, 
albeit few, which contradict this evidence. This 
evidence and counter-evidence will not be reviewed 
here. As so little research has been done in South 
Africa in this context,a major part of Chapter 3 will 
be devoted to reviewing the empirical research on 
market efficiency in the context of the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE). 
Before proceeding to Chapter 3,the implications for 
financial reporting in an efficient market will be 
briefly summarised. Generally speaking,these are 
the implications of the semi-strong form of the 
concept which naturally subsumes the weak form. 
A major implication for investors is embodied in the 
fair game property of an efficient market (see above). 
This in turn may affect the demand for firm specific 
information by the individual. As indicated in 
Section 2.3.1, the individual's perceptions of the 
relationship between share prices and information will 
have a significant impact on his/her demand for 
information. However, the significance for 
financial reporting of this fair game property is that 
the traditional concern for the narve investor may be 
trivial. If information is publicly available in an 
efficient market,it is difficult to see how the natve 
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. . . 
d. d (7 ) investor is preJU ice , whereas if information is 
not publicly available, the ignorant (as regards 
the non-public information) will be prejudiced. Thus, 
in an efficient market the concern for the nafve (or 
rather ignorant) investor is reduced to ensuring the 
admission of information to the public domain in the 
fastest manner. It seems clear that it is not 
necessary to expend resources on reducing the complexity 
of financial statements to the level of the layman, 
but it suffices that they be directed at the sophisticated 
investor. 
Related to this, it is implied by the efficiency 
concept that the market will not be fooled by the form 
of a disclosure; it will see through pure book-
keeping entries to the underlying econanic substance of what is 
being reported. This has a message for policy makers 
- resources spent on issues of display (e.g. extra-
ordinary items above or below 'the line') are resources 
wasted -once disclosed, the market will correctly 
interpret the implications. 
An efficient market is likely to reflect a much wider 
set of information than that provided by the accountant 
and the evidence on the U.S. markets indicates that 
share prices reflect a very rich information system. 
Accountants should take cognisance of this and provide 
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information in the production of which they enjoy a 
comparative advantage. 
There are a number of aspects of market efficiency not 
covered in this brief section. Howeve4 it is hoped 
that a sufficient background has been provided on 
this very important aspect of the relationship between 
share prices and information at the market level. (8 ) 
It must be emphasised,before concluding,that the 
condition of market efficiency is essentially empirical 
and as such cannot be accepted or rejected on purely 
intuitive grounds. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
In introducing an informational perspective to the 
objectives of financial reportin~ empirical research 
on the association between accounting data and share 
prices is absolutely essential. This is so because 
of the role information plays at both the individual 
and market levels. Accounting data have the potential 
to change investor expectations which cause price 
induced wealth changes that affect investment/ 
consumption decisions. Given this impact on general 
well-being,it is impossible to imagine an accounting 
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research prograrrune which excludes this branch of 
research. 
This thesis sets out to explore the relationships 
between accounting data and share prices and addresses 
the most fundamental questions, such as: 
(1) How useful are published accounting data in 
South Africa? 
(2) How important are accounting data relative to 
other sources of firm specific data in South 
Africa? 
(3) How efficient is the JSE vis u vis accounting 
information? 
Before proceeding to the empirical studies, Chapter 3 
provides a brief background on the JSE and reviews all 
previous empirical work which has been carried out in 
that environment. 
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 2 
(1) See Beaver (1981). 
(2) See ICAEW (1975). 
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(3) See AICPA (1970 and 1973). 
(4) The author has had considerable experience in 
lecturing to practising accountants on this 
issue. 
(5) A major part of this dissertation is devoted to 
empirically evaluating the informational content 
of the accountant's output. 
(6) See Beaver (1972). 
(7) Even the nalve play a fair game with respect to 
future information. 
(8) A more thorough treatment of this topic is 
presented in Knight (1981). 
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CHAPTER 3 
A REVIEW OF PUBLISHED RESEARCH ON THE 
JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of this chapter is to review the 
empirical research which has been conducted on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). This is 
considered appropriate as the dissertation presents 
additional research on the market and, furthermore, 
there is such a paucity of research that a compre-
hensive review is easily manageable. Virtually all 
the work has focused on the efficiency issue and, 
therefore,the review will group studies according to 
the various facets of efficiency investigated. 
A brief background on the JSE will precede the review. 
3.2 THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE 
Trading began on the JSE on January 16, 1888. At 
this time all quoted shares were associated with 
mining particularly gold and diamonds. Although 
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the mining sector is still of significant importance, 
there is a respectable industrial sector. 
As at 24 January 1982, 263 industrial companies were 
listed. There are 19 industrial sectors including an 
Industrial Holding category. The mining section 
consists of five major categories, Golds, Coal, 
Diamonds, Metals and Minerals and Mining Financial. 
There were (at 29.1.82) 96 companies (including 22 
mining financial) associated with mining. Sorre 51 canpanies 
are categorised as financia~ including insurance 
companies and banks. In total, therefore, there were about 
400 companies quoted as at 29 January 1982. 
By market capitalisation, Golds constitute 26% of 
the whole market. By this measure Industrial and 
Financials constitute + 51%. 
In view of the different factors affecting gold and 
mining shares, e.g. commodity prices, this dissertation 
confines itself to the industrial sector of the JSE. 
One phenorrenon prevalent on the JSE that is v.0rth not.tng is the 
significant level of concentration of ownership. As 
of May 1983 the Anglo American Corporation and four 
other companies effectively held 74% of the shares on 
the JSE. 
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3.3 THE EVIDENCE OF MARKET EFFICIENCY ON THE JSE 
3.3.1 Overview 
A brief survey of the empirical evidence for the efficiencv 
or otherwise of the JSE follows. (l) As there has 
been a relative scarcity of share market studies in South 
Africa, the survey will examine various methodological 
and technical issues encountered in these studies. 
The studies will be surveyed through the various levels 
of efficiency, namely: 
(1) Weak Form Tests 
(A) Non-Correlation Property 
(i) Serial correlation tests 
(ii) Runs tests 
(B) Homogeneous Distribution Property 
(i) Distribution tests 
(C) Fair Game Property 
(i) Trading Rule (TR) tests 
(1) Footnotes are given at the end of the chapter, page 50. 
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(2) Semi-Strong Form Tests 
Speed of Adjustment tests( 2 ) - No studies( 3 ) 
( 3) Strong Form Tests 
Mutual Fund performance tests. 
3.3.2 Weak Form Tests 
(A) Tests of the Non-Correlation of Returns Property 
(i) Serial correlation tests 
Recall equation (3) of Chapter 2 
= 
Where ~t defines the share price history, thus 
(1) represents the independence condition of 
(1) 
the strict Random Walk Model (IW-1). Bearing in mind 
that a lack of correlation in share returns is 
a sufficient condition for acceptance of weak 
form efficiency, tests evidencing a lack of 
such correlation in a series of share returns 
would constitute s~pport for the weak form. (4 ) 
One of the first share market tests in South 
Africa was published by Affleck-Graves and Money 
( 1975) . They performed a serial correlation 
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test on the returns of 50 shares quoted on the 
JSE. They used weekly data on 10 lag 
categories and thus 500 coefficients of 
correlation were calculated. (5 , 6 ) 
The result was that 33 of the 500 were more than 
two standard deviations from zero, of which 14 
were in the lags of one and two weeks. 
Accordingly they concluded that the condition 
of zero-autocorrelation was a reality for lags 
of greater than two weeks. They admi~ted that 
the existence of seven out of 50 coefficients 
greater than two standard deviations from zero 
for lags of one and two weeks may indicate 
dependence. They concluded that the results 
were consistent with what would be expected for 
weak form efficiency for 80% of the market. 
Furthermore, they suggest that what little 
dependence may exist would be useless to a 
technical analyst attempting to earn an abnormal 
return by analysing price histories. 
Although in support of weak form efficiency, 
the results are by no means categoric. The 
authors acknowledge that the conclusions drawn, 
although logical, are dependent on the implicit 
assumptions which underlie the tests, namely, 
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normally distributed returns with finite 
variance. 
In a further test on the same data,Affleck-Graves 
(1974) applied the non-parametric Wald-Wolfowitz 
test. (7 ) The results led to similar conclusions 
as of the parametric test referred to arove. Although the 
null hypothesis (i.e. that returns were random) 
was rejected for a number of shares, 
weak form efficiency was an accurate description 
of most of the market. Affleck-Graves performed 
runs tests reviewed in the next section. 
Two other works on serial correlation were 
subsequently published indicating support for 
weak form efficiency. (S) However, in both tests 
a certain amount of dependence was observe~ but 
not to such an extent as to constitute support 
for rejection of weak form efficiency. The 
researchers simultaneously reported the results 
of runs tests which are also reviewed in the next 
section. 
It is submitted that an acceptance of zero-
autocorrelation is not unjustified on the JSE, 
thus providing evidence consistent with weak 
form efficiency. The technical analyst 
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could argue that non-linear correlations would 
escape detection in such tests. These correl-
ations could be capitalised upon and thus earn the 
analyst abnormal returns which would contradict the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH). This 
emphasises how zero-autocorrelation is a 
condition consistent with the weak form EMH and 
not a proof thereof. The argument of the analyst is 
unsupported empirically. 
(ii) Runs Tests 
A runs test is a test of randomness where a run 
is defined as a sequence of the same sign in a 
time series of data (i.e. positive, negative or 
zero). In this case, it is a sequence of 
increasing, decreasing or constant price changes 
that determinesthe runs. 
Affleck-Graves (1974) performed runs tests on 
the same data used in the serial correlation 
tests referred to above. His results accepted 
the null hypothesis of randomness at a 95% 
confidence interval, thus concurring with the 
conclusions of his previous tests. This was 
evidence consistent with the weak form efficient 
market condition. 
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In contrast to their serial correlation tests 
both Hadassin (1976) and Gilbertson and Roux 
(1977) found evidence of non-random behaviour. 
Hadassin reports significant dependence in share 
price changes of 24 out of 30 shares using a 
differencing interval of one day and of 12 out 
of 30 for a differencing interval of four days. 
He thus concluded: 
" (The JSE) . has been proved to 
be an inefficient market ... thus 
. chartists . should be able 
to make greater returns than those 
of the market." (p.24). 
Gilbertson and Roux admit evidence of non-random 
behaviour and thus for rejection of the weak form 
efficiency. However, they point out that a certain 
dependence has been exhibited by erstwhile 
efficient markets as shown by Solnik (1973) on 
the Paris Bourse and by Fama (1965) on the 
NYSE. ( 9 ) 
Saloner and Strebel (1977) carried out runs tests 
on 10 highly traded shares and obtained results 
that evidenced randomness, thus being consistent 
with weak form efficiency. However, they found 
(B) 
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the converse on 10 thinly traded shares. Their 
observation on the dependence of Beta (B) on 
volume and the implied inefficiency on the 
thinly traded section of the market is addressed 
in the next section. 
The evidence from runs tests is not conclusive 
even should any shortcomings in rreth:xi l::e ignored. 
The general conclusion drawn from tests on the 
correlation condition is that the JSE conforms 
to a weak form efficient market. 
Homogeneous Distribution 
Gilbertson and Roux (1976) and Ozen (1977) 
reported strongly leptokurtic characteristics 
for the distributions of share returns, i.e. 
strongly peaked distributions with long tails. 
On six highly traded shares Schlosberg (1976) 
compared the distributions to the normal, stable 
Paretian, Student-t and Compound normal models. 
He showed that the Student-t and Compound normal 
provided the best fit. Further, he showed that 
over short periods share returns do exhibit 
homogeneous distributions. These short-term 
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distributions have been shown to be normal or 
leptokurtic. (lO) Over longer periods these 
distributions combine to form the Student-tor 
Compound normal observed by Schlosberg. 
Strebel (1977) suggests that thinly traded shares 
exhibit non-randomness and have leptokurtic 
distributions. He does, however,acknowledge 
the very limited number of shares examined. 
This conclusion he finds consistent with his own 
runs tests referred to above. He also 
acknowledged the limited extent of these tests, 
being on only 10 highly traded and 10 thinly 
traded shares. 
The major import of this evidence is not merely 
to the acceptance or rejection of the RWM,but 
to the appropriateness of statistical tests 
involving the assumption of a normally 
distributed population. Strebel states that 
any test on the JSE which involves an explicit 
or implicit assumption of normality would only 
be appropriate to highly traded shares. He 
further defines ~ighly trade~ as those shares 
with an annual traded volume of 250 000 and more. 
This conclusion seems to be based on three 
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studies involving only 31 shares 
(1) Saloner and Strebel (1977) using runs tests 
on 10 shares of each category (i.e. highly 
and thinly traded) showed that the highly 
traded shares exhibited randomness while 
thinly traded shares exhibited non-random-
ness. 
(2) Schlosberg (1976) showed that five of the 
six highly traded shares he studied were 
best described as having a Student-tor 
Compound normal distribution of returns, which 
is not too great a departure from 
normality. The distributions were 
symmetrical. 
(3) Ozen (1977) showed on tests of only five 
sha~es that those with leptokurtic 
characteristics exhibited non-randomness 
while those with quasi-normal characteristics 
exhibited randomness. 
Although each study is internally valid, the 
general conclusions drawn from each as to the 
whole market are to be treated wi.th caution, in view of 
the limited number of shares examined. It is 
respectfully submitted that Strebel's final 
assertion, based on the above, that thinly 
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traded shares on the JSE have leptokurtic 
distributions of returns is not justified. 
In another paper Strebel (1978) argues, inter 
alia, that linear regression tests on thinly 
traded shares would be worthless as the normality 
assumption was not valid for these shares. The 
normality assumption of Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression (OLS) only applies to the tests of 
significance of the parameters calculated, e.g. 
F-tests. Notwithstanding any distribution that 
may prevail,the OLS model, as applied in this 
thesis, establishes the best linear unbiased 
estimate of the relationship being explored. 
However,the departure from zero-autocorrelation 
which Strebel suggests is associated with thinly 
traded shares, could present a problem for the 
current model. The estimates, of course, 
would be unbiased and considering the lack of 
pervasive evidence to the contrary, (ll) and the 
existence of evidence supporting zero-auto-
correlation of returns for shares on the JSE, (l 2 ) 
it is submitted that the assumption is valid for 
the current study. A departure from auto-
correlation is unlikely to be an undermining 
factor for this study. ( 13 ) 
(C) 
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Fair Game Property Tests 
Trading Rule (TR) Studies 
The rationale behind such an approach to testing 
weak form efficiency is that for the fair game 
property to hold, (l 4 ) no mechanistic market 
strategy based on historical prices (and volumes) 
should be able to consistently outperform the 
market. 
Gilbertson and Roux (1976) used the TR approach 
on the JSE. 
this category. 
This is the only published work in 
Th2yapplied four different TRs to 24 shares and 
found that a buy and hold (B&H) strategy 
consistently outperformed the TR in each case. 
This result, they claim, constitutes evidence 
consistent with weak form efficiency. 
Bear and Stevenson (1976) have suggested that 
the TR approach is the only method of testing 
market efficiency directly. It is respectfully 
submitted,however, that the TR approach is the 
most indirect test of market efficiency in that 
failure to establish a TR which consistently 
outperforms the market is merely consistent 
44 
with the notion of efficiency. This certainly 
falls far short of asserting efficiency. 
Admittedly,the existence of a TR which 
consistently outperformed the market would 
constitute a rejection of the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH), subject to the below-rrentioned constraints. 
These constraints, the first three of which were 
acknowledged by Gilbertson and Roux and 
partially adjusted for subsequently, (lS) are 
(1) The comparison is biased towards rejection 
of the TR due to the differences in 
expected returns with the B&H. (l 6 ) 
(2) Short-term interest rates on uninvested 
cash should be accounted for. (l 7 ) 
(3) The outperformance by the B&H must be 
consistent. 
(4) The implicit assumption that all transactions 
can be executed at the price which signals 
t . t b l'd (lS) ac ion, may no e va 1 • 
Strebel (1977) points out that the TR approach 
does not avoid the importing of some implicit 
model with attendant questions of validity. (l 9 ) 
This is so because in order to compare the two sets of 
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returns they must be positioned in the same risk 
class. Thus a market model is implied. 
In an interesting application of the TR approach 
to their previous results, Gilbertson and Roux 
applied the TRs to the shares which had 
exhibited non-randomness in their serial 
correlation tests referred to above. The TRs 
failed to outperform the B&H strategy. They 
concluded that the correlation exhibitep was 
insufficient to be capitalised into a trading 
rule to earn an abnormal return. However, they 
ignore the possibility of the existence of a 
more sophisticated rule which could outperform 
a B&H strategy on the shares exhibiting non-
randomness in particular and the market in 
general. 
The general suitability of the TR approach 
and the results of this particular study are 
inconclusive. 
The reader is referred to Jensen (1967), Levy 
(1967), Praetz (1976) and Bear and Stevenson 
(1976) for a full debate on the TR approach and 
for empirical evidence for and against the 
existence of successful TRs on the New York 
46 
Stock Exchange. 
Conclusion on the Evidence for Weak Form Efficiency 
Despite Strebel's objections, it seems that the evidence 
reviewed supports, in the main, the validity of the 
weak form EMH on the JSE. Further work is obviously 
required to assert the complete veracity of the 
EMH. 
3.3.3 Strong Form Tests 
Mutual Fund Performance 
Tests of the performance of professionally managed 
portfolios, such as unit trusts, are generally 
classified as strong form tests (see Dyckman, Downes 
and Magee (1975, p.31)) based on the rationale that the 
managers of these funds are more likely to have 
access to inside information than the average 
investor. Thus,if these funds could be shown to 
outperform the average or overall market performance, 
it could be concluded that the market was not efficient 
in the strong form. However, if the premise that the 
managers do have access to inside information is 
incorrect then it is the semi-strong form of the 
EMH that would be negated. ( 20) This is so because 
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the funds would be earning an abnormal return by 
analysing publicly available information. 
Alternatively, it may be the fair game property of 
weak form efficiency that would be contradicted. 
On the other han~ if the funds are proved not to be 
outperforming the market, this would indicate 
consistency with strong form efficiency on the premise 
of access to inside information. If the premise is 
incorrect and the managers only have publicly avail-
able information, consistency only with the semi-
strong form may be inferred. Thus, the Mutual Fund 
tests would only be giving the negative assurance of 
a TR test. ( 2l) 
The above illustrates the further problems encountered 
in hypothesis setting on venturing beyond the weak 
form EMH. This problem is compounded by the use of 
indirect negative assurance tests such as Mutual Fund 
performance measurement. 
Tests of this nature carried out in the United States 
can be criticised on the abovementioned grounds. However, 
certain cognisance has been taken of the problem and 
the literature indicates that the conclusions have 
been drawn cautiously. The reader is referred 
particularly to Jensen (1969) and Friend, Blume 
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and Crockett (1970). These studies indicated that 
the Funds tested did not outperform the market. There 
has been a certain misconception that based on these 
results portfolio managers are proved incompetent. 
Jensen (1969) asserts that this notion is 
unjustified as the efficiency of portfolio management 
should be measured and compared with the market in 
ex ante terms and not in ex post terms as in the 
studies. ( 22 ) 
There have been two studies published of this nature on 
the JSE 
(1976). 
Du Plessis (1974) and Gilbertson and Roux 
Although involving a number of unresolved methodological 
issues (see Gilbertson and Roux (1976) and Strebel 
(1977)) the results indicate that the funds did not 
outperform the market. In view of these unresolved 
methodological issues, ( 23 ) and the hypothesis setting 
problems referred to, only very tentative conclusions 
should be drawn from these studies. Suffice to say, 
that the results constitute negative assurance vis a 
vis efficiency on the JSE subject to the reservations 
cited. 
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3.3.4 Conclusion on the Evidence for the EMH in the 
Context of the JSE 
The evidence is by no means voluminous or conclusive 
and seems particularly weak when compared to the 
evidence on the efficiency of the NYSE. (24 ) Further, 
Strebel suggests that the results are not conclusive 
because the tests to date may have been bedevilled 
by the phenomenon of 50% of the shares on the JSE 
being thinly traded. The studies in this dissertation 
will generally be invulnerable to this phenomenon as 
it is predominantly based on actively traded shares. 
Notwithstanding Strebel's posture on this issue, it 
is submitted that the evidence for acceptance of 
weak form efficiency outweighs evidence to the 
contrary. However, no statement is made, even 
tentatively, on the EMH in any other form in the 
context of the JSE. It is emphasised that this 
conclusion does not imply that the JSE is inefficient, 
but merely that its efficiency has not been established. 
so 
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 3 
(1) As evidence of market efficiency is not trans-
ferable from one market to another it is 
considered inappropriate to review the copious 
evidence of market efficiency of the NYSE. The 
interested reader is referred to the didactic 
review of such by Fama (1970). 
(2) The current study constitutes the first of this 
type. 
(3) This fact is further acknowledged by Gilbertson 
and Roux (1976). 
(4) Such evidence would not necessarily prove the 
Random Walk Model. 
(5) These lag categories were lags of (1, 2, 3, 4, 
S, 7, 9, 10, 15 and 20) weeks. 
(6) This was repeated for bi- and tri-weekly data. 
The results were substantially the same as for 
weekly data. 
(7) Being a non-parametric test the Wald-Wolfowitz 
approach is independent of the population 
parameters from which the sample is drawn. Thus 
no specific assumptions of distribution are 
made. 
(8) Hadassin (1976) and Gilbertson and Roux (1977). 
(9) Their rationale for citing such is presumably 
that a small amount of dependence is not 
sufficient to reject the null hypothesis of 
randomness, and not the fact of consistency with 
the observations of efficient markets. 
(10) See Ozen (1977). 
(11) Strebel only examined 20 shares in total. 
(12) See Affleck-Graves and Money (1975) and Affleck-
Graves (1974) and Gilbertson and Roux (1976). 
(13) See Chapter 4. 
(14) The fair game property of market efficiency was 
described in Chapter 2. 
51 
(15) See Gilbertson and Roux (1978). 
(16) See Praetz (1976). 
(17) See Gilbertson and Roux (1978). 
(18) See Jensen (1967). 
(19) Refer to Strebel's concern for the appropriateness 
of statistical models assuming normality for 
thinly traded shares. 
(20) This would of course simultaneously negate the 
strong form. 
(21) Negative assurance means that the evidence does 
not contradict the hypothesis; howeve~ it does 
not prove it. 
(22) It is submitted that the failure of a Fund to 
outperform the market merely indicates that the 
managers are competing in an efficient market, 
not that they are incompetent. 
(23) These are not central to the current t~esis, but 
flow from Strebel's assertion on the inappropriate-
ness of statistical models assuming normality in 
the context of thinly traded shares. Further-
more, Strebel and Saloner (1977) claim that 
because of the volume dependence of S (Beta) for 
these shares, the CAPM is inappropriate. See 
also Saloner (1977) for the evidence of the 
volume dependence of S (Beta) for these shares. 
(24) See Fama (1970). 
P A R T 2 
THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN COMPANY INFORMATION 
RELEASES AND SHARE PRICES 
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This part of the dissertation presents empirical evidence 
of the contemporaneous association between a number of 
company announcements and share prices. 
Chapters 4 and 5 investigate the information content of 
annual earnings releases with particular reference to the 
statutory reports, viz. the interim report (first-half 
results), the preliminary report (annual results -
summarised) and the annual report (complete financial 
statements). Chapter 4 presents a background for such 
a study and describes the various research designs 
applied. Chapter 5 describes the data, the results and 
various interpretations. 
Employing a similar methodology, Chapter 6 describes a 
study investigating the incremental information content 
of the half-yearly earnings series over the annual 
earnings series. Chapter 7 extends the studies on 
earnings releases to investigate the confounding effect 
of simultaneous dividend announcements. A number of 
dividend models are developed in an attempt to establish 
the incremental information content of dividends over 
earnings. 
Chapter 8 reports a study investigating the impact of 
the announcement of a change in accounting policy on 
share prices. The policy change is the FIFO to LIFO 
change an~ while of interest in itself, it provides a 
useful confirmatory control of the previous studies. 
Chapter 9 concludes Part 2 with a brief summary. 
53 
CHAPTER 4 
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF ANNUAL EARNINGS 
RELEASES : BACKGROUND AND APPROACH 
4.1 AIMS OF THE CHAPTER 
The primary objective of this chapter is to provide an 
introduction and background to the empirical testing of 
the informational content of accounting earnings releases. 
It describes the methodologies employed in the study 
reported in Chapter 5. The methods described in this 
chapter are employed (with certain re-specifications) 
in the studies reported in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The chapter can, therefore, be viewed as providing the 
necessary background to all the studies reported in 
Part 2. The objectives of the study reported in 
Chapter 5 are set out, followed by a literature survey of 
similar studies and some reflections on 'Information 
Content'. The balance of the chapter is devoted to a 
description of the empirical study of the information 
content of annual earnings releases within \vhich the hypotheses to 
be tested are set up and the models used are described. 
Naturally, no conclusions are drawn in this chapter as 
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no results are reported. 
4.2 BACKGROUND 
4.2.1 Objectives 
It is now widely accepted that the primary objective of 
Financial Reporting is the provision of information use-
ful to economic decision making. (l) 
In order to establish how well this objective is being 
achieved, it is necessary to define a user group and 
investigate the decision making processes of this group 
and then evaluate the usefulness of accounting inform-
ation in this context. 
Accounting theorists have generally failed to agree on 
a common user/environment specification. This lack of 
consensus has been cited as being contributory to the 
failure of attempts at developing a comprehensive and 
widely accepted accounting theory. (2 ) Purely analytical 
approaches to the evaluation of usefulness, given an 
assumed user/environment specification, are severely 
( 1) Footnotes appear at the end of the chapter, page 108. 
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limited since such approaches ignore the extent to which 
the predictions of the implied (and explicit) model 
conform to reality. A significant number of theorists, 
particularly the 'true income' school (prominent in the 
literature during the 1960s), ( 3 ) implied that as 
historic cost based income is an aggregation of dis-
similar element~ it is un-interpretable and, therefore. of 
doubtful utility. 
The question of whether accounting information is use-
ful is necessarily empirical. To investigate the 
usefulness of accounting information empirically, it is 
imperative to first establish which observable 
phenomena are indicative of utility. 
This and the following chapters seek to investigate, 
inter alia, the usefulness of accounting earnings 
releases empirically. This investigation should provide 
insights into the importance of published accounting data 
as a source of information for equity investors in South 
African quoted shares. It is obvious that in a 
competitive market all potential sources of information 
will be sought to price shares and thus the accountant 
must be seen as competing with all other sources of price 
sensitive information. It is important to identify all 
potential sources of information and develop only those 
with a comparative advantage in information production. 
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This study will, however, not attempt to identify 
potential alternative sources of information. 
The selection of the equity investor seems well supported 
in the literature since this group is probably the most 
significant constituent in the primary user class of 
economic decision makers. Furthermore, the choice of 
this group in the context of an organised share market 
need not reduce the generality of the findings. The 
share market provides a useful 'laboratory' to examine 
in situ the role of information in the decision process. 
Another aspect of the environment which will be 
simultaneously examined is the informational efficiency 
of the JSE with respect to published accounting data. 
This is more fully explained in Section 4.2.3 below. 
To summarise, the objectives of this study are 
(1) to measure the extent to which accounting data 
are used to price shares; 
(2) to estimate the relative importance of annual 
accounting releases to other sources of inform-
ation as regards timing and content; and 
(3) given that the data are useful in content and 
timeliness, to test the efficiency of the 
57 
market in assimilating the content. 
These issues are of obvious concern to all associated 
with financial reporting in South Africa. Yet it is 
hoped that the evidence provided will contribute to the 
international community as well. The U.S. markets are 
all well researched, however, as Foster (1978) indicates 
"Evidence from non-NYSE markets is important 
as there is a limited amount of information 
one can extract from any one data base. If 
the results found on the NYSE are supported 
for other data bases, one's confidence in 
their generality (rather than their being 
period - or sample - specific) is 
increased." (p. 336) 
Furthermore, where the results are non-compatible with 
other markets, analyses of the differences may provide 
additional insights to those provided by the studies 
separately. 
At the very least, this study provides an essential first 
step in empirical research in accounting in South Africa. 
4.2.2 Literature Survey 
This literature survey is confined to studies on the 
information content of the annual information releases 
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by companies. The objective is to survey the prominent 
papers which have reported empirical evidence of the 
information content of these releases in a variety of 
stock markets worldwide. 
The information content subset of capital market 
research in accounting has expanded substantially in 
the last decade. Mainly focusing on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), the studies have concentrated on a 
variety of company releases, from profit announcements 
to earnings forecasts by company officials. This study 
will be investigating official annual earnings releases 
and therefore the literature survey is confined to 
similar studies. 
The first of the modern genre of information content 
studies was published by George J. Benston (1967). 
The modern genre is distinguished by the methodology 
employed, namely the market model (Section 4.3.2). 
There were a few market based studies prior to this, 
using a variety of techniques which sought to determine 
the association between accounting data and share 
returns. (4 ) The Benston study, after a formidable 
numerical analysis (24 pages of results), concluded, 
albeit tentatively, that the information contained in 
published accounting reports is a relatively small 
proportion of the information set used to price shares. 
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The really seminal information content studies were those 
carried out by Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968). 
These papers are considered the most relevant to the 
current study and thus they will be reviewed in a greater 
methodological depth in Section 4.3.2.3. 
Ball and Brown (1968) employed the now familiar Abnormal 
Performance Index (API) metric (see Section 4.3.2.1) to 
examine the performance of various groups of shares in 
the 18 month period surrounding the date of the annual 
release of accounting earnings, i.e. 12 months before 
and six months after. The study was based on approximately 
2 340 announcements of 261 NYSE firms with 31 December 
financial year ends, over the nine year period 1957 
through 1965. Two types of portfolios were constructed, 
namely 'good news' portfolios and 'bad news' portfolios. 
These were formed 12 months prior to the relative 
announcements. The announcements were classified 'good 
news' or 'bad news' according to the sign of the 
unexpected earnings, a 'good news' announcement being 
identified by a positive unexpected earnings figure. The 
portfolio selection was dependent on three expectations 
models of income. 
The results (see Figure 4.2, page 100) imply that a 
foreknowledge of the sign of unexpected earnings could 
be used to earn abnormal returns. Firms reporting 
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'good news' in a particular year, on average show 
abnormal positive returns in every month prior to the 
announcement date. The converse applied to the 'bad 
news' releases. Moreover, for both groups little 
abnormal performance was discernible in the month of the 
announcement and the subsequent six months. 
Ball and Brown (1968) concluded that of all the inform-
ation that is impounded into a share price during a year 
the accounting income number captures more than half. 
Thus, the information content of annual releases is high, 
although, they add, not a very timely source of the 
information as most of the content (85% - 90%) seems to 
be captured by more prompt media. 
Beaver (1968), observing price residuals derived from 
the market model, reports above average absolute price 
variations in the week of the announcement of annual 
accounting earnings. He concludes that earnings announce-
ments have considerable 'news' value. In the same paper 
Beaver (1968) reported above normal trading volume in 
shares during the announcement week. This abnormal 
trading volume, Beaver (1968) claims, is indicative of 
the information content of the announcement for 
individuals as opposed to the market as a whole. The 
price residuals reflect the information to the market 
as a whole; this is expanded upon in Section 4.2.3. 
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These two studies present an apparent conflict : on the 
one hand, Ball and Brown (1968) implied that the pre-
liminary report had little news value (this interpretation 
was made explicit by Benston (1976)) and, on the other 
hand, the Beaver (1968) study reports significant news 
value. It is argued, in Section 4.3.2.3 below, that 
the results of these two studies do not in fact contra-
dict each other and the apparent conflict is resolved. 
Gonedes (1974), in a study of NYSE firms based on multi-
variate statistical techniques, reports that a number of 
accounting variables do have information useful to the 
market. The most useful accounting datum appeared to 
be the earnings per share number. 
In a study of the reaction of abnormal share returns to 
annual earnings releases by 73 insurance companies traded 
on the Over the Counter (OTC) market, Foster (1975) 
reports similar results to those reported by Ball and 
Brown (1968) on NYSE firms. 
Using a similar methodology to that employed by Beaver 
(1968), Grant (1980) compared absolute price residual 
behaviour around the date of annual earnings releases 
on the NYSE and the OTC. The results reflect a far 
greater reaction (and therefore information content) for 
the OTC firms than the NYSE firms. Grant (1980) 
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attributes the difference to the differential amount of 
interim information available on these two markets. 
These results counter-evidence the information content 
discerned in the Beaver (1968) study in that for the 
NYSE announcements no abnormal price residual behaviour 
was observed. The converse applied for OTC announcements 
supporting the proposition that the preliminary reports 
are more informative in a market with a relative paucity 
of interim information. 
Morse (1981) extended Beaver's (1968) study by analysing 
abnormal price behaviour and volume activity surrounding 
earnings announcements on both the NYSE and the OTC. 
The study was based on daily data (Beaver's - weekly) 
during the 1973 to 1976 time interval (Beaver's - 1961 
to 1965). Aggregating quarterly and annual announce-
ments, Morse (1981) reports a significant price and 
volume reaction on the day before and the day of the 
announcement. Contrasted to the Grant (1980) study, 
Morse (1981) reports no significantly differential 
reaction between the NYSE and the OTC releases. As 
acknowledged by Morse (1981), this difference in result 
may be due to the exclusive inclusion in the latter of 
well traded OTC firms for which there is likely to be 
an above average amount of interim information. 
The abovementioned seven studies present evidence which 
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indicates that accounting releases on the U.S. markets 
contain significant information content. It seems 
that the annual releases cause increased trading 
activity. This phenomenon may, however, support a 
number of interpretations. Although the accounting 
releases do not have a monopoly in firm specific, price 
sensitive information, they may be relatively more 
important in markets informationally less rich than 
the NYSE. 
The survey will now extend to studies reporting reactions 
to annual earnings announcements on the major stock 
markets of five countries. They are, in order reviewed, 
Sydney (Australia), Tel Aviv (Israel), Tokyo (Japan), 
Stockholm (Sweden) and London (England). It must be 
emphasised that these markets are generally not well 
researched and the papers reported are in most cases the 
only published works on the respective market. More-
over, these are the only exchanges on which the inform-
ation content of annual earnings releases has been 
tested. 
Brown (1970), employing an identical methodology to 
Ball and Brown (1968), reports an almost identical 
reaction to annual earnings releases on the Sydney Stock 
Exchange. 
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Lev and Yahalomi (1972) replicated the abnormal volume 
analysis of the Beaver (1968) study for the 62 firms 
quoted on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE). They 
report no significant abnormal trading volume in the 
weeks surrounding the releases of the annual report. 
They conclude that the accounting reports have no 
information content. This was attributed to the small 
number of active traders in the TASE, the possible 
informational inefficiency of the TASE and delays in 
the release of financial information in Israel. While 
it is obvious that differences in institutional arrange-
ments between two markets may explain differential 
reactions to accounting information, the results of 
this study reflect more than these differences. It is 
submitted that the difference in results between the Lev 
and Yahalomi study and the Beaver (1968) paper is almost 
certainly methodological. 
Lev and Yahalomi do not attempt to remove market wide 
factors and the analysis is based on the accounting 
releases of one calendar year only (1969). Thus, 
confounding factors which effect volume are inadequately 
controlled. It is further noted that firms were 
aligned on the week of the release of their 1969 
financial statements to the TASE and not the preliminary 
announcement date as in other studies. It seems that 
Israeli firms donot formally announce their results 
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prior to the submission of their annual reports to the 
stock exchange. Consequently, due to the considerable 
lag between financial year end and submission of annual 
report to the TASE, there is an increased potential for 
price sensitive information to 'leak out', reducing the 
informativeness of the annual report. This condition 
would be consistent with an efficient market (strong 
form), not an inefficient market as suggested by the 
authors. The criticisms of the volume approach 
presented in Section 4.2.3 (below) apply equally here. 
Deakin, Norwood and Smith (1974), in a study on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) based on 42 companies, 
report significant residual volume activity in the week 
of the release of company results by the Japanese Tax 
Administration Agency. However, in contrast with the 
results of the Beaver (1968) study, no significant 
residual price variation was discerned during the week 
of the announcement. The conclusion drawn was that 
earnings announcements change individual expectations, 
but not market expectations. The authors claim that 
this was consistent with the 'efficient markets 
literature'. This latter conclusion is not an obvious 
consequence of that study, since the objective was to 
establish whether or not the releases had information 
content rather than to establish the market's efficiency 
in impounding such. 
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As with the Lev and Yahalomi (1972) study, the Deakin, 
Norwood and Smith (1974) results probably reflect 
methodological weaknesses. Market factors were removed 
by regression and firms were aligned on the same 
calendar week (11 April 1972), i.e. the date the Japan 
Economic Journal was published wherein the Tax Adminis-
tration Agency reported· the earnings of all 42 companies 
included in the study. This dramatically weakens the 
power of the test as the results are in effect based on 
only one observation and thus confounding factors are 
not adequately controlled. 
Forsgardh and Hertzen (1975) present an information 
content study of 19 earnings announcements on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) during 1969. Employing 
the unusual methodology of establishing earnings 
expectations by direct communication with the dominant 
, 
Swedish investors (mainly financial institutions), the 
study reports significant information content in annual 
earnings releases. The ffi3.rket rrodel was used to derive price 
residuals during the period surrounding the announcement 
which were regressed with the rate of change in 
earnings expectations, i.e. log (Actual earnings/ 
e 
expected earnings). The relationship between these 
two variables was monitored before and after the 
announcements by reference to R2 (the coefficient of 
determination) for each regression. The R2 were then 
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averaged across firms. The results indicated that the 
earnings releases did change expectations, thus 
reflecting the information content of the announcements. 
The authors further concluded that these results supported 
the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis for the 
SSE, since the information content of the releases is 
impounded rapidly. Although an intriguing approach, 
it would not be feasible for large markets. 
A recent paper by Firth (1981) examines the reactions 
of absolute price residuals to annual earnings announce-
ments on the London Stock Exchange. The study was 
based on 120 firms over a three year period, although 
each year was kept entirely separate, i.e. residuals 
were not averaged across years. Using the absolute 
residuals methodology of Beaver (1968), Firth (1981) 
ranked the average absolute weekly residuals for each 
firm in descending order of magnitude. In each of the 
three years, the preliminary announcement week was 
ranked first, with either the week of the interim 
report or the week of the release of an annual report 
second and third. He concluded that the preliminary 
report has considerable information content, which is 
consistent with the Beaver (1968) results on the NYSE. 
The international research scenario is not as sharply 
focused as that of the U.S. It seems fair to conclude 
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that only the London and Sydney studies appear rigorous 
enough to be relied upon. These two studies render 
similar results to those obtained on the U.S. markets 
vis a vis the information content of annual earnings 
announcements. 
It is a pity that more comprehensive studies of this 
nature have not been conducted on the other stock 
exchanges of the world, for it is in these settings 
which are so substantially informationally different that 
insightful transnational comparisons could be made. 
The principal studies reviewed are summarised in 
Table 4.1 (overleaf). (S) 
4.2.3 Information Content - Some Reflections 
In general, share prices may be described as an 
equilibrium determined by an individual's wealth and 
beliefs and the state of the world. More 
specifically, prices are determined by market assessed 
distribution functions of returns to these shares, 
that is, the present value of all state-contingent 
claims to dividends. These assessed distributions 
are based on information pertaining to the likely amount 
and timing of dividends and the current and possible 
future state of the world. 
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TABLE 4. 1 
Studies of the Information Content of Annual Accounting Releases. 
Author(s) Market(s) No. Firms No. Yea rs Period Return Methodo- Result 
included studied studied interval logy 
Ball & NYSE * 261 9 1957 - Monthly API - IC 
Brown 1965 Price 
( 19 68) 
Beaver NYSE 143 5 1961 - Weekly Absolute 
( 1968) 1965 Residual 
- Price IC 
- Vol IC 
Brown Sydney * 118 10 1959 - r..,onth ly API -
( 19 70) 1968 Price IC 
Deakin, Tokyo 42 1 1971 - Weekly Absolute 
Norwood & 1972 Residuals 
Smith - Price NIC 
(1974) - Vol IC 
Firth London 120 3 X 1 1976,7, Weekly Absolute 
( 19 81 ) 8 Residuals 
- Price IC 
Fors gardh Stock- 19 1969 Weekly Absolute 
& Hertzen holm Residuals 
(1975) - Price IC 
Foster OTC 73 8 1965 - Monthly API -
(1975) 1972 Price IC 
Grant NYSE 110 5 1960 - Weekly Absolute NIC 
( 1980) OTC 211 5 1964 Residuals IC 
- Price 
Lev & Tel Aviv 62 1968 Weekly Average 
Y aha 1 omi 
- Vo 1. NIC ( 19 72) 
Morse OTC 25 4 1973 Daily Absolute ( 19 81 ) NYSE 20 4 Residuals 
ASE 5 4 1976 - Price IC 
- Vol IC 
KEY: IC= Information Content NIC = No information content. 
*These studies include a similar proportion of the respective 
markets, as the studies reported in this part of the thesis. 
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Accounting earnings represent signals from a state-
determined information system. Thus, if prices and 
earnings reflect common aspects of the prevalent state, 
it is likely that a statistical association will be 
observable between the two realisations. This 
association has been termed "information content". 
An alternative approach to viewing the association would be to 
imagine the processes generating prices and earnings as 
mappings between aspects of the prevalent state and 
these observable variables. Any association would 
then be due to a common mapping of some aspect of the 
current state of the world. 
Labelling the association 'information content' is 
ambiguous. A statistical dependence between accounting 
earnings and share price is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for earnings to have marginal 
information content and it is this that is really 
implied by the term 'information content'. A signal 
will have marginal information content only if a 
statistical association with the share price remains 
after accounting for the association among all signals. 
That is, to have marginal information content (true 
information content), the signal must provide a unique 
mapping between an aspect of the state and the share 
price. To be useful, accounting data must not merely 
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be reflected in share prices but,must also be the unique 
source of any information content it has. 
The notion that statistical association between signal 
and price is indicative of information content derives 
from the Information Economics definition of inform-
ation. (6 ) Strictly, to be defined as information, data 
must have the potential to change expectations. Thus, 
to have information content, accounting earnings must 
change the market's assessed distribution functions of 
the returns to the share. Such a change will result 
in a change in price. Moreover, in an informationally 
efficient market, the observable change in price 
induced by a change in the distribution function of 
returns would occur simultaneously with the admission 
of the signal to the public domain. 
Market efficiency in this sense requires that share 
prices reflect all publicly available information at 
all times. (7 ) As a result, information incremental 
to the set available must be impounded instantaneously 
and in an unbiased fashion. 
It has been suggested in the literature that, if signals 
have information content,they will evoke trading 
activity by investors who revise their portfolios as 
a result of changed expectations. Although 
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investigations of the association between earnings 
releases and changes in trading volume provide certain 
insights into the behavioural aspects of information 
processing, it is submitted that this definition of 
information content is more ambiguous than the price 
definition. For this reason no attempt is made in 
this study to investigate any aspect of trading volume 
and all references to information content refer to the 
price based definitions. A recent paper by Verrecchia 
(1981) is instructive on the anomalies associated with 
the volume analysis of information content. 
No theoretical framework has yet been developed to 
explain and predict the relationship between accounting 
earnings and share prices. 
Beaver (1981), nevertheless, provides a useful 
conceptual framework for the relationship presented 
here in order to provide a simplified view of a highly 
complicated process. Figure 4.1 (overleaf) represents 
diagramatically an interpretation of Beaver's approach. 
This framework provides a useful base to briefly 
review the empirical evidence of the relationship 
described. (S) 
There are three key relationships (depicted as~) 
presented in Figure 4.1 (A, B, C). A implies the 
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familiar characterisation of share price as the present 
value of expected future dividends. B represents the 
relationship between future dividends and future earn-
ings and C depicts the relationship between current 
earnings and future earnings. The curved arrows 
represent intervening factors which are likely to 
influence the association between the observable 
variables, current earnings and price. Without these 
intervening factors, there would be a direct and 
mechanistic relationship between current earnings and 
share price. This view of a mechanistic relationship 
is the basis of the traditional price/earnings approach 
to security analysis. Given relationship A, it is 
obvious that earnings (current and future) are only 
interesting vis a vis share price to the extent that 
they change dividend expectations. 
In order to trace the potential association between 
price and current earnings, one might consider how 
current earnings will reflect the dividend paying 
ability of the firm. Only that component of current 
earnings which will be reflected in future earnings 
has such potential. This component is known as 
"permanent earnings". The balance of earnings is by 
definition transitory, that is, t~ose components of 
earnings are once-off and not expected to recur . 
. -. 
This transitory component is represented by+ 1 which 
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indicates that the association between total earnings 
and share price will be dampened by this component. 
The B relationship is not that clear, but it is 
unlikely to be 1 
pay out ratio. 
1 or even a function of a constant 
-+ 0 represents that part of future 
earnings not perfectly correlated with future dividends. 
Inter alia, accounting methods with no cash flow 
implications would explain such a lack of correlation. 
Another aspect ( depicted as 0 -+) which may distort 
the mechanistic approach to the price earnings 
association, comprises of the factors that impinge on 
the dividend paying ability of the firm that are not 
transmitted through the "earnings channel". 
come about for two major reasons 
This may 
(1) Certain events may occur which impact on future 
dividend paying abilit~ but do not affect 
current (or even future) earnings. 
(2) Certain events of type (1), although reflected 
as earnings, may be reported to the market 
through more timely media. 
Finally, ~' 4 -+ characterises those factors, mainly 
market wide, which do not impinge on the likelihood, 
amount or timing of the dividends, but affect the price. 
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Obvious examples are interest rate changes and market 
risk premium changes. 
The evidence in the literature to date indicates 
(1) There is a positive correlation between changes 
in earnings and changes in prices (Ball and 
Brown (1968)). 
( 2) The relationship is not 1 
and Wright (1979)). 
1 (Beaver, Clarke 
(3) Prices behave as if there is a transitory 
component in earnings (Beaver and Morse (1978)). 
(4) Prices see through different accounting methods 
(Beaver and Dukes (1973); Sunder (1973)). 
(5) Changes in price are more correlated with 
earnings than with "cash flow" (Beaver and Dukes 
(1972)). 
(6) Prices behave as if earnings are an important 
source of information, but not the only source 
(Beaver (1968); Ball and Brown (1968)). 
(7) Prices are better forecasters of earnings than 
past earnings (Beaver, Lambert and Morse 
( 19 80) ) . 
(8) Systematic risk (S) seems correlated with the 
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analogous measure of systematic variation in 
earnings (Bacc) (Beaver, Kettler and Scholes 
(1970); Beaver and Manegold (1975); and 
Beaver, Clarke and Wright (1979)). 
Note that all these studies are American based and that 
no South African research has been carried out.( 9 ) Further-
more, the relationship between earnings and share prices 
is obviously highly complex and any observed statistical 
association may be interpreted in a number of ways. 
An investigation into this association should, neverthe-
less, provide insights into the process of information 
dissemination and consumption in a particular market. 
The application of an appropriate research design should 
reduce the ambiguity in interpretation. 
Changes in share price may still, however, be viewed 
as reflecting the impact of information on investor 
expectations. The information may relate to any 
aspect of the state or expected state and may be firm 
specific or economy wide. In a market which is 
informationally efficient, the changes in share price 
may be interpreted as reflecting the entry of inform-
ation to the public domain. This feature facilitates 
studies of the association between prices and earnings 
releases. Any observed changes in price occurring 
simultaneously with earnings releases may be attributed 
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to the effect of these releases on market expectations, 
assuming an adequate control of other factors. In a 
grossly inefficient market, the information content of 
earnings releases would be impossible to test, since 
the lag between the release and the price change would 
hamper any conclusion. In studies on markets of 
proven efficiency, this lagging of price reaction is 
not problematic and most studies merely assume market 
efficiency (based on conclusive evidence) and proceed 
to measure the contemporaneous relationship between 
price changes and information releases. Unfortunately, 
the JSE is a market of unproven efficiency, as the few 
studies that have been done reflect conflicting 
evidence (see Chapter 3). 
This aspect will naturally add a certain ambiguity to 
the results. It is, however, unlikely that the market 
is so inefficient that the lag in price reaction is so 
great and variant across firms that no conclusion is 
possible. In fact, this study will attempt to test 
the speed of market reaction to information releases. 
It is submitted that it is not the assumption of complete 
efficiency in the semi-strong form that is required, 
but the assumption that the market is not excessively 
inefficient that is required. (lO) Furthermore, it is 
acknowledged that efficiency with respect to the 
information content of accounting releases presupposes 
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that the releases have unique information. The testing 
of efficiency, then, is considered a by-product of this 
research study which focuses primarily on information 
content. The efficiency issue is one that could hamper 
the methodological approach and this is addressed in 
Section 4.3.2 below. 
4.3 EMPIRICAL STUDY 
4.3.1 General Approach 
In the most general terms the study tests the following 
competing hypotheses 
where 
H 
0 
H 
a 
= 
= 
= 
the return on share i in period t 
annual earnings on share i released 
during period t 
The null hypothesis (H) that expectations of returns 0 
are unaltered with the release of the annual earnings 
report (no information content) is tested against the 
alternative hypothesis (Ha) of altered expectations 
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(information content). 
It is thus·necessary to establish as accurately as possible 
the time of the release (t) and to observe any abnormal 
price changes at this time. 
Changes in Rit are induced by changes in market expectations 
which in turn are induced by information of all types. 
Information that affects expectations about a share will 
continuously affect price. These information releases 
will range from economy wide factors, affecting all firms, 
through firm specific releases, such as earnings releases 
which may only affect the share itself. Clearly, to focus 
on firm specific items it is necessary to remove the 
effect of all other factors. Thus the observable Rit 
needs to be transformed in order to abstract away from all 
non-firm specific information. 
The familiar market model suggested by Markowitz (1952) 
and developed by Sharpe (1963) has provided a useful 
mechanism for analyses of this nature. 
This model (often called the diagonal model) dichotomises 
the return of a share into systematic and non-sy$tematic 
cornp:ments which resp:ctively reflect a comron mcve.'!Eilt with the 
average return of all shares and a unique movement specific 
to a particular share. Observable changes 
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in Rit can be interpreted as being induced by two types 
of information, viz. that which affects all firms (which 
will affect the systematic component) and firm specific 
information. Changes in these components reflect the 
flow of these two types of information into the public 
domain. The variable portion of the firm specific 
component of return, viz. the unsystematic return are 
defined as 'residuals' from the market model of the 
form: 
where 
a..S. 
l l 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
distribution of the return on share i 
in period t 
distribution of the return on all shares 
(market return in period t) 
unsystematic return on security i in 
period t 
the intercept and slope coefficients 
specific to share i 
( 1) 
This transformation of Rit to Eit is essential to test 
the hypotheses cited which now become : 
H 
0 
H 
a 
E(E.tly.t) l ' l 
E(E.t'y.t) l ' l 
= 0 
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Untransformed the Rit represents one realisation from 
a distribution. A meaningful testing of the hypotheses 
would naturally require a large number of drawings from 
the distribution. In order to obtain a larger number 
of observations, it .is convenient to pool data over time 
and across firms. This would be permissible only 
where the expected value of the marginal distribution 
of Rit is the same for all i and t. This is unlikely to be 
the case. By asSllI11ption E(€it) = O,through use of O.L.S. 
r E.t = O and thus the 1.msystematic returns facilitate the 
t 1 
p:oling of data over tine and across firms to expand the number 
of observations in order to adequately test the canpeting 
hypotheses. 
An obvious omission from (1) would be an industry 
factor. The evidence, however, suggests that this is 
not a serious misspecification (see King (NYSE 1966) 
and Visser (JSE 1982)). 
This study will be based en~irely on residual price 
analysis. 
It must be noted that the market model introduces no 
assumptions as to the stochastic process generating 
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The following sections explain the basis for estimat-
ing unsystematic returns and provide two methods to 
analyse these residuals in order to interpret the 
effects of firm specific information releases. 
4.3.2 Methodology 
The usual approach to residual analysis is in three 
phases : 
(1) An estimation of the a,S parameters of the 
market model excluding the periods surrounding 
the events 
A 
(2) Based on the a and B of (1) the residuals (E) 
are estimated for the excluded periods. 
(3) Finally the E from (2) are pooled over time 
and cross-sectionally to derive average 
residuals (E) aligned on the common event. 
A variety of approaches to (3) and subsequent average 
residual analysis are evident in the literature. Two 
such methods are employed in this study, details of 
which appear in subsequent sections. The two 
approaches taken to Phase 3 (and subsequent analysis) 
have Phases 1 and 2 in common. Thus,both procedures 
are based on the same set of estimated residuals. 
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The rationale of estimating residuals in two phases 
sterns from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
The OLS approach for estimating residuals is by far 
the most common in studies of this nature. One of the 
assumptions of OLS is that the expected value of each 
residual is zero, i.e. E(Eit) = 0. An inclusion of 
periods where E(Eit) f O would contravene this 
assumption and thus render the regression redundant. 
It has been argued (Ball and Brown (1968)) that since 
the expected value of the residuals at the time of 
earnings announcements is non-zero, the estimates of 
residuals surrounding particular announcements should 
be derived from a. & S. estimates based on regressions 
1 1 
of Rit on Rrnt excluding the announcement period. 
The announcement period in this study spans 18 months, 
12 months prior to the announcement and six months 
after the announcement. In order to comply with the 
ar.overrentioned assunption, the complete data set ~uld be deleted 
which is nonsensical. An alternative has been to base 
a. & S. estimates on a fixed period (usually five 
1 1 
years) up to the period of interest (i.e. 12 months 
prior to the announcements). These estimates would 
then be used to estimate the residuals in the subse-
quent period (18 months). This approach is considered 
to be unnecessarily inefficient, since prior earnings 
announcements (where E(EiJ IO) are invariably included. 
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The approach adopted here will be to integrate phases 
(1) and (2) so that the residuals will be estimated 
directly. 
The unsystematic returns (residuals) were estimated 
from a time series regression of Rit on Rmt based on 
the OLS method; the form of the regression is: 
= 
pit-1 
= estimates of the intercept and slope 
obtained from the linear regression 
specific to share i 
= an estimate of unsystematic return 
on share i in week t 
= 
log (pit+ Dit) 
e Pit-1 
= cash dividends on share i in week t 
= share i closing price at the end of 
week t* 
= share i closing price at the end of 
week t-1* 
= the return on the market in period t. 
The ROM 100 industrial index was used 
as a surrogate. The return is 
calculated analogously to the return 
on share i. 
* Prices are adjusted for all capitalisation issues 
and share splits in week t. 
(2) 
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To achieve a consistent estimation of the a. ands. l l 
parameters using the OLS technique, the following 
conditions must prevail: 
(1) E(Eit) = 0 for all t 
o (Eit;Eit 1 ) = 0 for all t 'f t' (zero auto-
correlation) 
( 2) 
o2 (Eit) = a~ for all t (homoskedasticity) l ( 3) 
( 4) o(Rmt;Eit) = 0 for all t 
(1) and (2) are unlikely to constrain the application 
of OLS. Studies on the NYSE, e.g. Fama et al. (1969) 
have indicated a compliance with these assumptions. 
Random walk studies on the JSE by Affleck-Graves and 
Money (1975) indicate similar results to those obtained 
on the NYSE. It is stressed that an assumption of 
semi-strong market efficiency is not implied by the 
above conditions. Provided the conditions are 
complied with, this procedure does not introduce 
circular reasoning if inferences are drawn from the 
emergent results on market efficiency (see Section 
4. 2. 3 above) . ( 11 ) 
The assumption of constant variance (3) may not be 
literally correct. Affleck-Graves (1977) reports 
the heteroskedastic condition in a few shares from 
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a sample of JSE firms. It is acknowledged that this 
condition is a potential weakness in the current study. 
A lack of independence between Rmt and Eit could 
arise for two reasons : 
(a) the returns on share i are included in the 
market index; and 
(b) a cross-sectional correlation could be 
induced by industry effects. 
(a) is unlikely to be significant since firstly,share 
i is a small part of the index and secondl~ the index 
does not comprise all shares in the market (only 100) 
and thus the returns on share i may not be included. 
(b) King (1966) has shown that industry factors explain 
about 10% of a share's return (compared with 30% - 50% 
due to market factors) on the NYSE. Visser (1982), 
in a study on the JSE, reports no industry effects and 
that market factors explain about 30% of a share's 
return. 
The fourth OLS condition is therefore not likely to 
be problematic to this study. 
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The Eit were computed based on model (2) using an OLS 
regression. Weekly share and market returns were 
used over an eight year period. Thus 404 weekly 
residuals were estimated for each share. 
Seventy-five weekly residuals were thus estimated for 
each preliminary announcement (PA), viz. weeks -50 
through +24 where week O is the week of the PA. 
It should be noted that approximately two-thirds of 
all residuals (Eit) were included as observations in 
rrore than one of the PA' s analyses due to t..11e overlap of tine 
intervals. 
261 preliminary announcements were examined and 261 
groups comprising 75 weekly residuals provided the 
data base for subsequent analysis. 
These residuals were then averaged over time and 
across firms according to the two methods described 
in Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2 below. 
4.3.2.1 The API Metric and Income Expectations 
The Abnormal Performance Index (API) is a widely used 
metric in empirical work in Finance and Accounting. 
It presents a method of pooling the residuals (returns 
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transformed to abstract from market factors) over 
time and across firms to seek a larger number of 
observations to test hypotheses. The API is computed 
as follows : 
1 N w API = E II (1 + Enk ( 3) w N 
n=l k = -50 
where N = the number of earnings announcements 
examined 
= residual in week k relative to the nth 
announcement. 
The API may be interpreted as tracing the value of 
one Rand invested in equal amounts in all shares at 
the end of week -51 (i.e. 51 weeks prior to the 
earnings announcement) and held to the end of an 
arbitrary period (say week w) excluding the market effect. 
The gains and losses are considered abnormal since 
they are above or below what would be expected after 
risk adjustment. The API thus has an expected value 
of zero in all weeks. 
The API approach has been used in a variety of 
research settings and interpretations have been varied, 
from the inferences of information content to investor 
preference for particular accounting techniques. (l 2 ) 
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Within an information-content test, the API is 
interpreted as reflecting price changes which are 
observable realisations of informationally induced 
expectations changes. As expectations are likely to 
be changed positively and negatively and in different 
magnitudes, an averaging of residuals for all announce-
ments per (3) will remove the effects that the metric 
attempts to measure. The API metric is only useful, 
therefore, where an assumption is made about 
investors' expectations. These expectations, being 
unobservable, necessitate the development of an 
observable model of expectations. This model of 
investor expectations is required to provide an 
observable criterion by which to partition announcements 
of different impacts. This study will be confined to 
a model which provides a criterion to partition all 
announcements as having a positive effect on 
expectations ('good news') and a negative effect 
('bad news'). Naturally,the power of the API 
depends on the validity of the assumptions about 
investor expectations. An evaluation of the model, 
however, is only testable where assumptions are possible 
on information content. The above two aspects cannot 
be tested simultaneously as each requires the other as 
a maintained hypothesis. Patell (1979) is instructive 
on this aspect of research design. 
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The model of expectations employed in this study is 
known as the "earnings forecast error". It is 
hypothesised that investor expectations of a firm's 
earnings will be determined by the earnings of all 
firms and the relationship between the firm and all 
other firms. This is analogous to the price residual 
transformation and the forecast error is determined 
using the OLS technique of linear regression in the 
following form 
where 
liI. 
1. 
liI 
m 
a. ,b. 
1. 1. 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
i = 1. .41 
year to year% change in reported EPS 
year to year% change in the average 
reported EPS of all industrial firms 
estimates of the intercept and slope 
obtained from the linear regression 
specific to share i 
an estimate of the unsystematic 
accounting return 
The usual OLS conditions apply (see Section 4.3.2 
above) . Due to a significant level of residual 
autocorrelation where absolute income levels were 
used in the regression, first order changes were 
employed which significantly reduced this phenomenon. 
( 4) 
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While no previous work has been done in South Africa 
on the behaviour of earnings, studies in the U.S. 
(see Ball and Brown (1967)) indicate that about half 
of the variability in the level of earnings of the 
firms is attributable to economy wide effects. The 
results of the 41 regressions on earnings carried out 
in this study indicated a similar proportion. 
The possibility of a bias in estimates being introduced 
by a correlation between eit and 6Imt does exist, but 
it is unlikely to impinge on the inferences here 
drawn. (l 3 ) 
The amount of new information conveyed in a firm's 
income in a particular year is assumed to be the 
difference between the actual change in income and 
the change conditional upon the expectation implied 
in ( 4) 
6Iit = 
eit = 
where 
= 
= 
a. + b.6I i = 1 41 
mt l l 
t = 1 
6Iit - 6Iit 
the expected change in income for 
firm i in year t 
9 
the actual change in income for firm i 
in year t 
= 
= 
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the actual change in market earnings in 
year t 
the earnings forecast error for firm i 
in year t 
The forecast errors (eit) were computed over a similar 
time period as the price residuals (Eit) although 
yearly data were used for the former. As with the 
price residuals, it was considered unnecessarily 
inefficient to compute the forecast errors in two 
stages and thus the errors were estimated directly 
using the data during the full period. Moreover, 
due to limited data and in order to include at least 
nireobservations in each regression, the inclusion of 
all data was necessary. This should not constrain the 
research in any way since the OLS requires an 
assumption of the constancy of a. and b. and the fore-
1 l 
cast error estimates on both the full inclusion and 
past-data inclusion methods should consequently be 
similar. 
The strength of the API metric to investigate the 
information content of earnings releases is naturally 
dependent on the validity of the expectations model 
specified. For this reason, a rather unambitious 
interpretation is placed on the forecast error in 
this study which is likely to be less sensitive to 
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model misspecifications than other interpretations. The 
sign of the forecast error is interpreted as being a 
signal to the market from the accounting system; an 
association between this sign and the sign of the API is 
considered to be consistent with information content. A 
more ambitious interpretation would be to view the fore-
cast more as a measure of unexpected earnings with error, 
the latter having been introduced by misspecifications 
of the simple model induced by competing information 
sources. 
Each earnings announcement is thus classified according 
to the sign of the earnings forecast error. Thus,two 
portfolio API were computed, one for negative forecast 
errors and one for the positive forecast errors. 
Portfolios were compiled 50 weeks in advance of the earnings 
announcement and thus the information value of a fore-
knowledge of the sign of the earnings forecast error will 
be traced. 
The hypotheses to be tested with this methodology are 
H E(Eitleit) = E (Eit) = 0 0 
H E I - > 0) > E (Eit)' E ( . t, e. t a l I l 
and 
H E I - < E(Eit) a E( it:eit<O) 
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This methodology was used (with minor deviations) by 
Ball and Brown (1968) on the NYSE. This paper has 
been surveyed in Section 4.2.2 and is analysed in 
Section 4.3.2.3. 
The extension of this work of Beaver et al. (1979) 
into the association between the magnitude of the 
earnings forecast error and the magnitude of residuals 
would be logical in the South African context. 
aspect is tentatively tested in Chapter 7. 
This 
An alternative approach to the investigation of inform-
ation content in earnings announcements has been 
suggested by Beaver (1968). The API metric was not 
used and thus the attendant assumptions of investor 
expectations models were avoided. This approach, 
termed here anAbsolute Residual Analysis, was also 
employed and the methodology is explained in the next 
section (4.3.2.2). 
4.3.2.2 Absolute Residual Analysis (ARA) 
In order to avoid the necessity for the maintained 
hypothesis of the API metric, the ARA abstracts from 
the sign of the residual (Eit) by computing a squared 
residual (Ei~). Effectively then this approach is 
not concerned with whether the news content of a release 
96 
is unexpectedly 'good' or 'bad', but merely that there 
is news content. 
The squared residual is then divided by the estimated 
A 
variance of the residuals for share i ( o 2 ( E . ) ) . The 
l 
variance estimate is based on the full 404 weeks of 
data. 
An index is thus derived which measures the 
magnitude of the residual relative to the average 
magnitude of residuals for that share. The average 
A -
residual has an index value 1 since o 2 (E.) = 
l 
(since E(Eit) = 0). 
An index value above 1 indicates a residual price 
change greater than normal. 
The indices derived are then averaged across all firms 
and the analysis is based on an average index for each 
week surrounding the common announcement. In this 
study 75 values for the index were derived 50 weeks 
prior to the week of the announcement (week 0) and 24 
weeks after the announcement. This is consistent 
with the API approach. 
To summarise notationally 
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A 
(1) Square residuals (Eit) 
A 
E 2 
it 
(2) Estimate variance over the 404 weeks 
(3) Divide ( l) by ( 2) 
A 
E 2 
uit = it 
cr2 (€it) 
(4) Average (3) across announcements 
The residuals were estimated directly as described in 
Section 4.3.2. 
The null hypothesis infers that the average 
index in week O will be 1, that is, no abnormal inform-
ation is provided in the week of the announcement. 
Formally 
H 
0 
H 
a 
E (u
0
) = 1 
E (u ) > 1 
0 
no information content 
information content 
This approach was applied by Beaver (1968) on the NYSE. 
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His paper is surveyed above (Section 4.2.2) and is 
analysed in Section 4.3.2.3 below. 
4.3.2.3 A Review of Two Seminal Papers 
Before proceeding to the data and results of this study, 
it is considered appropriate to review the two seminal 
papers applying the above two methodologies (separately) 
to NYSE data. 
The two papers by Ball and Brown (1968) (BB) and Beaver 
(1968) (B) were published simultaneously, although are cross-
referenced. The Ball and Brown study employed the 
API and Beaver the absolute residual approach. 
Dealing firstly with BB, the work was based on monthly 
data and tested the association between the sign of 
the forecast error and the sign of the API for 261 
companies over a nine year period (1957 - 1965). 
Other features of the work were: 
(1) Only firms with 31 December fiscal year ends 
were used. 
(2) Both the price residuals and the forecast 
errors were derived using the full three 
phase approach, the estimates of the first 
phase being based only on data up to 12 months 
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prior to each announcement. 
(3) The date of the preliminary report, announced 
in the Wall Street Journa~ was deemed week 0. 
(4) Three models were used to estimate the sign of 
the forecast error, two as described in this 
thesis (LEPS%) and the nafve model, the third, was 
based on percentage changes in net income. 
All three rendered similar results. 
The results of the BB study are presented in Figure 
4.2 (overleaf). (l 4 ) The results of only one model 
(LEPS (regression) variable 2 in BB) are presented. (lS) 
The association is quite clear: the API for the 
'good news' portfolio (positive forecast error) rises 
continuously throughout the year until the month of 
the announcement whereafter the API remains constant. 
The 'bad news' portfolio (negative forecast error) 
displays a continuous reduction throughout the year 
prior to the announcement and this continues although 
much more slowly for the two or three months after the 
announcement. It should be noted that the 'bad news' 
portfolio reduced value to a larger extent than the 
'good news' portfolio increased value. This is to 
be expected as the API metric tends to have a downward 
bias. The conclusion drawn is that there is an 
association between the sign of the forecast error 
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and the sign of the price residuals which is consistent 
with information content. The extended conclusion is 
that the preliminary report was not a timely medium for 
such information since the API remained virtually 
constant after the announcement. This result highlights 
the fact that there are a number of competing sources 
of price sensitive information which are reflected 
in the changing API during the year prior to the 
announcement. As indicated above, this result has 
been interpreted by some as bearing evidence of the lack of new 
information in the preliminary report. (l 6 ) 
The B results are presented in Figure 4.3 overleaf. 
The salient features of the paper are ( 1) weekly 
data were used, (2) only the 17 weeks surrounding the 
announcement were examined, (3) the residuals were 
estimated with the three phase method using only data 
up to eight weeks before the announcement, (4) only 
firms which did not have 31 December fiscal year ends 
were studied, (5) only announcements which were not 
accompanied by a dividend announcement were included, 
(6) only firms with fewer than 20 news announcements 
per year in the Wall Street Journal were included and 
(7) 143 firms were examined over a five year period 
(1961 - 1965). 
Additional work in the B study on volume analysis is 
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not reviewed here. 
Referring to Figure 4.3, it is obvious that the week 
of the announcement has above normal residuals. This 
suggests that the preliminary report has significant 
news value. 
The results of these two studies seem contradictory 
on the one hand,it may be implied from BB that the 
preliminary report has no additional news, but on the 
other hand,the converse may be implied from the B 
results. The contradiction is easily resolved. 
answer sterns from the decreasing validity of the 
maintained hypothesis, during the year, in the BB 
study. Recall that the announcements were 
The 
partitioned as 'good news' and 'bad news' and allocated 
to portfolios one year prior to the announcement. 
During the year competing information about the firm 
affected the market's expectations (hence changing 
API). As a consequence of this, the expectations 
model became more and more misspecified so that on 
the month of the announcements both the 'good news' 
and 'bad news' portfolios were a random sample of both 
'good news' and 'bad news' announcements. As 
previously indicated, the API metric cannot be used 
to evaluate information content without a maintained 
hypothesis as the expected value of the API averaged 
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across all firms is zero. This progressive mis-
specification is really the strength and the weakness 
of the API approach. It is a strength since changing 
expectations reflect the effect of new information in 
the changing API, but is a weakness in as much as the 
required assumption of an expectations model is eroded 
by the changing expectations. 
Although the BB study provides extensive insights, it 
is limited by the aspects mentioned. The B study 
overcomes these weaknesses, but loses the positive 
aspects of the API method. It is the purpose of 
this thesis to combine the two methodologies and apply 
them on a consistent basis. It is considered vital 
to ensure that a comparison of the results from the 
two approaches is not distorted by unnecessary 
specification differences. A disappointing aspect 
of these two papers is that such differences may have 
distorted the comparison. Table 4.2 (overleaf) 
summarises the features of these papers and the current 
study. This will facilitate the brief commentary on 
the differences presented below. 
Beaver excludes 31Dec.year end firms to avoid the 
clustering of announcements. This clustering may 
distort the results since announcement information 
may be 'washed out' with market information as the 
Market 
No. of Announcements 
No. of Firms 
Period studied 
Return interval 
Methodology 
Expectations models: 
Exclusion Criteria 
( 1 ) Financial year 
end 
( 2) Dividends & 
Announcements 
( 3) More than 20 Ann. 
p.y. 
Period of Residual 
Analysis 
Residual estimates 
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TABLE 4.2 
COMPARATIVE DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS 
Ba 11 & Brown Beaver (1968) Knight 
1968 
NYSE NYSE JSE 
2340 506 261 
261 143 41 
1957 - 1965 1961 - 1965 1973 - 1980 
Monthly Weekly Weekly 
API ARA API & ARA 
-6 % EPS 6% EPS 
(regression) (regression) 
-6 Net income 6% EPS (naive) (regression) 
6 EPS (naive) 
31/12 only Non - 31/12 
only. 
N/A 
N/A If simultaneous, N/A 
exclude. 
N/A E xc 1 ude N/A 
Month -11 ,0 ,+6 Week -8,0,+8 Week -50,0,+24 
3 phase 3 phase 2 phase. 
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market index may be affected in a week of many announce-
ments. If the 31 Dec. shares and non-31 Dec. shares are 
generically different, the BB and B results are not 
comparable. The current study includes firms of all 
year ends (see Appendix I) and announcements in all 
months are included (see Appendix II). 
There is a certain clustering of announcements in 
months August and February which may tend to suppress 
information content, but this effect is likely to be 
slight. While the exclusion of announcements accanpanied 
by dividend announcements seems reasonable, 
in the context of the JSE virtually all the announce-
ments are accompanied by a dividend announcement. It 
was necessary, therefore, to ignore the dividend 
aspect as did the B & B study. An attempt will be 
made in Chapter 7 to distinguish the 
earnings and dividend effects. It is submitted that 
the exclusion of firms with a large number of 
announcements from the B study may have seriously 
reduced the generality of the conclusions. One 
would expect firms with fewer announcements to have a 
relatively higher information content in the earnings 
announcements. This contention seems to have been 
confirmed by Grant (1980) in a comparative study of 
NYSE and OTC firms. In employing a similar approach to 
Beaver, little information content was evident in the 
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announcements of NYSE firms selected without this 
exclusion criterion. 
The other specification differences, e.g. the different 
time interval studied, the analysis of different periods 
surrounding the announcement and the use of different 
return intervals may also have had distortive effects 
in the aforementioned studies. 
Finally, certain departures from both the B & Band B 
approaches were necessary in the current study to ensure 
a consistency between the two methods. These are 
(1) All residuals and forecast errors were estimated 
over the full eight year period. 
(2) In both approaches, 50 weeks before the announce-
ment and 24 weeks after the announcement are 
analysed. 
(3) As a result of (2), the estimation of the 
variances of residuals in the ARA approach 
were necessarily based on all data. 
While these factors should not sianificantly affect the 
inferences drawn in the ensuing stud~ they do, however, 
render the two approaches compatible. 
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FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 4 
(1) See Financial Accounting Standards Board (1978). 
(2) See American Accounting Association (1977). 
(3) See Chambers (1964). 
(4) See Ashley (1962), O'Donnell (1965) and Staubus 
(1965). 
(5) Only studies reported in English have been reviet.1ed. 
(6) See Theil (1967). 
(7) This is known as the semi-strong form of 
Efficiency; see Fama (1970). 
(8) This exposition draws heavily from Beaver (1981), 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
(9) An exception is Knight and Affleck-Graves (1983). 
(10) The evidence on the weak form efficiency of the 
JSE is conclusive and this assumption is well 
supported empirically; see Affleck-Graves and 
Money (1975). 
(11) The Durbin-Watson test was applied to the 
residual estimates of each share. No significant 
autocorrelation was detected. 
(12) See Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver and Dukes 
(1972). 
(13) The alternative naive model of expectations 
(viz. investors expect earnings in a year to be 
the same as the previous year), yielded very 
similar results to those reported. 
(14) The Chi-squared tests used by Ball and Brown 
(1968) are not reported here. The conclusion 
from these support their overall interpretation. 
(15) The pattern was very similar for the other two 
variables. 
(16) See Benston (1976). 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF ANNUAL EARNINGS 
RELEASES THE EVIDENCE 
5.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter tests the hypotheses set in Chapter 4 
on some 261 annual earnings announcements of quoted 
South African companies. 
The major conclusions, naturally subject to the 
adequacy of the methods employed, are 
(1) Unlike the U.S. reactions a la Ball and Brown 
(1968), there seems to be an asymmetrical 
reaction to 'good new~' and 'bad news' earnings 
releases. 
(2) However, in both the 'good news' and 'bad news' 
cases,there is a significant positive reaction 
during the week of the announcement although 
larger in magnitude for 'good news' releases. 
(3) Results similar to those obtained by Beaver 
(1968) are reported, thus indicative of a 
significant information content in all three 
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statutory reports investigated. It appears 
that the preliminary report is more informative 
than the interim report whic~ in tur~ is more 
informative than the annual report. 
(4) There seems to be an association between the 
sign of the forecast error and the sign of the 
annual abnormal return. 
The results in support of these tentative conclusions 
are presented in this chapter which concludes with a 
section on alternative research designs for future 
research aimed at testing the sensitivity of the 
results to design issues. 
5.2 DATA 
5.2.1 Preliminary Announcement Dates 
The most prominent financial newspaper in South Africa 
(the Financial Mail) is the most conunon medium through 
which quoted firms report their preliminary announce-
ments. An attempt was made to establish the exact 
date of earnings releases, but, unlike the Wall 
Street Journal in the U.S., advertisements in the 
Financial Mail are not indexed. The exact dates were 
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established by requesting each firm for which share 
price data were available to furnish these dates. The 
response rate was over 50%, 47 firms out of 95. 
However, six of the firms which replied could only 
supply approximate dates and were therefore excluded. 
The dates for the remaining firms were checked against 
the medium indicated for accuracy. The unavailability 
of this date data was a considerable constraint in 
this study. The 261 announcements examined should, 
however, be sufficient to extract any general trends. 
The preliminary announcement was chosen since it is the 
first time that the earnings number is publicly 
available. Appendices I - III present data which are an 
interesting by-product of this research. The analysis 
of the time lags between year end and preliminary 
report and between preliminary report and annual 
report may prove interesting if differential lags are 
discovered between audited/unaudited reports and 
between good news/bad news. The results of such an 
analysis will not be reported in this dissertation, 
but may be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
5.2.2 Share Price Data 
Weekly share prices were available continuously for the 
405 week period, 2 February 1973 through 14 November 
1980 for 95 industrial shares quoted on the JSE. The 
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weekly value of the RDM 100 industrial index was 
available for the same period. These data are avail-
able at the University of Cape Town (UCT) computer 
centre. 
5.2.3 Earnings Data 
Annual earnings data were obtained from the University 
of Stellenbosch Graduate School of Business data bank. 
The forecast errors were computed over a similar period 
to the price residuals. An index of average 
industrial earnings was obtained from the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange data bank. 
5.3 RESULTS 
The results and interpretations of the two approaches 
will be presented separately in Sections 5.3.1 and 
5.3.2 below. 
The overall conclusions and suggestions for future 
research, presented in Section 5.4 will synthesize 
the results of both approaches. 
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5.3.1 The API Method - Results and Interpretations 
The results of the API approach are presented 
numerically and graphically in Table 5.1 and Figure 
5.1 respectively (pages 115and 114respectively). 
For the major part the following discussion will focus 
on both forms of the results. 
The most startling feature of the API plots (Figure 
5.1) is that the pre-announcement pattern is asymmetrical 
for the two portfolios. 
The results reported by Ball and Brown (1968) on NYSE 
announcements (Figure 4.2) are similar only for the 
negative forecast error ('bad news') announcements 
of the current study. 
Two other features worth noting,before proceeding, 
are 
(1) In week O the positive forecast error ('good 
news') portfolio shows a positive cumulative 
abnormal return for the year (2,9%) whereas 
the 'bad news' portfolio suffered a negative 
return for the year (-8,2%); and 
(2) Both portfolios earned a substantial positive 
return during the week of the announcement, 
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Week reLitive to *AP!+ AP! ~PIT 
prel ir:ii n:,,·y w w 
announcement. 'GOOD NEWS' I BAD '{t}.!S I (TOT AL 
S.l\"1FLE) 
Week O = PA 
- 50 1.006 1. 001 1.003 
- 49 1. 010 1. 0% 1.008 
- 43 1. 014 1.010 1. 012 
- 47 1.019 1. 013 1. 016 
- 46 1.022 1.015 1.018 
- 45 1.021 1.017 1. 019 
- 44 l. 021 1.012 1.016 
- 43 1.019 1 .019 1.018 
- 42 1.021 1 .023 1.02?. 
- 41 1.026 1 .021 1. 023 
- 40 1.030 1 .021 1 .024 
- 39 1.025 l .013 1.018 
- 38 1.029 1.009 1.017 
- 37 1.021 1.002 1.010 
- 36 1.018 l .005 1.010 
- 35 1.017 1.000 1. 007 
- 34 1.014 .997 1.004 
- 33 1.014 .992 1.001 
• 32 1.008 .990 .997 
- 31 1.017 . 986 .999 
30 1.019 . 985 .999 
- 29 1.023 .984 1.000 
- 28 1.022 .978 .997 
- 27 1.022 . 971 .993 
- 25 1.028 .966 . 993 
- 25 1.032 . 96 3 .993 
- 24 1.034 .960 .992 
- 23 1.032 .963 .993 
- 22 1.031 .960 .991 
- 21 1.031 .963 .992 
- 20 1.035 . 955 .989 
- 19 1.033 . 949 .985 
- 18 1.035 .944 .983 
- 17 1.032 .940 .98'.J 
- 16 1.028 .939 .978 
- 15 1.030 .938 .978 
- 14 1.017 .930 .968 
- 13 1.008 .929 . 953 
-
12 1.006 .925 .960 
- 11 1.007 .928 .962 
- i 0 1.006 .924 • 959 
-
9 1.002 . 921 .956 
- 8 1.006 . 917 .955 
- 7 1.011 .915 .956 
- 6 .999 .907 .946 
- 5 1.002 .904 .946 
- 4 .994 .906 .944 
- 3 .999 .901 .944 
- 2 1.002 . 899 .944 
- 1 .998 . 903 . 944 
0 1.029 .918 .966 
+ 1 1.029 .926 . 971 
+ 2 1.039 .928 .976 
+ 3 1 .036 .935 .979 
+ 4 1 .042 .933 .980 
+ 5 1.053 .930 .983 
+ 6 1 .057 . 937 .%9 
+ 7 1.059 .941 .993 
+ 8 1 .051 .945 .992 
+ 9 1.050 . 951 .995 
+ iO 1. 052 . 951) .994 
+ 11 1 .054 . 9~. 7 . 994 
+ 12 1 .057 .944 .994 
+ 1 J 1.055 .947 .?9S 
+ 14 1 .052 .944 . 991 
+ 15 1.048 ,q40 
. 9El7 
+ 16 l. 045 
.9?7 .?35 
+ 17 1. 043 .934 .%2 
+ 18 1.041 a·· . .,..:':) , g,r32 
+ 19 1. 041 . )3,\ 
. ?cil 
+ 2Cl 1 .039 . 9 ~ I .978 
+ 21 l. 039 .927 • c, 16 
+ 2? 1. o.;5 . ~) .22 . ::: ~:? 
+ 23 1 .o,;g 
. 3:5 • ::-.i 7·_4 
+ 24 l. C!Si:' • ')2 J . ~ 7 'J 
------------------------- -----~--------~·- -----· 
* ,~bnon7~·1~ P:1·fot 1: 1,in >: I!1cit J.. - f~r·-. .-. ar <; t'r·,1r·-: in ,,.1f1i·,,_i1 tr,., 
dr,f1iJJl iP':.'Jl:'f', i-,ir-P(.d~t t:rr'C;r 'tf,l'"; •,r;c-,(i~"./i () ;:r,-~,._;,./,-' (··) 
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3,1% for the 'good news' announcements and 1,5% 
for the 'bad news' announcements. 
Focusing firstly on the 'bad news' announcements, it 
readily can be seen that, despite the upward drift to 
1.021 in weeks -50 to -40, the API decreases continuously 
until week -1. The API value in week -1 is 0.903, 
indicating that the information in the 'bad news' 
announcements had already been reflected in share 
prices. This pattern is consistent with the 
interpretation that the market expectations were 
changed by alternative sources of information through-
out the year in~ similar direction to the unexpected 
element in reported earnings. These alternative 
sources are difficult to identify,but would be likely 
to range from interim (half year results) reports to 
rumours. The definite increase in API on the week of 
the announcement would imply that there was an 
incremental information content in the preliminary 
report despite the competing sources. It seems that 
the market systematically overestimates the impact of 
'bad news', the subsequent release of a 'hard number' 
appears to result in a positive residual. The average 
increase in the week of the announcement of 1,5% is, 
however, less than half as large as the +3,1% return 
observed in week O for the 'good news' portfolio. The 
pre--announcement API pattern is, furthermore, very different 
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for this latter portfolio. There seem to be six 
discernible phases which are summarised as follows 
Duration Start Finish Return Return Phase for Accumulated for (Weeks) Week Week Phase Year to Date 
1 13 -so -38 +2,9% +2,9% 
2 6 -37 -32 -2,1% +0,8% 
3 8 -31 -24 +2,6% +3,4% 
4 9 -23 -15 -0 f 4% +3,0% 
5 3 -14 -12 -2,4% +0,6% 
6 11 -11 - 1 -0,4% -0,2% 
Phases in Pre-Announcement Pattern of 'Good News' Portfolio 
Although it is difficult to interpret this pattern, it 
seems that whatever firm specific information is 
impounded, the effect is reversed by other information 
which becomes available. Consequently, the different 
phases counteract each other almost exactly so that 
the net abnormal annual return the week before the 
announcement is effectively zero (-0,2%). This 
implies that the market expectations are not changed 
in any sustained way prior to the release of the 
preliminary report. As indicated, there is a consider-
able change in the API during week Oas the abnormal 
return for that week is 3,1%! Not only was this the 
largest change in any one week, but it was larger 
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than any one of the above phases. Quite obviously, 
the market perceives the preliminary report to have 
considerable information content. In fact,in the 
case of the positive forecast error portfolio, the 
preliminary report appears to be the only credible 
source of firm specific information. 
The 'good ne.ws' and 'bad news' announcements are both 
associated with an increase in the API, i.e. a 
positive price residual in week 0. Although in both 
portfolios week O marked the highest weekly residual 
of all 75 weeks observed, the size of the residual was 
at least twice as high in the 'good news' portfolio. 
The interpretation of this from the information content 
point of view, would be that in the case of 'good news' 
the market is particularly cautious and only reacts to 
'hard' sources of information, i.e. confirmed by an 
official announcement. Consequently, the release of 
this information has a considerable effect on market 
expectations. Conversely, in the case of 'bad news', 
the market anticipates the content of the 'hard' 
information by responding to alternate signals. The 
information content of these alternative signals seems 
consistent with the information content of the fore-
cast error, i.e. 'bad news'. The impounding of 
information content of other signals will result in 
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an increasing misspecification of the proposed 
expectations model as the year progresses, so that in 
week -1 it is impossible to ascertain the model of 
market income expectations. It does seem, however, 
that on average the market is pleasantly surprised. 
It could be concluded from the above that the market 
is unduly pessimistic in that it appears to selectively 
differentiate 'good news' 
only impound the latter. 
and 'bad news' signals and 
This conclusion would imply 
an informational inefficiency in the market vis a vis 
the 'good news' signals (if they exist). 
It is difficult to establish why this condition exists; 
presumably, it is reflective of the information market 
structure which will be a function of a complex 
institutional arrangement. Another possible inter-
pretation which would support these results would be 
that in view of the paucity of firm specific information 
in South Africa, much of the abnormal price behaviour 
observed may reflect the impounding of inside inform-
ation. The downward drift in the API for the 'bad 
news' announcements would thus reflect the leakage of 
'inside' information to the market. Why would bad 
news have a higher propensity to leak out than good 
news? Perhaps because the 'bad news' is less trace-
able to specific events to which the insider is privy 
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than good news and consequently the insider would be 
at less risk when trading on the former. 
The dramatic increase in the API for both groups 
reflects a certain efficiency in the sense that once 
the information became available, the market responded 
swiftly. This swift reaction may indeed be caused 
by the trades of insiders who,prior to the announce-
ment,were restrained from trading. This interpretation 
of efficiency is fairly weak since it does assume that 
there were no other sources of information. 
Directing the focus onto the post-announcement period is 
unlikely to provide much insight since the portfolios 
are likely to be a random sample of 'good news' and 
'bad news' announcements of the subsequent year. 
Nevertheless, the upward drift for six weeks in the 
case of the good news portfolio (nine weeks for the bad 
news announcements) may imply a market inefficiency. 
Although the reaction was swift in the week of the 
announcement, not all the information seems to have 
been impounded. The upward drift (not all of which 
is sustained) may reflect further information being 
impounded, of which an obvious source may of course be the 
annual report which is released some weeks after the 
preliminary report. 
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It is clear from these results that there is an 
association between the sign of the forecast error and 
the sign of the annual abnormal performance of the 
portfolios in the year preceding the announcement. 
To ensure the statistical validity of this conclusion, 
the Chi-square (x 2 ) test was carried out, based on a 
2 x 2 classification of announcements by the sign of 
the forecast error and the sign of the abnormal 
return to week o. 
The table and results are reported in Table 5.0(a) 
(overleaf). 
Briefly, the Chi-square test measures the statistical 
association between factors and is computed as 
follows : 
where 
r C 
D 2 = I: I: 
i=l j=l 
(0 .. - E .. ) 2 l] lJ 
E .. lJ 
0 .. lJ = observed number of cases with a j sign forecast error and an i sign of abnormal 
return 
E. . = expected number of cases for each cell lJ 
r = number of rows 
c = number of columns 
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TABLE 5.0 
SUMMARY OF CHI SQUARE TESTS 
( a) Sign of forecast error (+/-} and sign of abnormal 
performance in week O 
A A 
(et >O) (et <O) 
API 0 > l 60 29 89 
API 0 <l 50 l 2 2 172 
TOTAL l l 0 l 51 261 
02 = 35.369 
x2 (0,01) = 6.64 2 Reject H 0 of independence 
( b ) Sign of forecast error ( + I - } and sign of erice resi-
dual in week 0 . 
A A 
(et > 0) (et <O) 
Eo >O 67 96 l 6 3 
E <0 
0 
43 55 98 
TOTAL l l 0 l 51 261 
02 
= . 1930 
x2 
2 
(0,01) = 6.64 Cannot reject Ho of independence. 
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Under the null hypothesis (H) of independence, D2 
0 
has an x2 distribution with (r - 1) x (c - 1) degrees 
of freedom. The higher the D2 statistic, the greater 
the association. As reported in Table 5.0(a), the 
D2 has a value of 35,369 and since this is greater 
than the critical value for x; (0,01) of 6,64, the 
null hypothesis of independence is rejected. 
The results presented are thus generalizable and not 
the result of a few dominant announcements. In this 
respect, the result is similar to that obtained by 
Ball and Brown (1968) on the NYSE. The dramatic 
positive return on both portfolios is,however, a 
departure from the NYSE results. Whereas on the 
NYSE there is a significant association between the 
sign of the earnings forecast error and the sign of 
the price residual in the week of the announcement, 
such an association was not discerned on the JSE. 
Using an x2 test similar to that employed by Ball and 
Brown (1968) (not reported in this dissertation), 
this independence is confirmed. The D2 value 
reported in Table 5.0(b) of 0,1930 is significantly 
lower than the critical x~ (0,01) value of 6,64 and 
thus the H of independence cannot be rejected. The 
0 
Chi-square test i~ howeve~ incapable of detecting an 
association between the following two pairs of 
factors : 
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(1) The magnitude of the price residuals in the 
week of the announcement and the sign of the 
earnings forecast error; and 
(2) The magnitude of the price residual in the 
week of the announcement and the magnitude of 
the forecast error. 
As indicated above, the average value of the 'good 
news' residual in week zero was larger than that for 
the 'bad news' announcements. The potential, therefore, 
exists for an association between the above two pairs 
of factors. A recent paper by Beaver et al. (1979) 
reports a positive association between the magnitude 
of the ~arnings forecast errors and the magnitude of 
the API in the month of the announcement. 
Ball and Brown (1968L present a method to measure the 
proportion of total information impounded into a share 
that is sustained (net information) and the proportion 
of this net information that is captured in the income 
number. 
Their approach is not reviewed as it is considered 
inappropriate for two reasons : 
(1) Due to the asymmetrical use of information by 
the market, the assessment of the relative 
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importance of the preliminary report must be 
confined to the partitions created for analysis 
above; and 
(2) It is considered appropriate to base all 
analysis on average residuals rather than on 
individual residuals. 
The following definitions are used in order to 
determine the relative importance of the preliminary 
report. The 'good news' and 'bad news' portfolios 
are analysed separately as the relative importance 
of the announcement seems different in these two 
cases. 
(1) Total Information 
= 
This measures the value of the total inform-
ation which changed expectations during the 
year. 
(2) Net Information 
0 
= I I I 
t= -so 
261 
I 
i=l 
E.t1 l i Absolute Cumulative 
Average Abnormal 
Residual ( 1 CAR ! ) 
' O' 
( 3) 
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This measures the value of the total information 
which is not reversed by week O. 
Preliminary Announcement Information 
= 
!CAROi - ICAR_ll 
CAR I 
0 
This measures that portion of net information 
contributed by the preliminary report. 
The results obtained are summarised as follows 
Total information 
Net information 
PA informat._ion 
I Good news' 
19,1% 
5,0% 
62 ,0% 
'Bad news' 
18,9% 
6,3% 
27,0% 
The result is extremely interesting. It appears that 
both portfolios do have similar amounts of total 
information impounded during the year (including the 
preliminary report), viz. 19,1% and 18,9%. However, 
the percentage sustained net information up to week 0 
(net information/total information) is 26% for the 
good news portfolio and 33% for the bad news portfolio. 
The other significant difference is the proportion of 
this net information attributable to the respective 
preliminary reports. For the positive error port-
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folio the preliminary report provides approximately 
62% of the net information compared to the 27% for the 
negative error portfolio. In both cases the pre-
liminary report has significant news value. 
In order to provide insights into two aspects of the 
API plots presented, the following preliminary tests 
were carried out. 
In order to investigate the potential source of 
information in the pre-announcement period, the 
behaviour of price residuals in the weeks surrounding 
interim announcements was analysed. Based on the 
same set of data and the same portfolios, the 
residuals were re-aligned on the date of the interim 
announcement. The interim report is the only 
official communication between the firm and the market 
other than the preliminary report and the annual 
report. The interim report has a similar format to 
the preliminary report; the former reports the earnings 
for the first half of the financial year and must be 
published within three months of that date. The 
preliminary report announces earnings for the full 
financial year and must be published within three 
months of the year end (unless the annual report is 
released during the three month period after the 
financial year end). Neither the interim nor 
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preliminary report is required to be audited. 
The results of this investigation are presented in the 
same format as for the preliminary announcements. 
These will be found in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 
(pages 132 and 131 respectively). Note that,as with 
the preliminary announcement results, the total sample 
API are presented for completeness, but are not plotted. 
The only feature of interest is that for the 'good 
news' announcements (Note based on the annual 
earnings forecast errors) there is a significant 
positive residual in week O which is the highest of 
the 50 weeks surrounding the announcement. This 
implies that where the subsequent preliminary announce-
ment has a positive forecast error, the interim 
announcements have a certain information content. 
The same does not appear to apply for the other 
portfolio. This aspect will not be pursued any 
further in this chapter, but Chapter 6 reports the 
results of an empirical investigation into the incremental 
information content of half-yearly earnings. 
Another aspect to be investigated is the possibility 
that the upward drift in residuals, after the pre-
liminary report, is attributable to the information 
content of the Annual Report. The procedure above 
is repeated holding everything constan~ but 
129 
re-aligning on the date of the release of the annual 
report. 
It is not apparent from the results presented (Table 
5.3 and Figure 5.3, pages 134 and 133 respectively) 
that the annual report contains any incremental 
information. The random behaviour of residuals, 
manifesting as an upward drift in the API in Figure 
5.1, may, therefore, be due to either a slight market inefficiency 
or to informal announcements made by company officials 
between the date of the preliminary announcement and 
the release of the annual report. 
To summaris~ the following tentative conclusions are 
drawn: 
(1) There is an association between the sign of 
earnings forecast errors and the sign of annual 
unsystematic returns. 
(2) There is no association between the sign of 
earnings forecast errors and the sign of 
unsystematic returns in the week of the 
preliminary report release week. 
(3) There appears to be a potential association 
between the sign of the forecast errors and 
the magnitude of unsystematic returns in this 
week. 
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(4) The preliminary report appears to contain 
significant information conten~ in fact, in the 
case of the positive forecast errors portfolio, 
the preliminary report may be the only source 
of firm specific information impounded. 
(5) The market appears to be pessimistic in that 
competing information sources are employed, 
selectively differentiating between 'good news' 
and 'bad news'. It seems that 'good news' 
requires the confirmation of 'hard information' 
whereas 'bad news' is impounded. In most cases 
the market expectations are revised upwards with 
the release of 'bad news'. 
(6) The market seems fairly efficient in that the 
information content of the preliminary report 
is impounded swiftly. However, a non-random 
drift for a number of weeks after the announce-
ment may reflect a certain inefficiency. 
(7) The Annual Report does not seem to provide any 
incremental information. 
(8) There seems to be an information content in 
interim reports, but that information does 
not appear to have a lasting effect and in 
general is reversed. 
Avenues for further research which are suggested from 
these results will be reviewed in Section 5.4 below. 
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TABLE 5.2 
-----
SUMMAl~Y ST ,\TI ST! CS BY WEEK REL A TI VE TO !~TERP, ANNou;:cE~',::T :JATE ( !J\) 
Weel relative to 
"AP!+ APi APJT interim announce- w w 
rrent. (TOTAL 
Week O = IA SAMPLE) 
- 25 .997 .999 .998 
- 24 1.002 l.005 1.004 
23 l .010 1.006 1 .008 
- 22 1.008 l .010 1. 010 
- 21 1.010 1 .011 1.010 
- 20 1.018 1.014 l .015 
- 19 l.014 1.016 1.015 
- 18 1.020 l.025 1.023 
- 17 l.021 l.023 1.022 
- 16 1.032 l. 029 1.031 
- 15 l .027 1.031 l.029 
- 14 1.028 l.031 1.030 
- 13 1.028 l. 027 1.027 
- 12 1.025 1.029 1 .027 
- 11 l.032 1.026 l .029 
- 10 1.030 1.019 1.024 
- 9 1.025 1.013 1.018 
- 8 1.028 l.017 1. 021 
- 7 l.023 l.011 1.015 
- 6 l.016 l.008 l .012 
- 5 1.021 l.006 l. 012 
- 4 l.021 1.005 1.012 
- 3 l .025 .997 l .009 
- 2 1.024 .996 1.008 
- l l.026 .994 l.008 
0 1.040 l .')00 1.017 
+ l 1.051 .991 1.017 
+ 2 1.048 .990 1.015 
+ 3 1.049 .989 1.015 
+ 4 l.050 .981 l.011 
+ 5 1.051 .976 1.008 
+ 6 1.053 .977 l.010 
+ 7 l.052 .971 1.006 
+ 8 l.054 . 971 1.007 
+ 9 l.057 .961 1.002 
+ 10 l.052 .957 .997 
+ 11 1.048 .950 .992 
+ 12 l.044 .949 .990 
+ 13 1.041 .950 .989 
T 14 l.034 .952 . 987 
+ 15 l. 032 .947 ,984 
+ 16 1.033 .940 . 980 
+ 17 1.030 .933 .975 
+ 18 1.032 .928 .973 
+ 19 1.029 .928 .972 
+ 20 1.021 .929 .969 
+ 21 1.021 .923 .965 
+ 22 l .020 . 923 .965 
+ ?3 l .028 . 926 .970 
+ 24 l.030 .923 .969 
* Abnonnal Performance Index - firms and years in which the annual 
income forecast error was rositive ( +) or ne']ative (-) 
Week relJtive to 
Annual Report re-
lease dute 
Week O = AR 
- 50 
- 49 
- 48 
- 47 
- 46 
- 45 
- 44 
- 43 
- 42 
- 41 
- 40 
- 39 
- 38 
- 37 
- 36 
- 35 
- 34 
- 33 
- 32 
- 31 
- 30 
- 29 
- 28 
- 27 
- 26 
- 25 
- 24 
- 23 
- 22 
- 21 
- 20 
- 19 
- 18 
- 17 
- 16 
- 15 
- 14 
- 13 
- 12 
- 11 
- 10 
- 9 
- 8 
- 7 
- 6 
- 5 
- 4 
- 3 
- 2 
- 1 
0 
+ l 
+ 2 
+ 3 
+ 4 
+ 5 
+ 6 
+ 7 
+ 8 
+ 9 
+ 10 
+ 11 
+ 12 
+ 13 
+ 14 
+ 15 
+ 16 
+ 17 
+ 18 
+ 19 
+ 20 
+· 21 
+ 22 
+ 23 
+ 24 
1.000 
1.006 
l .009 
1. 015 
1.022 
1.021 
1. 019 
1.018 
1. 016 
1.014 
1.016 
1.012 
l .011 
1.010 
1.011 
l.017 
l.017 
1. 017 
l .021 
1.031 
l.045 
1.037 
l. 035 
l.035 
l.035 
1.039 
l.038 
1.044 
1.043 
l.045 
1.042 
l.032 
l.031 
1.023 
1. 025 
l.018 
1.017 
l.018 
1.024 
1.020 
l.Cl 7 
1.015 
l.015 
l.019 
l.021 
1.033 
1.034 
1.038 
1.041 
1.039 
1.043 
1. 046 
1.052 
1. ()61 
1.058 
1.061 
l .068 
1.071 
1.068 
l .062 
l. 061 
l .055 
1.053 
l. 060 
l. 057 
l .055 
l .056 
l .051 
1. 052 
l. 048 
l. OSB 
1. 059 
l. 067 
l. Ofi9 
l. OG3 
.999 
l. 002 
1. 001 
.997 
.998 
.999 
.994 
.997 
.994 
.990 
.989 
.935 
. 986 
.979 
.976 
.976 
. 974 
.969 
.970 
.961 
.959 
.961 
.959 
.950 
.945 
.942 
.937 
.532 
.933 
.930 
.925 
.923 
.918 
.910 
.913 
.910 
.908 
. 907 
.902 
.896 
. 396 
.894 
.889 
.894 
. 895 
. 892 
.896 
.907 
. 906 
.910 
. 921 
.923 
.924 
.927 
.925 
. 927 
.924 
.929 
. 931 
.938 
.933 
. 929 
.928 
.924 
.925 
.922 
. 91 7 
.922 
.92? 
.924 
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.919 
.916 
.912 
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1.00.'J 
l .003 
l .004 
l .004 
l .008 
l .008 
1.004 
1.006 
l. 003 
l.OOQ 
1.000 
.996 
.996 
.992 
.99Q 
.994 
.993 
.990 
.992 
.991 
.996 
.994 
.992 
• 987 
.984 
.984 
. 981 
.981 
.981 
.980 
.975 
. 970 
.967 
.959 
.961 
.957 
.955 
.955 
.954 
.950 
.948 
.945 
.943 
.948 
.949 
.953 
.955 
. 963 
.964 
.966 
.973 
.976 
. 979 
.905 
. 982 
.985 
. 986 
.990 
.990 
.992 
. 988 
.'J34 
.982 
. 983 
.982 
. 9F:n 
. 977 
. 97e 
.978 
.97R 
. 977 
. 9 79 
,QJ2 
. ~2,1 
. 977 
-------· -------· 
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In view of the results obtained, the hypotheses form-
ulated in Chapter 4 (page 94) may be restated as follows 
-
H ( E I A = 0) = E(Eit) = 0 (null hypothesis E ·t:e.t 0 l ' l of no association) 
-
H E(Eitjeit f 0) f E(Eit) a 
and the null hypothesis is rejected. 
5.3.2 The Absolute Residual Method - Results and 
Interpretations 
The results for the preliminary announcement are 
presented in Table 5.4 and graphically in Figure 5.4 
(pages 139 and 138 respectively). 
The shape of the plot on Figure 5.4 provides 
unambiguous evidence of the information content of the 
preliminary announcement. During the week of the 
announcement there is a 78,4% higher than normal 
residual variation! This is indisputably the highest 
in the total 75 weeks examined. Interestingly, if the 
17 weeks surrounding the announcement are viewed in 
isolation and compared to Beaver's results (see 
Figure 4.3) the pattern is not dissimilar. Beaver 
reports a higher than normal variation of 67%. It 
is tentatively concluded that the preliminary report 
in South Africa is perceived to be relatively more 
informative than the U.S. counterpart. This is not 
surprising, given the richer information markets in 
the U.S. which pre-empt the news value of company 
releases. Notice that Figure 5.4 includes all weeks 
in the period of interest. 
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The second highest abnormal residual behaviour (52,5%) 
occurred in week -19 which may coincide with the week 
of the interim report. This suspicion was investigated 
and the above procedures were repeated relative to the 
week of the interim report. This was achieved by 
aligning the residuals of each announcement on the 
week of the interim report before averaging through 
time and across firms. 
The results are presented in Table 5.4 and these are 
plotted in Figure 5.5 (pages 139 and 140 respectively). 
It must be noted that the week of the preliminary 
report was omitted in this test. The result again 
is clear : the interim report has significant 
information content. Excluding the preliminary 
report, the week of the interim report exhibits the 
highest abnormal price residual behaviour (45%). 
These results are perfectly consistent with those of 
the previous section and it is concluded that the 
preliminary report is the most important source of 
firm specific information and the interim report ranks 
second in importance. 
The third highest week in Figure 5.4 is week +5. It 
is possible that this is due to the information content 
of the Annual Report. 
137 
This indeed was found tote the case when the above procedures -were 
applied to the Annual Report. These results appear 
in Table 5.4 and are plotted in Figure 5.6. Exclud-
ing the preliminary report week and the interim report 
week, the week of the release of the annual report is 
the week with the highest abnormal residual behaviour. 
To summarise, it is concluded that the preliminary 
report, the interim report and the Annual Report all 
possess information content, in that order of importance. 
Rank Report Abnormal Absolute Residual 
1 Preliminary 78,4% 
2 Interim 45,0% 
: 
3 Annual 38,8% 
The results are consistent with those presented in 
Section 5.3.1 except for the inference drawn on the 
information content of the annual report. Whereas 
i 
in Section 5.3.1 it was concluded that the annual 
report possessed no incremental information content, 
it is implied above that this report appears to induce 
expectations changes which are manifested in an above 
normal price variation in the week of the report's 
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Week relative to 
an noun cement. 
Week O = announce-
ment 
• 50 
- 49 
- 48 
- 47 
- 46 
- 45 
- 44 
- 43 
- 42 
- 41 
- 40 
- 39 
- 38 
- 37 
- 36 
- 35 
- 34 
- 33 
- 32 
- 31 
- 30 
- 29 
- 28 
- 27 
- 26 
- 25 
- 24 
- 23 
- 22 
- 21 
- 20 
- 19 
- 18 
- 17 
- 16 
- 15 
- 14 
- 13 
- 12 
- 11 
- 10 
- 9 
- 8 
- 7 
- 6 
- 5 
- 4 
- 3 
- 2 
- 1 
0 
+ 1 
+ 2 
+ 3 
+ 4 
+ 5 
+ 6 
+ 7 
+ 8 
+ 9 
+ 10 
+ 11 
+ 12 
+ 13 
+ 14 
+ 15 
+ 16 
+ 17 
+ 18 
+ 19 
+ 20 
+ 21 
+ 2? 
+ 23 
+ 24 
Pre l i rn i nJ ry 
Announcement 
1. 121 
1.075 
1.177 
l. 386 
1. 100 
. 865 
1.208 
1. 129 
.999 
.941 
. 833 
.975 
1.252 
1.072 
.953 
.885 
. 739 
.911 
.942 
.932 
1.055 
l. 176 
1.083 
1.369 
1. 115 
.829 
.805 
.971 
.937 
.929 
.982 
1. 525 
.853 
.690 
.898 
.834 
1,380 
.896 
.906 
1.031 
.814 
.947 
.913 
. 741 
.872 
1 .,()13 
.943 
l. 156 
1. 105 
l .063 
1. 784 
l. 356 
1. 175 
1.204 
1.009 
1 .388 
.954 
.986 
l. 290 
• 972 
. 845 
.698 
1.011 
. 807 
.896 
. 862 
. oE6 
. 943 
.8ZJ 
l. 02') 
. 917 
. 9 37 
l. Cl 15 
l. 238 
. ELD 
Interim 
Announcement 
.833 
.908 
1.045 
1.187 
1.032 
1.007 
.866 
l. 321 
1.040 
1. 132 
.900 
.843 
1.086 
1.046 
.934 
.886 
. 876 
. 840 
1. 016 
.923 
.836 
. 869 
1. 104 
.974 
l. 198 
l. 455 
l. 204 
.989 
.918 
.783 
.866 
. 774 
l. 242 
. 875 
.904 
. 921 
• 894 
.885 
.978 
. 770 
l. 134 
. 871 
l . l'J 7 
l ,'._156 
.885 
. eAz 
. 830 
. 834 
l. 1]9 
Annual Report 
1.045 
1. 137 
l. 139 
1.071 
.920 
.900 
.984 
. 813 
.964 
1.048 
.957 
.941 
. 928 
.963 
. 85.7 
.851 
1.010 
1. 226 
1. 173 
1.192 
• 871 
1.253 
.889 
.856 
.852 
.902 
1.278 
.962 
.922 
. 853 
.985 
1. 180 
.774 
1. 205 
• 747 
.837 
.991 
.926 
1.035 
.922 
1. 252 
1. 102 
1. 144 
.954 
.908 
1. 185 
1. 136 
1. 245 
1. 163 
1.017 
1.388 
1.070 
l .067 
l. 059 
l .071 
l. 065 
.908 
. 779 
.833 
.801 
.785 
. 832 
.859 
.837 
l. 035 
.929 
.P25 
1. 063 
. 234 
1.1-+(3 
l ,['.f,P, 
1. 137 
. F';)2 
. 9 /4 
.93S 
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release. This conflict is analogous to that between 
the results of Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) 
and can probably be resolved in the same way. The 
expectations model of earnings used with the API 
method may be considerably misspecified by the week of 
the release of the report. Consequently, the information 
content cannot be detected using the API method and 
by basing the partition on the misspecified model. 
5.4 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS,IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The results of the two approaches were mutually 
supportive and indicative of the fact that the 
preliminary earnings release is a significant source 
of price sensitive information. 
A number of issues remain llr'.resolved and should provide 
a meaningful base for future research: 
(1) Why should there be an asymmetrical consumption 
of 'good' and 'bad' news? 
(2) Is there an association between the magnitude 
of forecast errors and the magnitude of 
unsystematic returns? ( see Chapter 7) . 
( 3) What is the effect of dividends? To what 
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extent is the inference on the information 
content of earnings confounded by simultaneous 
dividend announcements? (see Chapter 7). 
(4) Is there an association between the sign of 
half-yearly forecast errors and unsystematic 
returns? (see Chapter 6). 
(5) Which information sources compete with account-
ing releases in the production of price 
sensitive information? 
(6) Is the market efficient in terms of speed of 
adjustment to new information? 
As indicated, certain of these issues (2, 3 and 4) will 
be addressed in this dissertation. 
A by-product of this research was the collection of 
data on the lags between financial year end and 
preliminary report and between preliminary report and 
annual financial statements. These are summarised 
in Appendices I to III. These data would provide a 
useful base to investigate the effect of the sign (and 
magnitude) of forecast errors on the time lag between 
year end and the first release, i.e. are companies 
slower at disclosing bad news; does the auditing of 
the preliminary report significantly delay the report-
ing of this important information; and are the audited 
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reports presumed to have more information?(l) 
Answers to these research issues should be of consider-
able value to the accounting profession. 
This study may have raised more issues than answered 
questions, yet it is hoped that it has established 
the considerable importance of the preliminary report 
as an information source. 
An implication for the financial reporter is to ensure 
the timeous production of the information and in view 
of the apparent paucity of alternative information 
sources, firms should increase the level of communication 
to investors. In other words, two official releases 
per annum are likely to be insufficient. Moreover, 
there is a lesson for reporters who would attempt to 
delay the release of 'bad news' - the market is likely 
to overdiscount the 'rumours' - therefore,all inform-
ation should be reported timeously. 
5.5 RESEARCH DESIGN ISSUES AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Before finally concluding this chapter, it is necessary 
(1) Footnotes appear at the end of the chapter (page 149). 
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as with any empirical study, to reconsider the research 
design and models employed. 
Focusing primarily on the 'anomalous' results of the 
API approach (Section 5.3.1) the asymmetry of 'good 
news' and 'bad news' is open to three possible interpret-
ations : 
(1) The earnings forecast model is misspecified; 
(2) The price residuals model is misspecified; and 
(3) There is some fundamental difference between 
the South African data and the U.S. data, e.g. 
the S.A. market may be informationally different, 
perhaps inefficient. 
It would be interesting in future research to repeat 
the current study with different earnings models and 
test the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
specifications. It is submitted, however, that a mis-
specification of the current model is not likely to be 
confounding the interpretations presented. Aside 
from the econometric issues addressed in Chapter 4, 
a necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for a 
correctly specified model was present, viz. the sign 
of the forecast error partitioned the universe of 
announcements into approximately equally sized groups. 
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A more likely misspecification is that of the derivation 
of price residuals. It may be that the results are 
sensitive to the deletion/non-deletion dilemma. 
Recall,that the residuals were derived from data for 
the full period. 
An interesting extension of the current research would 
be to repeat the study deleting data surrounding the 
announcements, in the original regressions. A number 
of different deletion periods could be experimented 
with, say deletion periods from five to 20 weeks before 
and after the announcements. (2 ) In the case of the 
current data, a deletion of 20 weeks before and after 
each announcement would leave approximately 96 
observations for each regression which would be 
sufficient. 
This would be a three phase approach as defined in 
Section 4.3.2. If any of these alternative designs 
resulted in a symmetry(as per Ball and Brown (1968)) 
such a study would be a considerable contribution to 
research on the sensitivity of results to alternative 
research designs. Studies of this-kind have not 
appeared in the literature to date. 
Subject to these caveats on the research design, 
interpretation (3) is tentatively accepted. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter employed a dual approach to investigate 
the information content of earnings releases in South 
Africa. The results indicate that the preliminary 
report has significant information content and appears 
to be the most important source of firm specific 
information. Moreover, the interim report and the 
annual report appear to display information content 
although to a lesser extent than the preliminary report. 
A certain asymmetry in the market's reaction to various 
types of 'news' was detected. It appears that the 
market has a greater propensity to impound bad news. 
It is possible that a certain inefficiency in the market 
reaction to information exists. This conclusion is, 
however, rather tentative and open to alternative 
interpretations. 
The results suggest that the South African information 
market is rather undeveloped in the sense that company 
releases (which occur only biannually) seem to 
monopolise firm specific information. 
An important contribution of this study was to illustrate 
that it is not possible to transfer research from other 
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markets ir..to the South African context. The uniqueness 
of the South African institutional framework and its 
level of development requiresthe establishment of our 
own research facilities. This is particularly 
important for accounting policy makers, within and 
outside firms. In order to properly achieve the 
objectives of financial reporting it is imperative 
that we understand the peculiarities of our own environ-
ment. 
Finally, it is hoped that the differences between these 
results and those obtained on markets in other countries 
may provide generalised insights into the process of 
information dissemination and consumption. 
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FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 5 
( 1) A brief look at Appendix II indicates that the 
audit process delays the release of the pre-
liminary report. Given the importance of the 
announcement,it is hoped that the cost of this 
delay is exceeded by the additional credence 
attributed to audited figures. A research study on 
this issue is currently in progress,but is not 
reported in this dissertation. 
(2) This suggestion was made by William H. Beaver. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE INCREMENTAL INFORMATION CONTENT OF 
HALF-YEARLY EARNINGS RELEASES BY 
SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As described in Chapter 3, the primary objective of 
financial reporting is to provide information useful 
to economic decision making. In order to establish 
whether the issuance of half-yearly earnings reports 
achieves this objective, an attempt is made to 
evaluate the information content of these reports. 
This chapter reports a significant statistical 
association between the release of the reports and 
unusual share price behaviour, which condition is 
consistent with the reports possessing information 
content. 
Chapter 5 reports that the preliminary report has 
significant information content. In fact, it was 
suggested that this medium was the most important 
source of firm specific information. The current 
chapter aims to extend the analysis presented in 
Chapter 5. Whereas the latter viewed the earnings 
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process as an annual one, i.e. the preliminary announce-
ment reports annual earnings, this chapter will view the 
process as being biannual. In other words, a more 
detailed model of earnings expectations is defined 
based on half-yearly earnings. 
The results indicate that half-yearly reporting has an 
incremental information content over annual reporting. 
A certain market informational inefficiency is detected 
in that the reaction to the information content by the 
market is fairly sluggish and may persist for up to 
nine weeks in some cases. 
6.2 BACKGROUND 
South African companies provide only half-yearly interim 
information and thus studies of South African half-yearly 
reports are analogous to the American studies of quarterly 
reports. 
No previous work on half-yearly earnings has been done 
in South Africa and,consequently, the following American 
studies are briefly reviewed to provide a background to 
the issues. 
152 
The interim reports (quarterlies) have attracted a 
lively research interest in the United States. It is 
convenient to trichotomise this work into the following 
categories 
(1) Time Series Research 
(2) Predictive Ability Research 
(3) Share Return Research. 
The time series behaviour of quarterly earnings has 
been an important aspect of many issues in accounting 
and finance, such as the 'smoothing' of income 
(Gonedes (1972)) and the estimation of the cost of 
capital (Miller and Modigliani (1966)). 
The predictive ability research has concentrated on the 
ability of a quarterly earnings series to predict the 
following quarter's earnings or the annual earnings. 
Examples of such research are Brown and Niederhoffer 
(1968), Brown and Rozeff (1979), Coates (1972) and 
Foster (1977). Generally, these results indicate that 
the quarterlies improve the predictive ability of the 
annual earnings. This would be consistent with the 
interim report providing incremental information. 
The final category of work has concentrated on the 
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contemporaneous association between the release of 
quarterly earnings announcements and the behaviour of 
share returns. 
In expanding the Ball and Brown (1968) approach to 
quarterly announcements, Brown and Kennelly (1972) 
report an increased information content in the quarterly 
earnings relative to the annual series. Kiger (1972) 
reports a significant price and volume reaction to the 
release of quarterly reports which is consistent with 
information content. May (1971) extended the Beaver 
(1968) approach to quarterly announcements and reports 
a significant information content in these. His study 
was based on 105 American Stock Exchange shares over a 
three year period and employed minor variations to 
the Beaver (1968) technique. 
It should be noted that the Brown and Kennelly (1972) 
approach used the API metric which requires a specific-
ation of earnings expectations whereas the absolute 
residuals approach of May (1971) avoids such a 
specification. 
The reaction of share returns to quarterly reports has 
been the centre of a significant academic controversy 
in recent years. A paper by Joy, Litzenterger and 
McEnally (1977), using the API metric employed by Ball 
154 
and Brown (1968), reported a sluggish adjustment of 
share prices to the announcement of unanticipated changes 
in quarterly earnings. This non-random behaviour of 
price residuals immediately after the announcements was 
interpreted by the authors as reflecting a market 
inefficiency vis a vis the information content of these 
reports. Ball (1978) indicates that such behaviour 
could equally be attributed to a misspecification of 
the model from which the residuals were derived and 
recommends procedures to avoid such misspecifications. 
Watts (1978), in implementing these procedures, presents 
evidence of systematic abnormal returns after the 
quarterly earnings announcements which supports the 
conclusion of the Joy et al. (1977) study. 
The efficiency issue is not to be central in this 
chapter. However, as reported below, a certain 
systematic drift in weekly residuals is observable for 
a number of weeks after the half-yearly announcements. 
The above summary of research is by no means exhaustive, 
but the studies mentioned are the prominent ones and 
provide good examples of the various categories of 
research identified. A paper by Foster (1977) tends 
to defy classification along the lines here suggested 
and presents results on all three aspects referred to. 
The relevance of the Foster (1977) paper to the current 
155 
study is that it reports a significant association 
between the sign of the quarterly forecast error and 
the sign and magnitude of the annual cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR). (l) 
The current study would be classified in the third 
category mentioned above in that its objective is to rreasure 
the contemporaneous association between the release of 
half-yearly reports and abnormal changes in share prices. 
Changes in share price are interpreted as being the 
observable result of a change in market expectations. 
As information content is defined as the potential to 
change expectations, the release of a signal with 
information content should be associated with a change 
in share price. The semi-strong form of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis requires that information is impounded 
instantaneously and,thus,the information induced price 
change is expected to occur immediately the report is 
admitted to the public domain. 
This chapter attempts to evaluate the usefulness of 
interim reports while investigating the following: 
(1) Price reaction to half-yearly announcements. 
(1) Footnotes appear at the end of the chapter (page 184). 
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(2) The association between the sign of the half-
yearly earnings forecast error and the sign of 
the abnormal return over a similar period. 
(3) The additional information content of the half-
yearly earnings series versus the annual earnings 
series. 
(4) The efficiency of the JSE with respect to any 
information content contained in the half-
yearly reports. 
6.3 EMPIRICAL PROCEDURES 
Similar procedures to those described in Chapter 4 
were employed based on the same data. These are 
briefly reviewed within the new context. Weekly residuals 
were computed over the 404 week period, 2 February 1973 
through 14 November 1980, as follows : 
where 
= 
S.R t) i m t = 1 
i = 1 
404 
41 
estimates of the intercept and slope 
obtained from the linear regression 
specific to share i 
( 1) 
= 
= 
= 
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an estimate of the unsystematic return 
on share i in week t 
cash dividends on share i in week t 
= share i closing price at the end of 
week t 
= the return on the market in week t. 
The RDM 100 industrial index was used 
as a surrogate. The return is calculated 
analogously to the return on share i. 
(Note: Prices are adjusted for all capitalisation 
issues and share splits in week t.) 
The usual OLS conditions must prevail in order to 
achieve consistent estimates of ai and Bi. These 
should not constrain the application of the OLS technique 
in this study and are dealt with adequately in Chapter 4. 
The API metric was then employed to pool the residuals 
through time and across firms according to the follow-
ing form: 
where 
API 5 
w 
= 
l N w ... 
i: IT (1 + Enk 
N n=l k=-25 
N = the number of announcements examined 
c: nk = residual in week k relative to the nth 
announcement. 
( 2) 
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s = the sign of the earnings forecast error 
announced in week 0. 
The API may be interpreted as having the value of one 
Rand in equal amounts in all shares in the portfolio 
of interest at the end of week -26 (i.e. 26 weeks prior 
to the release of the half-yearly report) and held to 
the end of an arbitrary period (say week w). 
The gains and losses are considered abnormal since they 
are above or below what would be expected after risk 
adjustment. The API thus has an expected value of 
zero in all weeks. 
As indicated by Patell (1979), the API methodology is 
dependent upon an assumption of an expecta~ions model 
of earnings. In this study portfolios are classified 
as being 'good news' or 'bad news' depending on the 
sign of the forecast error derived as follows : 
where 
.. H 
m 
= i = 1 .. 41 (3) 
= percentage change in EPS in the six 
month period t relative to the 
corresponding six months (t-1) in the 
previous year 
= percentage change in ~he EPS of all 
industrial ~ir~s in the six ~onth 
b. 
]. 
= 
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period t relative to the corresponding 
six month period (t-1) in the previous 
year 
estimates of the intercept and slope 
obtained from the linear regression 
specific to share i 
= an estimate of the unsystematic account-
ing return 
Again the OLS conditions apply and are not constraints 
on the application of the OLS technique to these data. 
The amount of new information conveyed in a firm's 
income in a particular half-year is assumed to be the 
difference between the actual change in income and the 
change conditional upon the expectation implied in 
( 3) 
6Iit = a. + b. 6I i = 1 41 ]. ]. mt 
t = 1 9 
eit = 6Iit - 6Iit 
where 
6Iit = the expected change in income for 
firm i in half-year t 
6Iit = the actual change in income for firm i 
in half-year t 
6I = the actual change in market earnings 
mt in half-year t 
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= the earnings forecast error for firm i 
in half-year t 
The half-year earnings forecast errors (eit) were computed 
A 
over a similar time period as the price residuals (Eit) 
although half-yearly data were used for the former. As 
with the price residuals, it is considered to be more 
efficient to compute the forecast errors over the full data 
set.( 2 ) This restricts a literal interpretation of the error 
as a signal, since it is based to some extent on events 
after the earnings of a particular half-year are released. 
All announcements were thus classified as 'good news' or 
'bad news'. Four hundred and twenty announcements were 
analysed using the API metric according to the following 
plan (see Table 6.1 overleaf). 
The first partition permits an analysis of half-yearly 
announcements generally. Thereafter, the various announce-
ments are split into sub-groups to analyse the trends making 
up the general pattern. Firstly, the portfolios are 
partitioned between first and second half announcements. 
The positive and negative error portfolios are further 
partitioned for each half-year depending on the sign of the 
previous half's earnings error in the case of second half 
results and that of the subsequent half's earnings error in 
the case of first half announcements. A (+-) in a second 
161 
TABLE 6.1 
Reference to Portfolios analysed in this chapter. 
Portfo 1 i o No. of Colour 
Announcement : Forecast error Announcements Figure Table Code 
1. First half and positive 210 6. 1 6.2 Blue 
second half negative 210 red 
(pooled) 
2. First half positive 97 6.2 6. 2 Blue 
negative 113 red 
3. Second half positive 93 6. 3 6.2 Blue 
negative 117 red 
4. First half ++ 44 6.4 6. 3 Blue 
+- 53 green 
-+ 49 purple 
--
64 red 
5. Second half ++ 44 5.5 6 . 3 Blue 
-+ 49 green 
+- 53 purple 
--
64 red 
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half portfolio indicates a current half negative fore-
cast error in a firm which had a positive forecast 
error in the first half. Whereas a (+-) in the first 
half portfolio indicates a current half positive fore-
cast error which was followed by a negative forecast 
error, in the subsequent half. 
In total, the performance of 14 portfolios was monitored 
over the 50 week period surrounding the announcements, 
i.e. 25 prior to and 24 weeks after the week of the 
announcement. 
6.4 DATA 
The report announcement dates were established by direct 
communication with all companies for which share price 
data were available. The response to this request for 
data was just over 50% and this constrained the study 
to 41 quoted companies on the JSE. 
Half-yearly earnings data were obtained from the JSE 
data bank. 
Share price data were obtained from a share price data 
bank available at the University of Cape Town. 
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6.5 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
Part 1 All Half-Yearly Announcements 
Initially the API analysis was based on a pooling of 
all half-yearly announcements, i.e. first half announce-
ments and annual announcements. The announcements were 
partitioned into those with positive half-yearly earnings 
forecast errors and those with negative errors. These 
two groups formed two hypothetical portfolios constructed 
25 weeks before the relative announcement. 
The weekly API's for the 50 week period surrounding the 
announcement were plotted in Figure 6.1 (overleaf). (For 
the summary statistics see Table 6.2, page 172.) 
The most striking feature of Figure 6.1 is the sharp 
increase in the API during the week of the announcement. 
For both portfolios over the entire 50 week period, the 
change in API is greatest during this week. The change 
is much larger for the 'good news' portfolio. This 
implies that in general the half-yearly announcements 
are informative. Moreover, there appears to be an 
association between the sign of the earnings forecast 
error and the sign of the abnormal return in the 25 
weeks preceding the announcement. With a 25 week 
foreknowledge of the sign of the forecast error, an 
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investor would have been able to earn an abnormal return 
of 4% on the 'good news' portfolio and an abnormal 
return of 3,7% on the 'bad news' portfolio (if sold 
short). This implies that the information reported in 
the announcements is consistent with the information set 
on which shares are priced. The question of exactly which 
medium transmits this information remains open. 
The downward drift in API, in the case of the 'bad news' 
portfolio, suggests that the market anticipates the 
'news' value of the report - presumably from alternative 
media. This does not appear to be the case for the 
'good news' portfolios. During the ten weeks -25 
through -15 a slight upward drift is discernible, 
however the pattern seems random,thereafter culminating 
in an API value of 1,018 in week -1. The conclusion 
to be drawn is similar to that drawn in Chapter 5 
in respect of annual announcements: the market appears 
to anticipate 'bad news' to a much greater extent than 
'good news'. However,the results do not display the 
same degree of asymmetry as that reported in Chapter 5. 
In order to validate the inferred positive association 
between the sign of the forecast error and the sign of 
the abnormal return to the week of the announcement,a 
Chi-square test was carried out on the 2x2 classification 
presented below 
Forecast error> O 
Forecast error< 0 
D2 = 32,9 
x2 (0,01) 
2 
= 6,64 
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API > 1 
0 
118 
79 
197 
API
0 
< l 
72 
151 
223 
190 
230 
420 
Reject H of independence 
0 
The test supports the conclusion that there is an 
association between the sign of the forecast error and 
the sign of the abnormal return. 
Part 2(a) Second-Half Announcements 
In Chapter 5 it was indicated that there was a 
differential market reaction to first half and second 
half announcements. In order to investigate this 
phenomenon, the 'good news' and 'bad news' portfolios 
were split into first half and second half announcements. 
The second half portfolio will be analysed in this 
section. The API plots are presented in Figure 6.3 
(summary statistics Table 6.2) (pages 171 and 172, 
respectively). The pattern differs from that of 
Figure 6.1 in two distinct ways: (1) the change in 
API during week O is much larger for the second half 
announcements, and (2) the API_ 1 values are significantly 
smaller than the total group. It may be concluded 
for the 'good news' second half announcements that 
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virtually no alternative sources of information are 
exploited by the market. The same is not true for 
the 'bad news' announcements, the information content 
of which is apparently anticipated by the market. 
A feature of the second half announcements which may be 
significant is the non-random upward drift in the API 
for about nine weeks. This drift was identified in 
Chapter 5 using annual forecast errors and interpreted 
as being indicative of an informational inefficiency 
vis a vis the information contained in the report. 
Part 2(b) First Half Announcements 
Attention will now be focused on the market reaction 
to the release of first half earnings reports in order 
to complete the comparative analysis. 
Before proceeding, it must be emphasised that the 
behaviour of the abnormal residuals before and after 
the announcements are not likely to be biased by the 
sign of the previous or subsequent half's earnings. 
A 2x2 Chi-square test was performed on the following 
to test for the association between the sign of the 
forecast error of first and second half earnings: 
Second Half 
Forecast 
Error 
D 2 = 0,084 
2 
X2 = 6,64 
+ 
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First Half 
Forecast Error 
+ 
44 49 93 
53 64 117 
97 113 210 
Cannot reject H of independence 
0 
The API's for the first half announcements are plotted 
on Figure 6.2 (summary statistics Table 6.2) (pages 
170 and 172 respectively). 
The results appear, at first glance, to be very different 
from the second half announcements. Firstly, the API 
for the 'good news' portfolio is considerably higher in 
the week prior to the announcement; 1,05 versus 0,990 
for the equivalent second half portfolio. This implies 
that the market receives information through more timely 
media. Consequently, by the time the first half report 
is released, there is a smaller surprise element. It is 
cautioned against this interpretation since all of the increase 
in API occurs between weeks -25 and -18 and there-
after remains reasonably constant. Furthermore, this 
upward drift in weeks -25 and -18 is apparent for the 
'bad news' portfolio as well. This must be due to the 
upward drift in the API's of both the second half 
portfolios (as reported above) in the weeks after the 
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announcement. If the weeks -25 to -18 are omitted 
and the portfolios formed in week -17, the pattern 
elicits an alternative interpretation. From week -17 
through week -1 the API remains constant for the 
'good news' announcements,implying no anticipation 
of the information contained in the announcements. 
The increase in API during week O would be consistent 
with the 'good news' announcements possessing inform-
ation. Conversely, mapping the API for the 'bad 
news' portfolio from week -17 onwards,reveals a 
continual downward drift which persists to the end of 
week +25. There is no patent reaction to the half-
yearly report. 
The non-random behaviour of the residuals after the 
second half earnings announcements which were 
tentatively interpreted as indicating an informational 
inefficiency may be re-interpreted in the light of the 
market reaction to first half earnings. The annual 
announcement of a firm's earnings may be followed by 
a series of information releases about the firm. The 
rrost significant of these is tre release of the annual rep:)rt 
which generally is a time when various company officials 
make press statements regarding performance, etc. 
The upward drift in the weeks after the announcement 
may thus be due to new information rather than 
sluggish reaction to the report. This interpretation 
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TABLE 6,2 
Summary Statistics by Week Relative to half-yea1·1y earnings anr,ounce!l'ent dates 
Week relative A 11 A~nouncemr:nts r1rst half ' Second :1a l f 
I 
to~ yearly (pooled 1st and 2nd half) Announce'1lents 
~f" "°"'"""'"ts ,WIT Announcement AP!+ AP!- AP!+ 1\Pl- AP API+ AP!-
-25 1.006 .995 1.007 .998 1 1.003 .995 .999 
-24 1.011 1. 000 1.014 1. 004 1 .009 1.004 .995 .999 
-23 1. 017 1.000 1 .023 1 .003 1.013 1 .006 .997 1 .001 
-22 1. 014 1.000 1.023 1 .006 1.014 1. 003 .996 .999 
-21 1. 017 1. 001 1 .021 1.011 1. 016 1 .007 .995 1.001 
-20 1 .022 1 .003 1.030 1 .014 1 .022 1. 008 .993 1. 000 
-19 1. 022 1. 001 1 .028 1.017 1.022 1 .008 .987 .997 
-18 1. 025 1 .002 1 .040 1.023 1 .031 1 .004 .986 .994 
-17 1. 026 .998 1.040 1.021 1.030 1 .006 .980 .992 
-16 1 .030 .993 1. 049 1.027 1. 037 1 .004 .975 .988 
-15 1.032 .995 !.049 1.023 1.036 1. 005 .972 .987 
-14 1.027 .992 1.050 1. 022 1. 036 .993 . 967 .979 
-13 1.025 .989 1.051 1 .019 1. 034 .991 .961 .975 
-12 1.023 .989 1.050 1.021 1. 035 .990 .959 .973 
-11 1.027 .987 1 .055 1.017 1 .035 .995 .959 .9°5 
-10 1.023 .981 1.048 1 .011 1.029 .994 .953 .972 
- 9 1.018 .976 1 .042 1.007 1 .024 .992 .949 .968 
- 8 1.025 .973 1.048 1 .005 1 .026 .995 .946 .968 
- 7 1. 024 .973 1 .045 1 .001 1 .022 1. 001 .947 .972 
- 6 1.018 .963 1.042 .993 1.017 .991 . 937 .962 
- 5 1 .017 .963 1. 041 .995 1 .0171 .992 .936 .951 
- 4 1.015 .962 1 .044 .993 1.017 .988 .936 .960 
- 3 1.014 .955 1 .041 .986 1 .0121 .990 .931 .958 
- 2 1.013 .956 1.045 .987 1. 015 · .985 .933 .957 
- 1 1.018 .953 1.051 .980 1. 014 .990 .933 .959 
- 0 1.040 .963 1.066 .985 1.023 1 .020 .948 .981 
+ 1 1.043 .966 1 .066 .982 1 .022 1 .027 .954 .987 
+ 2 1.043 .968 1.064 .981 1 .021 , 1 .030 . 961 . n93 
+ 3 1.050 .965 1.069 .976 1 .021 I 1 . C37 .952 .99£ 
+ 4 1.048 .965 1.065 .971 1.016 1. 038 .964 .997 
+ 5 1.051 .961 1.066 .965 1.0141 1 .044 .959 .998 
+ 6 1.053 .968 1.069 .967 1 .01 s I 1 .G46 .971 1. 005 
+ 7 1.057 .967 1 .071 .960 1 .013 1. ·]50 .975 ~ . 009 
+ 8 1.059 .965 1.073 .959 1.C13 1. ~SQ .974 1 .009 
+ 9 1.055 .964 1 .071 .952 1.009 1. 047 .978 1. 009 
+10 1 .052 .962 1. 066 .947 1. 004 1 .051 .978 1. C11 
+11 1.046 .960 1 .056 .942 .997 i .048 .977 1.010 
+12 1.050 .958 1.059 .942 .998 1. 854 .974 1. 010 
+13 1.047 .960 1. 054 .945 .997 1 .C54 .975 1 .011 
+14 1.046 .959 1. 051 .945 .995 1. 054 .973 1. o 1 o I 
+15 1. 050 .952 1 .055 .937 .994 1 .053 .965 1. 006 
+16 1 .045 .952 1. 049 .934 .989 1. 050 . 966 1. 004 
+17 1. 041 .947 1.044 .930 . 9134 1 .0'17 .950 1. 080 I 
+18 1 .042 .944 1. 043 . 925 .982 1. a.is .951 1. 001 
+19 1.038 .945 1. 042 .924 .981 1 .040 .963 .998 
+20 1 .032 .944 1. 032 .925 .976 1. 03S .961 .996 
+21 1.030 .940 1 .028 .921 .972 1. 035 .955 .991 
+22 1.034 .943 1. 030 . 920 .973 1. 042 . ?62 .999 I 
+23 1. 036 .941 1.037 .925 .979 1 .043 .956 .9961 
+24 1. 039 .941 1. 037 . 925 .979 1. ~47 .953 .996 
l 
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is supported by the absence of a drift in the API 
after the first half 'good news' announcements. 
Considerably less new information is provided immediately 
after the first half report. 
The 'bad news' first half portfolio API pattern after 
the announcement is difficult to interpret in terms of 
efficiency. While there is a non-random downward 
drift, it is not obvious that the reports have an 
information content to which the market is able to 
react, albeit inefficiently. 
To conclude Part 2, it is submitted that the second 
half announcements do appear to provide more inform-
ation than the first half announcements. 
Part 3 Further Analysis 
To further investigate the difference between first 
half and second half and between 'good news' and 'bad 
news' announcements, the following portfolios were 
constructed. The announcements for each firm for 
each year were paired and these pairs were grouped 
according to the number of half-yearly reports with 
'good news' and 'bad news', viz. 
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2 'good news' 
1 'good news', 1 'bad news J 
( ++) 
( +-) 
(-+) 
(first half 'good news') 
(second half 'good news') 
2 'bad news' (--) 
The performance of each portfolio was then monitored 
separately (using the API metric) in the period 
surrounding the first and second half announcements. 
The 50 week API plots are presented in Figure 6.4 
(first half) and Figure 6.5 (second half) (pages 175 
and 177 respectively) for these four portfolios. 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 6.3 (page 
17 8) . 
Attention will initially be focused on the performance 
of the portfolios in the six months surrounding the 
first half announcements. The pattern in Figure 6.4 
is quite clear and the performance of these portfolios 
is highly associated with the number of 'good' and 
'bad news' reports received. As indicated above, the 
initial upward drift in all four API's in the period 
week -50 through -40 may be distortive and is thus 
ignored. Thereafter, the (++) portfolio provides 
little abnormal return until the week of the announce-
ment. After an abnormal return of 2,4% in week O, the 
API reverts to a random pattern. The two portfolios 
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with conflicting first half and second half signals 
(+- & -+) behave similarly except in the week of 
announcement when the first half positive portfolio 
generated a larger positive return. 
The (--) portfolio displays a dramatic downward drift 
in API throughout the period (API+ 24 = 0,884). 
The performance of the portfolios for the 50 week 
period surrounding the second half announcement provides 
a valuable insight into the market's reaction to 
accounting earnings. 
The most striking feature of Figure 6.5 is that there 
appears to be an association between (1) the sign of 
the abnormal return and the sign of the forecast 
errors, and (2) the magnitude of the week O return and 
the sign of the forecast errors. The classification 
of portfolios according to the sign of their half-
yearly forecast errors is a useful explanation of 
this abnormal performance. 
It is interesting to note that the non-random drift in 
API detected after second half earnings announcements 
is not evident in the (++) portfolio. It appears 
that, where the second half report is contrary to the 
first half report, or negative, the information content 
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Summary Statistics by week relative to half-yearly earr.ings announcement dates 
Week relative First half Announcements Second half Announcen,ents I 
to~ yearly 
API++ API+- API-+ -- AP!++ API-+ AP!+- --Announce;nent AP! AP! 
-25 1.011 1.007 1 .006 .990 1.012 .997 .993 .993 
-24 1. 022 1 .012 1 .020 .995 1. 011 .999 1.002 .983 
-23 1.033 1.020 1 .016 .994 1 .012 1. 003 .999 . 995 I 
-22 1 .028 1.020 1 .015 .998 1 .0 i 1 .998 .994 . 904 I 
-21 1.025 1.022 1. 022 1 .000 1. 023 .999 .996 .990 
-20 1.031 1.034 1 .026 1.004 1 .025 .997 1.000 .986 
-19 1. 036 1. 030 1 .028 1 .007 1 .035 .989 .998 .976 
-18 1.042 1.044 1.0?9 1 .015 1. 027 .988 .995 .976 
-17 1.045 1.041 1.030 1.011 1.026 .993 .992 .966 
-16 1. 050 1. 055 1.045 1.009 1. G23 .992 .931 .964 
-15 1.052 1 .059 1 .039 1.006 1.021 .998 .980 .964 
-14 1.048 1. 061 1 .037 1 .006 1.009 .939 .975 .959 
-13 1.044 1.060 1.028 1 .009 1.008 .984 .967 .957 
-12 1.046 1.055 1 .034 1.007 1 .007 .981 .967 .956 
-11 1.055 1 .056 1.035 .999 1 .017 .980 .972 .950 
-10 1.056 1.041 1.026 .995 1. 024 .973 .969 .944 
- 9 1 .052 1.033 1. 021 .991 1.017 .975 .960 .939 
- 8 1.062 1.039 1. 017 .990 1 .C20 .9SO .96C .935 
- 7 1.058 1.029 1 .014 .986 1 .023 .990 .S60 .939 
- 6 1. 056 1. 024 1. 006 .978 1. 023 . 971 .S47 .930 
- 5 1.056 1 .020 1.013 .977 1.027 .970 .952 .921 
- 4 1.058 1.019 1.016 .969 1.010 .978 .945 .927 
- 3 1.053 1.014 1.015 .956 1.011 .981 .:40 
.9221 
- 2 1.053 1.017 1.015 .957 1. 011 .975 .936 .925 
- 1 1. 064 1.017 1.000 .959 1.008 .987 .938 .924 
- 0 1.088 1.021 1 .006 .951 1. 053 1 .008 .957 .935 
+ 1 1. 084 1.021 1 .018 .952 1 .054 1. 019 .961 
.944 I 
+ 2 1.078 1.026 1.026 .945 1.056 1.019 .937 .947 
+ 3 1.084 1.032 1 .020 .941 1.068 1.022 .957 .954 
+ 4 1.086 1 .022 1.010 .939 1 .G66 1.C26 .968 .954 I 
+ 5 1.087 1.021 1 .005 .935 1.072 1 .C34 .966 . 949 I 
+ 6 1. 093 1.018 1. 008 .937 1 .071 1 .039 .977 .959 
+ 7 1.104 1.015 1 .002 .928 1. 070 1 .049 .984 
.9631 
+ 8 1.108 1.021 .995 .930 1. 070 1 .046 .990 .958 
+ 9 1. 107 1.015 .994 .919 1 .068 1. 041 .989 
.9641 
+10 1.096 1.008 .988 .915 1.072 1 .042 .991 .964 
+11 1.088 .999 .988 .908 1.072 1.038 .986 .967 
+12 1. 089 1 .003 .992 .904 1 .080 1.040 .983 
.9651 
+13 1.088 .995 1 .003 .900 1. 077 1 .041 .983 .967 
+14 1. 085 .993 1. 006 .896 1. 075 1 .043 .979 .970 
+15 1. 093 1.001 .996 .890 1.077 1 .040 .969 .967 
+16 1 .087 .993 .997 .884 1.077 1 .036 .964 .973 
+17 1.092 .980 .989 .883 1 .070 1. 025 .956 .969 
+18 1 .093 .981 .987 .874 1 .075 1. 034 .953 .971 
+19 1.094 .977 .975 .882 1. 072 1. 023 .957 .975 
+20 1 .085 .966 .976 .882 1.068 1. 025 .952 .974 
+21 1 .091 .960 . 977 .875 1. 066 1. 020 . 948 .969 
+22 1. 085 .965 .979 .873 1 .Oo..\ 1. 021 .953 .976 
+23 1. 091 .966 ."77 .876 1 .087 1 .019 . 945 · .972 
+24 1. 101 .959 .978 .884 1. 091 1 .025 .938 .969 
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appears to be sluggishly impounded. This is extremely 
difficult to interpret, but is consistent with a 
certain market inefficiency. Two caveats are necessitated. 
Firstly, as indicated by Ball (1978), the abnormal 
returns may be due not to an inefficiency in the market, 
but rather to a misspecification of the market model, 
and, secondly, as indicated above, other information 
releases may occur soon after the preliminary 
announcement. 
The salient features of the aforegoing analysis are 
summarised in the following table: 
Portfolio First Half Second Half Performance API RES API RES Rank 
0 0 0 0 
1. ++ 1,088 2,45% 1,053 4,6% 1 
2. +- 1,021 0 I 4% 0,957 2,0% 2 
3 . -+ 1,006 0 I 6% 1,008 2,0% 3 
4. -- 0,961 0,2% 0,935 1,1% 4 
In order to evaluate whether the provision of interim 
reports is of any value to investors, an investment 
strategy based on a foreknowledge of half-yearly 
forecast errors is compared with a strategy based on 
a foreknowledge of annual forecast errors. 
If the half-yearly reports are of any value, the 
strategy based on half-yearly forecast errors should 
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yield a higher annual abnormal return than the strategy 
based solely on the annual forecast errors. 
Strategy based on half-yearly forecast errors 
Portfolio Strategy 
1. (++) Buy and hold for full year 
2. ( +-) Buy and hold for first six 
3. (-+) 
4 • (--) 
months. Sell short for 
second six months 
Sell short for first six 
months. Buy and hold for 
second six months 
Sell short for full year 
Average annual abnormal 
return 
Strategy based on annual forecast errors 
Portfolio 
1. 
2. 
( +) 
(-) 
Strategy 
Buy and hold for full year 
Sell short for full year 
Average abnormal return 
Abnormal Return 
13,0% 
6,8% 
0,2% 
10,5% 
7 ,625% 
Abnormal Return 
2,9% 
8,2% 
5,5% 
This result indicates that the half-yearly reports 
provide approximately 33% more information than would 
otherwise be available. This result is consistent 
with that reported by Brown and Kennelly (1972) using 
a similar methodology. Before concludin~ it must be 
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noted that all transaction costs have been ignored 
which, if accounted for, would reduce the performance 
of the strategy based on half-yearly data. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides evidence of the market reaction 
to half-yearly earnings reports. It seems that second 
half reports are more informative than the first half 
reports. The provision of half-yearly reports does, 
however, provide significant incremental information. 
The asymmetrical behaviour of the API plots to 'good 
news' and 'bad news' reported in Chapter 5 persists 
in the reaction to half-yearly reports. The half-
yearly forecast errors appear to be more highly 
associated with abnormal price behaviour which 
indicates that the half-yearly model of income 
expectations may be more descriptive. 
A certain market inefficiency may exist in that there 
is significant non-random price behaviour for a period 
after the release of the preliminary report in certain 
cases. 
It is re-emphasised that the results may be a function 
of model misspecification as described in Chapter 5. 
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The research design issues apply equally to this study. 
Furthenrore, it must l:e stressed that the simultaneous disclosure 
of dividends may be responsible for the results 
presented. Almost all the earnings announcements 
were accompanied by a dividend announcement. In 
mitigation,it must be added that dividend expectations 
will to an extent vary randomly across the portfolios 
examined in this study. 
Further research would require that the potentially 
confounding effect of simultaneous dividend announce-
ments be controlled. The confounding effect of 
simultaneous dividend announcements is dealt with in 
an empirical study, the results of which are presented 
in Chapter 7. 
Taken in conjunction with the results reported in 
Chapter 5, it seems clear that the role of published 
accounting information is significant in the pricing 
of South African shares. It is,therefore, imperative 
that accounting policy makers ensure that these 
reports are presented timeously. Moreover, a strong 
case exists to introduce more frequent reporting in 
South Africa, which would be achieved by the provision 
of quarterly reports, provided, of course, that such 
provision be cost effective. The challenge to those 
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opposed to quarterly earnings announcements is to prove 
the extent of cost; this study has shown the benefits 
of increased interim reporting. 
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FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 6 
(1) Certain aspects of this study are extended and 
presented in Foster (1978: p.341). 
(2) It should be noted that two earnings regressions 
were carried out for each firm: (1) a regression 
of first half earnings, and, (2) a regression of 
second-half earnings. This avoids any confounding 
effect of seasonality of the data. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDENDS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine 
whether any potential information content of dividend 
announcements confoundsthe interpretation of the 
results reported in Chapters 5 and 6. More than 90% 
of the earnings announcements examined in those 
chapters were accompanied by a dividend announcement. 
Consequently, the price reaction detected during the 
week of the announcements and in the period 
immediately thereafter, may be attributable, to some 
extent, to the information content of dividends. 
The evidence, presented here suggests that there is 
little information content in dividend announcements 
and thus the previously drawn conclusions on the 
information content of earnings remain. This 
result is consistent with the evidence available on 
the NYSE. 
The chapter proceeds with a brief background on 
(1) the need to consider the dividend question in 
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this context, (2) the 'Dividend Information Hypothesis' 
and (3) the NYSE evidence. 
The information hypothesis is then tested using three 
different research designs. The chapter concludes 
with a brief description of two pilot research studies 
which were a by-product of the current study and seem 
fruitful avenues for further work. 
7.2 BACKGROUND 
7.2.l The Need to Test the Infornation Content of 
Dividends 
Share price reaction contemporaneous with earnings 
announcements cannot be entirely attributed to the 
earnings per se when dividends are announced 
simultaneously (and vice versa). In such situations 
an attempt must be made to distinguish the information 
content of the dual events. 
In attempting such a distinction in an earnings study, 
one naturally simultaneously tests the information 
content of dividends. 
The major studies reviewed in Chapter 4 have, by and 
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large, ignored this dimension of the problem. Although 
the 'two classics', viz. Ball and Brown (1968) and 
Beaver (1968) were able to cope with the potential 
confounding effect of dividend information without 
measuring the information content of dividends directly. 
Beaver (1968) dealt with the problem by construction. 
He merely excluded all earnings announcements 
accompanied by dividend announcements. The abnormal 
price residual behaviour he reports is,therefore, a 
pure earnings reaction. 
In the Ball and Brown (1968) study the issue is not 
addressed directly. Their result which indicates no 
' 
abnormal residual from the month of the announcement 
onwards, is, however, fairly insensitive to the potential 
confounding effect of dividend announcements. It is 
extremely unlikely that the information content of 
dividends would exactly offset the information content 
of earnings which would be implied in the context of 
their results. Furthermore, although it is likely that 
earnings and dividends may be positively correlated, 
there is no reason to suppose that unexpected earnings 
and unexpected dividends are similarly associated. 
Portfolios formed on the basis of unexpected earnings 
are likely to consist of a random collection of dividend 
announcements (i.e. both 'good news' and 'bad news') and 
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therefore any potential confounding effects would be 
set off as the residuals of the portfolio constituents 
were aggregated in the way reported by Ball and Brown 
(1968). The dividend effect, then, is likely to have been 
'washed out' . It is worth noting that Ball and Brown 
(1968) did not indicate the extent to which simultaneous 
dividend announcements were included in their study. 
It is not possible in the current study to ignore the 
potential confounding effect of dividends, for the 
following two reasons. Firstly as indicated, virtually 
all earnings announcements are accompanied by dividend 
announcements so that the dividend exclusion option is 
not feasible for the South African earnings researcher. 
Secondly, a significant positive abnormal return was 
detected on the date of earnings/dividend announce-
ments for both the 'good news' and 'bad news' 
portfolios. Recall that the magnitude of the abnormal 
residual for the former was the larger. Clearly,this 
reaction may be attributable to either of the two 
events - earnings or dividends. Without attempting 
to control for either one, no statement can be 
conclusively made on the information content of the 
other. It may be possible to assume a maintained 
hypothesis of no information content of the variable 
not tested, however the ambiguity would remain. 
Being intolerant of ambiguity, an attempt is made in 
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the following section to control the earnings variable 
in order to isolate any confounding effect of dividend 
information. 
7.2.2 The Dividend Information Hypothesis 
Lintner (1956) first suggested that current dividends 
were dependent on future as well as current and past 
earnings. This allows for the possibility of current 
dividends reflecting information on the expected future 
well being of the firm which is not reflected in 
current earnings. In this sense, dividends have a 
potential informational content,but would only have 
a marginal informational content if this information 
were not available to the market from other sources 
(assuming market efficiency). 
It has been strongly argued by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958 & 1959) that the value of the firm is independent 
of the dividend policy adopted. Thus, they argue that 
any observed association between dividends and value 
is likely to be a result of a 'dividend surrogate' 
effect whereby dividends are highly correlated with 
the real determinants of value rather than being due 
to the importance of dividend policy ;er se. 
Clearly, the only concern in earnings information 
content studies is the extent to which the individual 
190 
dividend announcements transmit information rather 
than the dividend payment per se. Modigliani and 
Miller (1959) suggest that to the extent that dividends 
reflect management's expectations of long-run earnings 
not reflected in current earnings (and other inform-
ation sources) the current dividend payment may 
provide informative signals to the market. 
In effect, the Dividend Information Hypothesis implies 
that dividends are determined to some extent by 
hitherto inside information. Dividend information 
is, therefore, defined as being that information 
provided by the dividend announcement incremental to 
that information provided by earnings, i.e. information 
conveyed by both dividends and earnings is considered 
earnings information. In this study, dividends are 
deemed only to confound the earnings information study 
to the extent that the dividend announcement provides 
the market with new and unique information. 
7.2.3 The NYSE Evidence 
The dividend information hypothesis was first tested 
directly by Petit (1972) in a study simultaneously 
testing the informational content of dividends and 
the efficiency of the market's response to such. Using 
the familiar API approach, Petit reports the price 
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residual behaviour for the six months surrounding 
some 1 000 dividend announcements. 
Petit attempted to control the earnings variable by 
partitioning the sample into two groups based on the 
sign of an earnings forecast error derived from an 
expectations model of quarterly earnings. Both these 
groups were categorised into seven sub-groups accord-
ing to the magnitude of the percentage change in 
period to period dividend payments. 
In principle, he argued that the earnings partition 
effectively controls any confounding earnings inform-
ation. Petit reports a significant information 
content in dividends evidenced by the price residual 
behaviour contemporaneously associated with the 
announcements thereof. Furthermore, he argues that 
as the dividend sub-groups exhibit similar 
characteristics regardless of the earnings group, the 
potential confounding effects of earnings were 
adequately controlled and that the information content 
of dividends tends to dominate that of earnings. He 
maintains that this is not inconsistent with the Ball 
and Brown (1968) result since it does not infer zero 
earnings information, but rather the greater information 
content of dividends. Petit (1972) also reports the 
daily abnormal performance of the various dividend 
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groups (in total) for the 20 days surrounding the 
dividend announcements. 
He concludes that the market impounds the information 
content of dividends efficiently. 
Petit's approach has been severely criticised (see 
Watts (1976) and is generally considered deficient 
in two major respects:(l) 
Firstly, his earnings expectation model is considered to 
be dramatically misspecified and consequently, the 
partitioning does not adequately control the earnings 
variable. 
Secondly, Petit assumes that it is the change in 
dividend levels that is informative. However, it is 
not obvious that the market will be surprised by a 
change in dividend level on the announcement date. 
No attempt was made to establish the market's expect-
ations of dividend levels and consequentlY, it is not 
possible within the Petit research design to establish 
the extent to which the dividend announcement revised 
the market's expectation of long-run earnings. It 
(1) Footnotes appear at the end of the chapter, page 228. 
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is unlikely that the implicitly assumed naive model 
(i.e. the market expects dividend levels to remain 
constant) is sufficiently powerful in a test of this 
nature. 
It should be noted that the majority of dividend 
announcements in the Petit study were not accompanied 
by an earnings announcement, but were generally 
preceded by one. As a result, the alignment of API's 
on the dividend announcement date will tend, on 
average, to dissipate the earnings effect over the 
pre-dividend announcement period. 
The most conclusive evidence on the information content 
of dividends was reported in a study by Watts (1973). 
There were two major sections to the Watts paper. 
Firstly, he investigated the necessary (although not 
sufficient) condition for the dividend information 
hypothesis to hold, viz. the ability of dividends to 
predict future earnings. Secondly, the association 
between unexpected changes in dividends and abnormal 
share price behaviour was investigated. 
For both aspects of the study, the Fama and Babiak 
(1968) model of dividend changes was used which attempts 
to explain these changes in terms of earnings and 
past dividends. (2 ) This model is of the following 
form(J) 
where 
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= 
is the difference in the dividend of 
firm i in years t and t-1 
is the dividend of firm i in year t 
is the earnings of firm i in year t 
an error term representing the unexpected 
element in dividends 
The error term Zit would thus represent that element 
in dividend changes not associated with or explained 
by the previous year's earnings and dividends and 
the current year's earnings. It is this property 
of Zit which makes it a feasible measure of the 
information content of dividends. 
This residual series was used in two different ways 
in the Watts study: 
(1) In the prediction of future earnings changes. 
Using Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS), 
changes in the following year's earnings (Eit+l) 
were regressed on the residuals derived from 
the FB model: 
(FB) 
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= Y. + g,z.t + w.t 1 l l l l + 
The average value of the coefficient 9 was 
positive, suggesting a positive association 
between Zit and Eit+l' but was not positive 
for all firms. Watts concluded that the 
unexpected element in dividends was generally 
not a good predictor of future earnings 
changes and as such had little informational 
content. 
(2) In a test of the association between the sign 
of Zit (the dividend forecast error) and 
unsystematic share returns around the time of 
the announcement. It is this second approach 
which is considered to be more ~elevant and thus 
this method is applied in the current study. 
In a test analogous with the Ball and Brown (1968) 
earnings study, Watts employed the sign of the error 
to classify firms into two portfolios 11 months in 
advance of the end of the last month in the fiscal year 
after which the dividends were announced. 
Although firm/years were not aligned on announcement 
dates, it is clear from the results that there was no 
abnormal price movement throughout the 24 month period 
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surrounding fiscal year ends. The conclusion, there-
fore, is that dividend changes have little informational 
content and the null hypothesis of no information is 
accepted. Clearly, if dividends had information 
content, a certain abnormal reaction in share price 
residuals would be expected in the period immediately 
after the announcement. Alternatively, if the 
pattern of API's had been similar to the Ball and 
Brown results (see Chapter 4), it could have been 
concluded that dividends provided information, not 
provided by earnings, consistent with the information 
set used by the market. Yet, in such a setting, it 
could have been implied that the dividend announcements 
were not a timely source of information, subject to 
the misspecification issue addressed in Chapter 4 in 
the context of the Ball and Brown results. 
There was some criticism of the Watts paper in the 
literature, but Watts adequately defended himself. 
It is thus felt that the issues raised need be 
pursued no further (see Watt~ 1976 and 1976(a)). 
The conclusion in the context of the NYSE is that 
dividends per se have little or no information content 
over and above the information content of earnings. 
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7.3 AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE INFORMATION 
CONTENT OF DIVIDENDS 
7.3.1 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses to be tested are in general terms 
H 
0 
H 
a 
where 
= E(EitJoit > 0) no information 
content 
information 
content 
= a measure of abnormal performance in 
share returns 
= a dividend forecast error conditional 
on earnings 
The evidence presented in Chapter 5 suggests that the 
abnormal return on a share is positive in the week of 
the announcement of earnings and dividends regardless 
of the sign of the earnings forecast error. Thus, 
in a test holding earnings constant, in an attempt to 
evaluate the dividend effect, one would expect to 
observe a positive abnormal return in the same week. 
However, what would be of interest is any discernible 
differential reaction to different dividend signals. 
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Recall from Chapter 5 the hypothesis accepted was 
However,due to the simultaneous announcement of 
dividends the hypothesis actually accepted in expanded 
form was 
Thus, the hypothesis was that the earnings have inform-
ation content; yet any incremental information 
content in the simultaneous dividend announcement 
(oit) may be responsible to some extent for the 
inequality in (B). It is possible to assume away the 
(A) 
(B) 
effect of oit by claiming a lack of association between 
oit and eit and thus the effect of oit would be 'washed 
out' of portfolios formed conditional on the sign of 
eit only. However, it is considered more rigorous 
to explicitly control this factor an~ moreove~ the 
informational content of oit is in itself of interest. 
Thus the hypotheses H and 0 H above a may be reformulated 
as : 
H' E (E it I e it, 0it < O) = E (E it: e it' 0it > 0) 0 
H' E(Eitjeit' 0it < 0) -:/ E (E it'. e it' 0it > 0) a 
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Clearly, if H' is accepted,Hypotheses A and Bare 
0 
equivalent as the informational content of oit would 
be zero and thus have no confounding effect in B. 
An acceptance of Ha' would imply that oit did have a 
certain informational content. Howeve4 in such a 
setting it would be difficult to establish the extent 
f th t 1 f d . f and ~it· (4 ) o emu ua con oun ing o eit u 
Three methods will be used to test these hypotheses with 
various definitions of eit and oit· The analysis will 
be confined to the week of the announcements and the 
subsequent nine weeks. It must be re-emphasised that 
in all cases an attempt is made to define oit as the 
incremental information content of dividends. 
(1) The API Method Using the Fama & Babiak Model 
In this test abnormal performance will be measured 
using the API metric and oit will be defined in terms 
of the error term of the Fama and Babiak dividend 
model. 
(2) The ARA Method Using the Fama 3 Babiak Model 
The absolute residual analysis described in Chapter 4 
will measure information content and oit will be 
defined as in (1) above. 
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(3) The API Method Using the Earnings Forecast Error Model 
As in (1) above, abnormal performance will be measured 
using the API metric. oit will be defined as the 
error term from a regression of change in dividend 
on the earnings forecast error used in Chapter 5. 
7.3.2 Empirical Procedures 
The same data as those employed in Chapter 5 were used, 
but approximately 40 earnings announcements not 
accompanied by dividend announcements were excluded. 
Weekly price residuals were computed over the 404 week 
period, 2 February 1973 through 14 November 1980, 
as follows : 
where 
a., S. = 
l l 
= 
t = 1 
i = 1 
404 
41 
estimates of the intercept and slope 
obtained from the linear regression 
specific to share i 
an estimate of the unsystematic return 
on share i in week t 
( 1) 
= 
= 
= 
= 
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loge ( Pit + Dit) 
pit-1 
cash dividends on share i in week t 
share i closing price at the end of 
week t* 
the return on the market in week t. 
The ROM 100 industrial index was used 
as a surrogate. The return is 
calculated analogously to the return 
on share 1. 
(*Prices are adjusted for all capitalisation issues and 
share splits in week t.) 
The usual OLS conditions must prevail in order to 
achieve consistent estimates of a. and 6 .. 1 1 These 
should not constrain the application in this study and 
are dealt with adequately in Chapter 4. 
In the cases of methods (1) and (3) above, the API 
metric was employed to pool the residuals through time 
and across firms according to the following form 
where 
CAR 
w 
= 
1 
N 
N w 
i:: i:: E nk 
n=l k=O 
N = the ntunber of announcements included 
(1) 
Note: 
w = 
.. 
E nk = 
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weeks relative to the announcement 
(week 0) 
price residual for announcement n in 
week k. 
Announcements are aligned on week O. 
Attention is now focused on the week of the 
announcement and subsequent nine.weeks since 
any confounding effect will occur during this 
time interval. 
An alternative API metric to the multiplicative 
variation,previously described, was used. (S) 
In the case of method (2), the residuals were pooled 
through time and across firms after the following 
transformation. 
.. 
(1) Square residuals (Eit) : 
.. 
E 2 
it 
(2) Estimate the variance of residuals over the 
full 404 week period: 
(3) Divide (1) by (2) 
• 
= 
A 
E 
it 
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(4) Average (3) across announcements aligning 
announcements relative to week O: 
= 
1 N 
N I: uit 
i=l 
ut thus represents an absolute residual index with an 
expected value of 1. A value greater than 1 is 
indicative of an abnormal return behaviour consistent 
with an information reaction. (See Chapter 4, 
Section 4. 3. 2. 2 for a rrore extensive explanation of this index.) 
Method 1 
All earnings announcements accompanied by a dividend 
announcement were partitioned into two groups depend-
ing on the sign of the annual dividend forecast error 
derived from the following regression for each firm. 
= 
i = 1 41 
t = 1 9 
(The symbols have been defined in Section 7.2.3.) 
( 2) 
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The incremental informational content of a dividend 
announcement is assumed to be the difference between 
the actual change in dividends and the change 
conditional upon the expectation implied in (2) 
where 
= 
i = 1 41 
t = 1 9 
= 
indicates an estimate 
= the annual dividend forecast error for 
firm i in year t. 
As in the Watts' stud~ the use of an annual model is 
justified in terms of the fact that most dividend 
changes occur with the announcement of final 
dividends. (6 ) 
Where the actual change in dividends exceeds the 
estimated change, the forecast error is positive which 
would indicate a 'good news' component in the potential 
informational content of the announcement. The 
opposite applies in the case of a negative forecast 
error. 
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Summary statistics of this model are presented in 
Table 7.1. The parameters derived seem very similar 
to those of Watts (shown in parentheses). The mean 
R2 for the current model is, however, considerably 
higher than that reported by Watts which is consistent 
with the model being a better explainant of dividend 
changes than the Watts version. Yet, too much 
significance should not be attached to this difference 
as the Watts' model was based on a higher number of 
observations and, therefore, a lower R2 would be 
expected. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the 
current model is at least as useful as the Watts' 
model. 
The two groups of announcements were treated as 
hypothetical portfolios formed at the beginning of the 
week of the announcement and held for 10 weeks. The 
residuals of each portfolio were pooled in accordance 
with (1). The resultant ten CAR's for each portfolio 
are plotted on Figure 7.1 (page 207) and tabulated in 
Table 7.2 (page 208). 
The result is fairly easy to interpret. It seems 
quite clear that there is no real difference between 
the residual behaviour of the two portfolios in the 
time interval studied. The negative forecast error 
portfolio (red) does exhibit a fractionally higher 
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TABLE 7.1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE PARAMETERS OF THE REGRESSION MODEL* 
= 
Parameter 
p 
Mean 
p 
.887 
* (.584) 
-0.381 
(-0.321) 
.272 
(.227) 
-.088 
( .017) 
* Parameters of Watts'model in parentheses 
Standard Deviation 
0 
. 1 2 
(.187) 
.60 
(.334) 
. 174 
(.206) 
.206 
(.247) 
Week 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
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TABLE 7.2 
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR) 
RELATIVE TO DIVIDEND/EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT 
DATE (WEEK O) 
*CAR+ 
w 
102.0 
101 . 8 
103. 1 
103.7 
103.8 
103.7 
104.4 
104.8 
104.7 
105.3 
* CAR - firms and years in which Zit positive (+) or 
negative (-). (See Figure 7.1). 
CAR 
w 
102.4 
103.8 
104.0 
104.1 
104.4 
104.6 
105.0 
105. 1 
105.5 
105.9 
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jump in week 0; thereafter very little difference is 
manifest, bearing in mind the cumulative nature of the 
plot and the fact that the difference between the two 
in week +9 is similar to the difference in week o. 
The null hypothesis of no incremental information 
content of dividend announcements is thus accepted. 
The implication, therefore, is that the interpretation 
of Chapters 5 and 6 are not confounded by a dividend 
effect. Clearly this interpretation is 
dependent on the validity of the models used. 
Method 2 
An average absolute abnormal residual index (ut) as 
described above was computed for each portfolio formed 
in Method l for the 17 week period surrounding the 
dividend announcement (week -8 through week +8). 
That is, the absolute abnormal residual indices for 
the individual announcements were averaged across 
announcements aligned on the week of the dividend 
announcement. The values for the 17 ut's are 
presented in Table 7.3 (page 211) and plotted in 
Figure 7.2 (page 210). 
Two features of Figure 7.2 are important. Firstly, 
the week of the most abnormal behaviour is week O and 
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TABLE 7.3 
ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL RETURNS (AAR) 
RELATIVE TO DIVIDEND/EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT 
DATE (WEEK 0) 
zit 
Week *AAR+ 
w 
-8 .94 
-7 .83 
-6 .79 
-5 1 . 2 5 
-4 1 . 0 5 
-3 1 . 1 4 
-2 1 . 22 
-1 1 . 1 7 
0 1 . 77 
+1 1 . 36 
+2 1 . 4 1 
+3 1 . 4 7 
+4 1 . 1 4 
+5 1 . 51 
+6 1 . 2 7 
+7 .77 
+8 1 . 3 3 
*AAR - firms and years in which Zit positive (+) or 
negative (-). (See Figure 7 .2). 
AAR 
w 
.92 
.70 
.95 
. 71 
.84 
1 . 36 
1 . 0 9 
1 • 0 1 
1 . 76 
1 . 31 
1 . 0 0 
.89 
.88 
1 . 30 
. 71 
1 . 1 7 
1 . 2 3 
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secondly, the magnitude of this abnormal behaviour 
index is virtually identical in each group. This 
lends further credence to the conclusion drawn above. 
It should be noted that this method is not strictly applicable 
since absolute residuals are examined and reactions of different 
direction are therefore not observable. 
is consistent with the null hypothesis. 
Nevertheless the result 
It should be noted that the inference, again, depends 
on the validity of the models employed in Method 1. 
However, the ARA approach avoids the setting off of 
residuals of opposite sign permitted in that method. 
This test, therefore,improves our insight into the 
behaviour of the residuals. 
Method 3 
The final test of the dividend information hypothesis 
aggregates the residuals in an identical manner to 
Method 1 (i.e. CAR). However, oit are re-defined in 
terms of model (i) below. The sign of Wit in (i) was 
used as the criterion by which the total sample of 
dividend/earnings announcements were partitioned. 
i:iD. it = Cl . l i = 1 
t = 1 
41 
9 
(i) 
where 
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is the annual earning forecast error for 
firm i in year t 
is an error term. 
The eit were derived using the OLS regression 
technique of the following form:(?) 
where 
t.I 
m 
= 
= 
= 
i = l . . 41 
year to year% change in reported EPS 
year to year% change in the average 
reported EPS of all industrial firms 
a., b. = 
l. l. 
estimates of the intercept and slope 
obtained from the linear regression 
specific to share i 
= an estimate of the unsystematic 
accounting return! 
The usual OLS conditions apply (see Chapter 4). 
(4) 
Due to the significant level of residual autocorrelation 
where absolute income levels were used in the regression, 
first order changes were employed which significantly 
reduced this phenomenon. 
While no previous work has been done i~ South Africa on 
the behaviour of earnings, studies i~ ~he U.S. (see 
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Ball and Brown (1967)) indicate that about half of 
the variability in the level of earnings of the firms 
is attributable to economy wide effects. The results 
of the 41 regressions on earnings carried out in this 
study indicated a similar proportion. 
The possibility of a bias in estimates being introduced 
by a correlation between eit and 6Imt does exist, but 
it is unlikely to impinge on the inferences here 
drawn. ( 8 ) 
The amount of new information conveyed in a firm's 
income in a particular year is assumed to be the 
difference between the actual change in income and 
the change conditional upon the expectation implied 
in ( 4) 
= 
eit = 
where 
a. + b. 6I t 
i i m 
6Iit - 6Iit 
i = 1 
t = 1 
41 
9 
6Iit = the expected change in income for firm 
in year t 
6Iit = the actual change in income for firm i 
in year t 
LH = the actual change in market earnings in mt year t 
i 
= 
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the earnings forecast error for firm i 
in year t. 
The forecast errors (eit) were computed over a similar 
A 
time period to that of the price residuals (E. ) . althouqh it . -
yearly data were used for the former. As with the 
price residuals, it was considered unnecessarily 
inefficient to compute the forecast errors in two 
stages and thus the errors were estimated directly 
using the data during the full period. Moreover, 
due to limited data and in order to include at least 
nineobservations in each regression, the inclusion of 
all data was necessary. This should not constrain 
the research in any way since the OLS requires an 
assumption of the constancy of a. and b. and the l l 
forecast error estimates on both the full inclusion 
and post-data inclusion methods should consequently 
be similar. 
Unlike the Fama and Babiak model employed in Method 1, 
the model proposed in this section does not purport 
to explain changes in dividend. It is not a model 
to forecast dividend changes nor is it a description 
of the stochastic process generating dividend changes. 
It is merely proposed as a research tool designed to 
hold constant the information content of earnings in 
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order to isolate the incremental information content 
of dividends. 
The incremental information content of dividends over 
earnings will clearly be unrelated to the information 
content of earnings. Model (i) presents a method of 
removing from the changes in dividends series that 
element associated with the earnings forecast error 
wit'therefore, contains the effect of oit· 
It is accepted that Wit may be a fairly 'noisy' 
series in that it will also reflect expected elements 
of changes in dividends including those associated 
with expected earnings. Obviousl~ expected changes 
in dividends are not relevant as they do not have the 
potential to change investor expectations. It is 
hoped, therefore, that Wit is a suitable surrogate for 
oit· This model is constructed in such a way that 
Wit is unassociated with eit which is a necessary 
condition for it to be a surrogate for oit· 
The two CAR plots based on the sign of Wit and derived 
similarly to the CAR plots of Method 1 are presented 
in Figure 7.3 (page 217). (The results are 
presented numerically in Table 7.4, page 218). 
The conclusions to be drawn are identical to those of 
the previous methods and the null hypothesis of no 
Week 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
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TABLE 7.4 
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR) 
RELATIVE TO DIVIDEND/EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT 
DATE (WEEK 0) 
*CAR+ 
w 
1 • 0 25 
1 • 0 30 
1. 038 
1 . 0 35 
1 . 0 35 
1 • 0 36 
1 • 04 6 
1 • 0 48 
1 • 0 5 2 
1 • 0 5 7 
*CAR - firms and years in which Wit positive (+) or 
negative (-). (See Figure 7. 3). 
CAR 
w 
1 • 024 
1 . 02 9 
1 • 0 36 
1 • 0 42 
1 • 046 
1 . 04 5 
1 • 0 51 
1 • 0 54 
1 • 0 55 
1 • 0 5 7 
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dividend information and therefore no confounding 
dividend effect is accepted. 
Clearly, there is only a trivial difference in the 
+ 
week o residual for the wit and Wit plots. Furtherrrore, 
the ten week cumulative returns for both portfolios 
are identical. 
It must be emphasised that the conclusion accepting 
the null hypothesis is jointly conditional on the 
earnings expectations model and the model deriving 
The conclusion across all three methods was similar 
and it can therefore be concluded (subject to the 
usual validity issues) that 
(1) The incremental information content of dividends 
is low; and 
(2) The results of studies in Chapters 5 and 6 can 
be accepted as not being confounded by a 
dividend factor. 
7.4 FURTHER RESEARCH 
There were two by-products of the research reported in 
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this chapter which are considered to be worth high-
lighting. It is emphasised that while neither 
purports to conclusively test the relevant hypothesis, 
the preliminary results do seem to indicate fruitful 
avenues for further research. 
7.4.1 The Association Between the Magnitude of 
Earnings Forecast Errors and the Magnitude 
of Unsystematic Returns 
In Chapter 5 a study was discussed that tested the 
association between the sign of the earnings forecast 
errors and the sign of unsystematic share returns. 
It was suggested in that chapter that an extension of 
this research to the association between the magnitude 
of the earnings forecast error and that of the 
unsystematic share return would be appropriate. Indeed, 
this association has been investigated in the context 
of the NYSE by Beaver et al. (1979) and found to be 
positive. 
A similar, although only preliminary, test was conducted 
as part of the research for Method 3 above. All 
announcements were ranked firstly, according to the 
magnitude of the annual forecast error (eit) and 
secondly, according to the magnitude of the individual 
annual API value in week O. The announcements were 
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ranked in descending order of magnitude and a rank 
correlation coefficient was then computed according to 
the following statistic. 
where 
R 
s 
R 
s 
N 
= 
= 
= 
= 
261 
6 I (dli - d2i)2 
i=l 1 
-
N (~J2 
- 1) 
paired rank correlation coefficient 
rank assigned announcement i using 
variable 1 
number of ranked pairs 
R had a value of +0,32. 
s 
Clearly, the association is 
weak, but it is positive and statistically significant. 
Beaver et al. (1979) report a coefficient of +0,38. 
It should be emphasised, however, that the rank 
correlation coefficient is likely to be more significant 
at a portfolio level. Not~ that this test ranked 
individual announcements whereas in the Beaver et al. 
(1979) study a coefficient of rank correlation of 
0,74 was estimated at a portfolio level. No attempt 
has been made here to test at the portfolio level. 
This indication of a significant positive association 
between the magnitudes is extremely encouraging and 
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would call for further research. 
7.4.2 The Performance of Various 'Dividend Change' 
Portfolios in the Year Prior to Their 
Announcement 
In the early stages of the research reported in the 
first part of this chapter on the information content 
of dividends, a number of potential research designs 
were considered. One such design was to categorise 
all announcements into five groups dependent on the 
magnitude of the change in dividend payments. These 
groups were formed into five hypothetical portfolios, 
aligned on the date of the announcement and the 
residuals pooled using the API metric for the 50 weeks 
before and 24 weeks after the announcement. 
The results are reported graphically on Figure 7.4 
(page 223) and numerically in Table 7.5 (page 224). 
It should be noted that the vertical axis (API) in 
Figure 7.4 is not on the same scale as previous API 
plots in this dissertation. 
Clearly, at the extremes, i.e. 6Dt > 50% and 6Dt < 0 
there seems to be a high association between pre-
announcement performance and change in dividends. 
The no change group fared poorly, while the other 
TABLE 7. 5 
SL':-1:-l<\RY S'L\'!"ISTICS BY ~·.'~!:X REL\T!Vf. TO DIVIDt:'.m A;;;:rL·~;c F.: ff ~JT (i)A) 
Week relative to TOTAL SAflPLE 
Dividend Announcement 
* API APIO APio-19 API20-•9 
APiso+ 
.., .., .., w w 
Week 0 DA 
- 50 .992 .995 1 .009 1 .008 .995 
- 49 1 .007 .990 1.011 1 .020 .994 
- 48 1.019 .992 1 .019 1 .015 1 .006 
- 47 .970 1.001 1. 024 1.022 .997 
- 46 .975 1.011 1.017 1.036 .998 
- 45 .963 1.017 1 .018 1.038 .984 
- 44 .955 1.008 1 .016 1 .042 .987 
- 43 .959 1.005 1 .024 1 .044 .981 
- 42 .979 1.001 1 .025 1 .053 .984 
- 41 .964 .999 1.025 1 .057 .998 
- 40 .970 .998 1.028 1.058 1 .006 
- 39 .982 .992 1 .021 1 .042 1 .002 
- 38 .951 .996 1 .020 1 .036 1 .034 
- 37 .950 .980 1. 011 1 .03t, 1. 035 
- 36 .980 .975 1.013 1.031 1 .042 
- 35 .966 .972 1 .015 1 .023 1 .037 
- 34 .969 .963 1.009 1 .020 1 .052 
- 33 .950 .958 1.006 1.015 1 .062 
- 32 .944 .952 1.004 1.009 1.070 
- 31 .938 .950 1 .007 1.011 1 .082 
- 30 .924 .948 1.001 1. 021 1.091 
- 29 .905 .942 1 .005 1.022 1.091 
- 28 .904 .934 1.003 1 .019 1. 107 
- 27 .880 .920 1 .007 1.013 1.110 
- 26 .862 .907 1.009 1.016 1. 137 
- 25 .839 .902 1.008 1 .020 1. 162 
- 24 .827 .897 1.008 1 .024 1. 151 
- 23 .832 .898 1 .013 1 .021 1. 143 
- 22 .828 .898 1 .010 1.019 1. 136 
- 21 .814 .898 1 .015 1.015 1. 138 
- 20 .799 .889 1.012 1.014 1. 149 
-
19 .752 .893 1.006 1.020 1. 145 
-
18 .750 .891 1 .005 1.018 1.141 
-
17 .739 .889 1.002 1.016 1. 137 
-
16 .751 .871 1.002 1. 021 1. 120 
- 15 .753 .854 1.007 1.020 1. 129 
- 14 .742 .857 .992 1 .007 1. 131 
- 13 .734 .850 .985 1.006 1. 129 
- 12 • 726 .841 .982 1.005 1. 136 
-
11 • 722 .849 .979 1 .009 1. 140 
- 10 .707 .851 .978 .998 1. 145 
- 9 .716 .840 .974 .995 1. 147 
- 8 .708 .836 .973 .934 1. 174 
7 .712 .835 .976 .993 1. 175 
-
6 .708 .827 .966 .980 1. 169 
- 5 .673 .830 .966 .987 1. 153 
- 4 .672 .830 .969 .985 1. 125 
-
3 .667 .826 .968 .985 1. 142 
2 .664 .823 .973 .982 1. 135 
1 .680 .828 .970 .983 1. 129 
0 .688 .839 .992 1.004 1. 186 
+ 1 .683 .847 .994 1 .015 1.183 
+ 2 .672 .851 1 .002 1 .023 1. 192 
+ ~ .674 .854 1 .002 1 .035 1. 165 
+ 4 .686 .857 1.005 1.027 1. 169 
+ 5 .644 .860 1.010 1. 029 1. 18/+ 
+ 6 .638 .867 1 .020 1. 031 1. 195 
+ 7 .629 .862 1 .028 1 .037 1. 192 
+ B .625 .869 1 .025 1 .033 1. 197 
+ 9 .E32 .872 1.027 1. 038 1. 197 
+ 10 .626 .878 1. 026 1. 038 1. 193 
+ 11 .625 .874 1. 024 1 .039 1. 199 
+ 12 .632 .874 1 .023 1 .032 1. 219 
+ 13 .645 .880 1 .022 1. 030 1. 213 
+ 14 .627 .882 1. 022 1.026 1. 208 
+ 15 .641 .873 1.018 1 .021 1.201 
+ 16 .651 .872 1. 012 1 .021 1. 210 
+ 17 .635 .872 1.011 1. 024 : . 175 
+ 18 .642 .877 I.01 3 1. 018 1. 1 r,s 
+ 19 .629 . il73 1.013 1 .014 1. 168 
+ 20 .605 .873 1.009 1.018 1. 171 
+ 21 .595 .374 1. 003 1.018 1 • 175 
+ 22 .612 . 871 1. 007 '.02(, 1.1% 
+ 23 .592 .875 1. 002 1 • 02~+ 1. 201 
+ 24 .589 .875 .999 1. 028 1. 204 
* Abnorrn.al Perform.1nce lndex - firms and years c:1trp·;._1ris'-"d by yc,_1r on Vf>,1r c.hangP in Dividend. 
0 • no ch.1n~e. 0 - 1') inrr~1se bt'tWC·1~!1 0 and 1 ~ ~. 20 - 49 = i n1~ re :1 s L' h~·~~ .. ccn ~0 :int; "9'. 
50• ~ inc r'2.J.:,~ over S:F. 
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two groups did not exhibit significant abnormal 
performance. 
The implication of this configuration is merely that 
the information content of the signal 
transmitted by management via the change in dividend 
level is available from other sources and in certain 
cases there is little information content at all. 
This interpretation is consistent with the evidence 
of no marginal information reported above. 
It must be emphasised strongly that no significance 
should be attached to the differential changes in the 
API during week 0. (9 ) The change in dividend is not 
an indicator of market expectations anq therefor~ is 
not amenable to testing the marginal information 
content of dividend announcements. 
In conclusion, therefore,these results do not really 
portray more than the ex post performance of certain 
dividend groups and that changes in dividends are 
highly associated with earnings. 
The importance of dividend policy in the valuation of 
South African shares is an area that is likely to be 
extremely fertile for future studies. 
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7.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents a tri-lateral approach to the 
investigation of the information content of dividends. 
It has been fairly conclusively demonstrated that any 
marginal information content of dividends is unlikely 
to be significant enough to confound the interpretation 
of the studies reported in this dissertation on the 
information content of earnings. Furthermore, the 
study on the market reaction to LIFO reported in the 
following chapter i~ therefor~ likely to be invulnerable 
to the confounding effect of simultaneous dividend 
announcements and thus this issue will not be pursued. 
Although a variety of designs were used to support the 
preliminary conclusion of no incremental information 
content of dividends, it is important to conclude by 
emphasising that the conclusion of each method was dependent 
on the validity of the models employed. 
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The final empirical study to be reported in this part 
of the thesis will be an empirical evaluation of the 
market's reaction to a change to LIFO. 
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FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 7 
(1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
( 6) 
The technical details of the exchange between 
Watts (1976) and Petit (1976) will not be dealt 
with in great detail. 
See Fama and Babiak (1968). 
The summary statistics for the Watts model are 
reported in Table 7.1. 
coincidence that 
exactly offsets the 
and results in an 
It is, of course, possible by 
the confounding effect of eit 
information content of oit 
erroneous acceptance of 
H I 
the null hypothesis 
0 • 
This additive variant should in no way affect 
the results and conclusions. This method was 
used purely for the sake of time efficiency. 
It is also the variant used in the LIFO study 
reported in Chapter 8. 
The choice of changes in dividends, as opposed to 
dividend levels, is explained in Section 7.2.3 
above. 
(7) The model was described in Chapter 4. However, 
it is fully described here for convenience. 
(8) See Chapter 4, Footnote (13). 
(9) This factor was the source of much criticism of 
the Petit (1972 and 1976) studies. See Section 
7.2.3. 
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CHAPTER 8 
MARKET REACTIONS TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN 
ACCOUNTING CHANGE TO LIFO 
8.1 OBJECTIVES AND SUMMARY 
This chapter reports empirical findings on the share 
market reaction to the announcement of a change to 
LIFO.(l) It is intended to provide further evidence of 
the association between accounting data and share 
prices. As set out in Section 8.3 the test may be 
seen as a test of semi-strong form market efficiency. 
The results indicate that the change to LIFO has a 
negative impact on share prices which is contrary 
to the U.S. evidence using a similar methodology 
(Sunder (1973)). (2 ) 
Furthermore, the negative reaction seems to be impounded 
rather sluggishly. 
These two aspects are interpreted as reflecting a 
(1) Footnotes appear at the end of the chapter (page 274). 
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certain market inefficiency or naivety vis a vis LIFO. 
It seems that the magnitude of the negative reaction 
is proportional to the magnitude of the negative 
impact on reported earnings and the relative riskiness 
of the firm (measured by S). Howeve~ it appears that 
the more recent announcements were received less 
negatively and less sluggishly which would be 
consistent with an increasing efficiency with respect 
to LIFO. 
Another important aspect of this study is that it 
provides collaborative evidence of the conclusions 
drawn in the previous chapters. In the earnings 
studies, a positive price reaction was detected on 
the date of earnings announcements. Based on a 
completely different data set, using different computer 
programs and with a slightly different research desig~ 
this same positive reaction is detected. The majority 
of LIFO changes were announced simultaneously with the 
preliminary announcements. In view of the results 
in Chapters 4 through~ it can safely be concluded 
that the sharp positive reaction in week O in all the 
graphs of this chapter is attributable to the inform-
ation content of earnings and not the LIFO change, per se. 
The chapter is concluded with some suggestions for 
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further research. 
8.2 INTRODUCTION 
LIFO refers to the 'last-in, first-out' cost flow 
assumption of inventory valuation whereby it is 
assumed that the costs of the most recent purchases of 
merchandise should be charged to the most recent sales 
of such. Thu~ in times of rising prices a lower 
earnings figure results. This is the converse of 
the FIFO approach which refers to the 'first-in, 
first-out' cost flow assumption of inventory valuation 
whereby year end inventory is valued at the most 
recent purchase price. 
LIFO is given an economic significance by virtue of 
the fact that if applied to tax reporting, a reduced 
liability for tax is incurred. Thu~ the present value 
of future cash flows is increased because the present 
value of future tax payments decreases. The result 
is an increase in economic well being in times of 
rising prices. 
With the increase in price levels witnessed in recent 
years, this characteristic has enticed a number of 
South African companies to change to LIFO to improve 
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their inflation squeezed cash positions. There are 
certain immediate implications of a switch to LIFO of which 
the more important are listed below 
(1) Section 22(5) of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 
1962 requires that if a company uses the LIFO 
system for tax purpose~ it must use LIFO for 
financial reporting purposes. However, this 
section does not prohibit the simultaneous 
footnote disclosure of FIFO information. 
(2) The reported book value of the firm diminishes 
as inventory is valued at older prices. 
(3) The equity of the company reduces and based on 
book value the firm may seem more highly geared. 
(4) If there is a reversal of current trends and 
the price level falls, earnings will be inflated 
above the FIFO figures and an increased tax will 
become payable. 
(5) LIFO removes the unrealised holding gains 
reported on a FIFO system and thus the difference 
between the two earnings figures {LIFO and FIFO) 
may measure, to a degree, the firm's exposure 
to inflation. 
It is noted that it is, of course, possible for a firm 
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to report LIFO and not take it for tax purposes, in 
which case a change to LIFO would have no economic 
significance whatsoever. However, no such case has 
been encountered on the JSE (Knight (1981)). 
Thus, a change in accounting method from FIFO to LIFO 
may be classified as a 
translatable change which has an economic impact and a 
negative impact on earnings. Moreover, this negative 
impact on earnings is counter-directional to the 
economic impact which is positive. Hence, a study of 
the effect of such a change should be of great interest 
as it should indicate which impact (earnings or 
economic) has the dominant influence on the share price. 
In addition, by examining the length of time it takes 
the JSE to adjust to the informational content implied 
by the change, the efficiency of the market can be 
tested. More specifically, a test of the semi-strong 
form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) can be 
made. 
The purpose of the study will therefore be to 
(1) Indicate to both the management and the 
investing public what impact a change to LIFO 
HAS had on share prices; 
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(2) Provide investors with some information on the 
likely impact of future changes to LIFO; 
(3) Provide the management (report preparers) of 
companies considering a change with information 
on the likely impact on their share price; and 
(4) Test the efficiency of the JSE in the semi-strong 
form. 
8.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The effect on a company's share price of a change to 
LIFO is examined using the two-stage time series 
methodology. This approach was first employed by 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) in the first 
direct test of the semi-strong form of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. This method has now become firmly 
established in the finance literature and is briefly 
summarised below in the context of the LIFO problem. 
Consider a company which decides to change from FIFO 
to LIFO. The raw data required comprise the weekly 
returns m the share price which is defined as 
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where 
Rt is the return on the share in period t; 
pt is the price of the security at the end 
of period t; and 
Dt is the dividend paid during period t. 
The first stage of the methodology involves the removal 
of those movements in share prices which are attributable 
to market-wide or common factors. Such factors are 
common to all shares and King (1966) has shown that for 
the NYSE approximately 50% of the variability in share 
prices is due to such common factors. The effect of 
these market-wide influences must be removed so that 
the effects of a change to LIFO can be clearly observed 
and not obscured or confounded with broad market move-
ments. 
The market related return can be removed as follows 
estimate the a and S coefficients in the well known 
market model 
= 
where 
Rt is the return on the security in period t; 
R is the return on the market in period t; M;t 
( 1) 
E 
t 
a and B 
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is the residual or non-market related return 
in period t; 
are the regression parameters estimated 
using ordinary least squares. 
In estimating a and B, it is customary to omit several 
periods around the date of the announcement of a change 
to LIFO so that any unusual price behaviour in this 
period will not obscure the long-term relationship 
between Rt and 1\i;t· 
The difference between the actual return on the security 
and the return expected if relationship (1) holds can 
then be determined for each of the omitted periods 
around the date of announcement. 
called the abnormal return 
This difference is 
i.e. 
where 
E 
t 
A 
= 
is the actual return observed in period t; 
is the return predigted for period t by 
equation (1) (i.e. Rt = a+ ~RM;t); and 
is the residual return in period t. 
Note that Et is often referred to as the abnormal 
return on the share because it is the return over and 
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above the market return. 
The second stage in the methodology seeks to examine 
the residual returns which may be attributable to the 
event being examined. To further reduce the effect 
of any price changes not caused by the announcement 
of a change to LIFO, an average residual is established 
for each time interval as follows : 
where 
N 
(x-1) 
X 
A 
E jt 
= 
1 N 
N I j=l 
A 
E jt t = -(x-1) • • , 0 ' • 
is the number of securities examined; 
• X 
is the number of periods before the 
announcement of a change to LIFO which 
were omitted in the estimation of a and B; 
is similarly the number of periods after 
the announcement which were omitted; and 
is the estimated residual of the jth company 
in period t. 
Thus, for example, u_ 4 is the average, over all the 
securities examined in the study, of the residuals in 
the 4th week before their announcement of a change to 
LIFO. This helps further remove any market or industry 
A 
effects because, for example, El;- 4 (the residual of the 
first company four weeks before its announcement of a 
A 
change to LIFO) and E2 ;_ 4 (the residual of the second 
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company four weeks before its announcement) are calculated 
at completely different calendar dates. 
Finally, the average residuals are cumulated as follows 
k 
= I: ut 
t=- (x-1) 
for t = x-1; ., O; •• X 
ut and Zk both have expected values of zero and hence 
any movements away from zero in a plot of Zk can be 
attributed to the announcement of a change to LIFO. 
It is important to note, however, that some random 
variation around zero is to be expected and it is only 
persistent or very marked deviations from zero that 
should be further examined. 
The product of such an analysis is therefore 2x values 
of cumulative average residuals (CAR's) which are 
plotted graphically. If the event being studied (in 
this case the announcement of a change to LIFO) has 
any informational value, a movement away from zero would 
be expected at period O (the actual date of announcement). 
Hence, the plot of the CAR's can be used to test both 
the efficiency of the JSE and the informational content 
of the accounting change. This is best illustrated 
by reference to Figures 8.1 to 8.5 (overleaf). 
Figure 8.1 would occur if the marketwere efficient and 
CAR 
CAR 
0 
Figure 3 .1 
0 
Figure 3. 3 
CAR 
time 
time 
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therewere positive informational value in the announce-
ment. This follows, since the CAR's are constant 
before the announcement and after the announcement 
they remain constant,but at a higher level than 
previously. The market is clearly efficient because 
it adjusts to the informational content immediately and 
the informational content of the announcement is 
positive because the jump is upwards. Figure 8.2 
has an identical interpretation except that the 
informational content is negative. 
Figure 8.3 indicates a situation in which the informational 
content is positive (the CAR's rise after the announce-
ment), but the market is inefficient. This follows since 
there is a gradual adjustment over several periods to 
the new equilibrium level resulting from the announce-
ment. Thus the market is inefficient. Figure 8.4 
displays the identical reaction except that the 
informational content is negative. 
Finally, Figure 8.5 represents the situation where the 
informational content of the announcement is zero. 
This is the only case in which nothing can be said 
about the efficiency of the market. 
It must be noted that Figures 8.1 to 8.5 indicate 
theoretical behaviour. In practice, the plots of the 
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CAR's will have some random variation around the 
straight lines. However, the informational content of 
the announcement and the efficiency of the JSE can be 
ascertained from the general shape of the CAR's. 
8. 4 THE DATA 
A survey was undertaken to establish all the firms 
quoted on the JSE which employed LIFO at 14 November 
1980. This resulted in the selection of some 32 firms 
( see Appendix V) . However, only those firms 
meeting the following criteria were retained in the 
study: 
(1) All shares must have been quoted continuously 
from 18 July 1969 to 14 November 1980 (590 
weeks) . 
(2) The firms must not have undergone substantial 
changes at any particular time. 
(3) The firm must not only have announced a switch 
to LIFO, but the ef feet must also have been quantified. 
Any reversals on consolidation of LIFO effects 
would disqualify a firm. 
(4) Because the RDM 100 index was employed as a 
surrogate for the market, non-industrial firms 
242 
were ignored. 
(5) The announcement must have been made at least 
35 weeks after the 18 July 1969, i.e. since 
20 March 1970 and before 35 weeks prior to the 
14 November 1980, i.e. before 14 March 1980. 
These criteria resulted in a reduction of the population 
to 21 shares (see Appendix V). 
Even firms making only partial changes to LIFO were 
considered, for it is the first change to LIFO that 
is of interest in this study of the accounting change. 
For example, a firm which converts 50% of its stocks 
from FIFO to LIFO in one year and the rest in the 
following year can be viewed as having had an accounting 
change in the first year only. The change of method 
in the second year is merely an application of a method 
already in use. This is further justified when it is 
considered that the initial change reflects management's 
partiality to the method. 
The Timing of the Announcement 
Unlike Sunder (1973) and Brown (1980) who used an 
arbitrary date of announcement in their studies of the 
NYSE, an attempt was made in the current study to 
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establish unequivocally the exact timing of the release. 
This was achieved by direct contact with the board of 
directors of each company in the study. The date 
supplied by the company official was the date on which 
the firm had released an announcement of the change to 
the public. This varied from the date the interim 
results were released to Reuters (press) to the date 
of posting the annual financial statements. This date 
was then verified by reference to the source as claimed 
by the company and the date of the announcement (zero 
week in this study) was deemed to be the following 
Friday. Appendix V lists the firms in the study and 
the date of the announcement. Although it is 
acknowledged that all market participants will not 
have received the information simultaneously, by 
allowing a lag until the following Friday, it is 
considered reasonable that the information can then be 
deemed to be publicly available. Clearly, the problem 
of leakages should be borne in mind,but unfortunatel~ 
this factor could not be controlled in the current 
study. 
In order to ensure that the CAR configuration of the 
study group is peculiar to that group, a number of 
earlier studies have constructed a control group of 
firms which were not exposed to the event under consider-
ation. The objective of such control groups is to 
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establish the randomness of the residuals in periods 
of non-occurrence of any particular event. 
In order to overcome the problems of a non-equivalent 
control design the current study presents what it refers 
to as a 'quasi-equivalen~' control design. Acknowledging 
the difficulty in matching firms directly, the design 
addresses the problem of implicit matching. Thus, the 
control group of non-changers were selected by matching 
each change firm with a non-change firm according to 
the following: 
(1) The selection of a shadow firm from the same 
industry; and 
(2) Employing the selection method of choosing the 
firm in the industry with the closest valuation 
of inventories at the date of the change firm's 
switch to LIFO. 
This procedure does not purport to suggest that an 
equivalent level of inventory holding will result in a 
similar impact of a change to LIFO if the shadow firm 
made the change. The implications of a change to 
LIFO depend on a number of factors including the 
extent of the change, the stock mix, the rate of price 
increase for various combinations of stock, etc. .Z'\s a result, 
no attempt is made to match equivalent firms and the 
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level of inventory holding is really a random selection 
technique. Thus, the selection procedure must be 
emphasised as being random within the industry. 
Nevertheless, this approach should eliminate some of 
the inconsistencies of a non-equivalent control design. 
A group of non-change firms was selected 
and the data collected in the same way as in the 
case of the study group. The shadow group was subject 
to the same procedures as the study group and the 
cumulative residuals were derived. The deletion period 
for each shadow firm was determined by the deletion 
period used for each partner in the study group. 
Thus, the data used in the study consisted of the 
weekly closing prices of the 42 selected shares (21 
which changed to LIFO and 21 control group securities) 
from 18 July 1969 to 14 November 1980. As only 
industrial shares were considered in the study, the 
RDM Industrial Index was used as a surrogate for the 
market. 
8.5 INITIAL RESULTS 
Having selected the firms and constructed the data 
file, the method of ordinary least squares was used to 
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estimate the parameters a and 6 in the market model 
where 
~;t 
a. and 6. 
J J 
= 
. h th .th "t . is t e return on e J secur1 y 1n 
period t; 
is the return on the RDM industrial 
index in period t; and 
are the regression parameters for the jth 
security 
The data used in the study comprised all weekly returns 
between 18 July 1969 and 14 November 1980 (590 
observations) less 70 weeks around the announcement 
date which were deleted. The deletion period of 70 
weeks consisted of 34 weeks before the announcement, 
the week of the announcement, and 35 weeks after the 
announcement. These 70 weeks are omitted from the 
estimation data lest any unusual price behaviour in the 
weeks surrounding the announcement obscure the long-
term relationship between Rt and RM;t· 
The actual weekly returns observed in the deletion period 
were then used to derive 70 residuals for each firm as 
follows 
= t = -34; .. , o, .. 35 
2 4 7 
where a. and B. are the OLS regression estimates of a. J J J 
and B. for share j. 
J These residuals were aggregated and 
averaged cross-sectionally throughout the sample so that 
70 average residuals denoted by ut were derived for the 
entire group of 21 LIFO companies : 
= 
l 21 
21 I: E J't j=l 
t = -34, .. -1, o, 1, 2, .. 35 
Finally, 70 cumulative average residuals (CAR's) defined 
by Zt were derived for the group: 
= 
t 
E 
i=-34 
u. 
l t = -3 4, .. , -1, O, 1, 2 , . . 35 
The CAR's were plotted and are presented in Figure 8.6 
overleaf. 
The interpretation of a cumulative graph is not easy and the 
approach adopted in this analysis is set out below. The 
model employed and the aggregation of CAR's should distil 
confounding events so that the final CAR graph is likely to 
represent the impact of LIFO only. However, the assumption 
of the methodology may not be a complete description of 
reality and thus some of the CAR movement may be due to 
various other non-random effects albeit diluted on 
aggregation. In view of this possibility, although the 
full deletion period will be presented and analysed, the 
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detailed interpretation and conclusion will concentrate 
on the 21 weeks surrounding the announcement of the 
change. Thus the graph will be reproduced with only 
22 observations - the CAR's for weeks -11 through +10 
(Figure 8.7, page 252). It is submitted that this time 
period is the most accurate description of the impact. 
Although arbitrary, the reduced period of examination 
further diminishes the possibility of confounding 
events disturbing the expected residuals. 
Little time will be devoted to trying to explain in 
detail the fluctuations observed during weeks -34 
through -12 and weeks +11 and +35 as these may be due 
to spurious confounding events. The full deletion 
period is presented to give a full perspective only. 
As the graphs are cumulativ~ the absolute position of 
an observation in any particular week is irrelevant. 
What is of importance in a week by week analysis is 
the relative position to the previous week's observation 
because this measures the CAR for a particular week. 
Further, in this particular study the period after week 
0 (the week of the announcement) is the most interest-
ing. These two factors taken together justify the 
use of a sliding scale in the analysis of the reduced 
period graphs. Thus each category's CAR value was 
equated to zero for week -1. 
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In order to test the efficiency of the JSE and to 
ascertain the informational content of a change to 
LIFO only the graphs of the 21 LIFO firms need be 
studied. The graph of the quasi-control group in 
Figure 8.7 is presented only to show how the 
configuration of residuals is different for the change 
firms and the non-change firms. That is, the control 
group clearly shows through Figure 8.7 that the LIFO 
change group behavesdifferently on aggregate to the 
rest of the market. Thu~ the announcement of a change 
to LIFO definitely does have an impact on share price 
and this is studied below. 
Figure 8.6 indicates that initially the CAR's fluctuate 
between O and -4% settling back to O in week -15. These 
fluctuations are fairly random and the cumulative 
average residual at week -15 is at the expected zero 
level. 
However, for weeks -14 through -9 there does appear 
to be a certain non-random behaviour. It seems that 
the change firms experienced a positive abnormal return 
for six weeks of cumulative value 3%. This is rather 
difficult to interpret. It ma~ howeve~ be due to 
leakages of the impending announcement. Thus, the 
trading activities of investors with prior knowledge of 
the switch to LIFO may be responsible for this non-
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random behaviour. It may also, however, be an inexplicable 
confounding event. This cumulative abnormal return is 
lost in the following three weeks and the CAR's settle 
back to the expected zero value for the six weeks up to 
the week of announcement. 
After the announcement there is a definite occurrence of 
abnormal positive return so that week +l has a cumulative 
value of 3,4%; yet, this is immediately followed by a 
number of successive weekly negative abnormal returns so 
that the CAR for week +12 is -3,8%! This indicates a 
very negative impact of a LIFO chang~ considering the 
negative abnormal return of -7,2% for the period +l through 
+12. Thereafte~ there follow rather volatile, although 
random, fluctuations of the cumulative residuals. It is 
considered inappropriate to interpret extensively the 
behaviour of the CAR's beyond week +12. 
Turning now to Figure 8.7, attention will be directed to 
the 11 weeks before the announcement and the 11 weeks after 
the announcement (including the week of the announcement). 
Effectively, this assumes the fluctuations before week -11 
and after week +10 to be random and not a function of the 
announcement. Obviousl~ the longer the period of the 
analysis the greater the chance of confounding effects, 
obscuring the reaction to the announcement. 
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Apart from the possibility of a leakage effect, the 
behaviour of the residuals immediately prior to the 
announcement is as expected, i.e. a random movement 
along the zero line. 
There is a definite positive reaction in the week of 
the announcement which is not evident in the control 
group. It should be noted that the majority of LIFO 
announcements coincide with the preliminary announce-
ment date and that the alignment date in the control 
group is in no case the preliminary announcement date. 
Thus, in view of the results presented in previous 
chapters, it can be safely concluded that the positive 
jump in week O is associated with the earnings 
announcements and not with the LIFO announcement. 
Even if there is a selection bias and LIFO announcements 
are made only in 'good years' (i.e. coincident with 
, 
positive forecast error years) or only in 'bad years', 
the residual pattern does not seem to be systematically 
affected. The downward drift after week +l is not 
really apparent in either 'good news' or 'bad news' 
announcements (see Chapter 5). 
Thus, it would appear that, although there is an initial 
positive reaction to the earnings information, it seems 
that there is an overall negative reaction to LIFO of 
about -4%. Further, it seems that the downward 
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adjustment has taken at least eight weeks. 
This interpretation is not intended to be dogmatic. 
However, it appears that the potential efficiency 
exhibited by the rapid initial upward movement is 
likely to be due to the information content of 
simultaneous earnings announcements. This is 
subsequently reversed by an overriding negative reaction 
to LIFO which seems to be sluggishly impounded. The 
implication then appears to be that the market is 
inefficient in respect to this piece of information 
for two reasons: 
(1) The market appears to be deceived by the 
negative impact on earnings despite the 
improved cash position; and 
(2) This negative impounding seems to take a long 
time. 
The obvious implication of this is that an individual 
who sells short shares of a LIFO switcher would have 
earned an abnormal return of 4% based on publicly 
available information. 
The movement of the residuals of a quasi-equivalent 
group of non-change firms followed a random pattern. 
Although a week by week comparative analysis between 
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the two would be meaningless, the trend is apparent. 
Finally, it must be stressed that the raison d'~tre 
of the shadow group was merely to ensure that the 
results of the study were not a function of the model 
(see Section 8.7 for further suggestions on control 
group design). 
8.6 FURTHER ANALYSIS BY PARTITIONING 
The results presented in the previous section were 
aggregate results for all of the 21 securities examined 
in the study. Howeve~ there may be numerous other 
factors which might cause the share price of an 
individual company changing from FIFO to LIFO to behave 
somewhat differently. Therefore, to examine the effect 
of a change to LIFO more closely further tests were 
carried out. 
The study group was thus partitioned into pairs accord-
ing to the following criteria: 
(1) High Beta risk/low Beta risk 
(2) High earnings impact/low earnings impact 
(3) Pre-1979 changes/1979 and post-1979 changes. 
256 
The procedure was to classify all firms with a Beta 
above 0,75 as high Beta firms and those with Beta 
below 0,75 as low Beta firms. Firms which reported 
earnings which were less than 80% of the earnings that 
would have been reported under the FIFO system were 
classified as high earnings impact firms. That is, 
firms whose FIFO earnings were reduced by less than 
20% were classified as low earnings impact firms. 
Finally, the pre-/post-1979 criterion refe:rs to the date 
of the announcement and not the financial year of the 
firms. 
The result was 
Two groups in category (1) of 11 (high S) and 10 
(low S) firms 
Two groups in category (2) of eight (high earnings 
impact) and 13 (low impact) firms 
Two groups in category (3) of 10 (pre-1979) and 
11 (post-1979) firms 
Appendix V shows the date of the change, the Beta 
values and the percentage by which FIFO earnings were 
reduced for all firms in the study group. 
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8.6.l Relative Risk 
It can be argued that the relative risk of a firm is 
an exogenous intervening variable in the market's 
interpretation of a change to LIFO, i.e. an outside 
factor which effects the extent of the reaction. That 
is, there will be a differential market reaction to the 
announcement of a change to LIFO by high risk companies 
and low risk companies. This hypothesis can be 
examined with reference to Figure 8.8 overleaf. 
Prior to week O the high risk firms show a definite 
non-random pattern. Week -9 to week O was an almost 
continuous period of negative returns resulting in an 
abnormal negative return of 4,5%. In the same period 
the low risk firms exhibited fairly random residual 
behaviour. These differences in the pre-change 
period are extremely difficult to interpret; suffice 
to say that the abnormal negative return exhibited by 
the group as a whole prior to week O (Figure 8.7) 
appears to have been caused by the high risk firms.( 3 ) 
Immediately after the change (i.e. after week 0) there 
appears to be a differential reaction with the low risk 
firms showing an average abnormal return of 5,4% in 
the two week period comprising the week of change and 
week +l. During the same two weeks the high risk 
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firms showed an average abnormal return of 1,6%. 
Thereafter, there was a period of definite non-random 
behaviour when abnormal negative returns were earned 
for six or seven weeks before levelling out. 
The reaction in the first two weeks was considerably 
greater for the low risk firms which suggests that 
the relative risk is an exogenous intervening variable. 
This could be explained by the fact that the market is 
more confident in the management of low risk firms. 
However, it should be noted that for the next six or 
seven weeks both firms experience almost identical 
abnormal negative returns. The interpretation is by 
no means apparent, but it would appear that although the 
effect of LIFO was negative on both, the change seems 
to have had a less severe impact on returns in the 
case of low risk firms. This may be explained in 
terms of the market's interpretation of management's 
motives and expectations. Perhaps the market is 
sceptical of any changes made by high risk firms. 
Further, the market may feel the change represents a 
risky method for an already risky firm to raise extra 
cash. 
It is interesting to note that the market took just as 
long to impound the information in both cases. 
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Thu~ it is concluded that relative risk seems to be an 
exogenous intervening variable; however, the impact is 
negative for both high and low risk firms. 
8.6.2 The Effect of Impact on Earnings 
It might be hypothesised on the basis of the results 
presented in the previous section that the market 
reacts in the direction of the impact on earnings of 
a change to LIFO and thus the magnitude of the reaction 
will be directly proportional to the magnitude of the 
impact on the earnings. 
This aspect of the study can be examined with reference 
to Figure 8.9 (overleaf). 
Again,it is difficult to interpret the pre-change 
pattern and,indeed, it is probably pointless. However, 
this partition criterion results in two groups which 
display similar and fairly random configuratiorsof 
CAR's immediately prior to the week of change. This 
is to be expected in a period during which no common 
event with informational value impacted the firms. 
The pattern after the week of the announcement of a 
change to LIFO is quite different for each group. 
The initial reaction to the announcement was about a 
% CAR 
5 
4 
\J 
3 
2 
1 ,, 
I \ 
0 I 
-1 
-2 
-":1 
.J 
-4 
-5 
-6 
-7 
-8 
-9-
-1 
\ 
,\ 
'' 
, ' 
0 
' 
' 
l ,\ 
I 
I 
• 
I 
' I 
/'-
,- \ ,, 
• 
Figure 8. 9 
261 
HIGH EA~HNGS I!U'AC'l' 
- - - - - LOW EAR~INGS I1".i.PACT 
+10 
262 
4% positive abnormal return in the case of the low 
impact firms while it was about 3% for the high impact 
firms. Thereafte~ there followed a period of abnormal 
negative returns for both groups. There was a 
startling negative abnormal return of approximately 
11,5% for the period between week +land week +7 for 
the high impact firms whereas the negative abnormal 
return for the low impact firms for the same period 
was only about 7%! Admittedly by week +10 about 2,5% 
of this had been regained by the high impact firms. 
It must be emphasised, however, that the returns after 
week +7 may be part of the expected random return. 
Week +7 represents the end of a non-random period of 
abnormal returns, in both cases. 
Thus, it appears irrefutable that the market reacts in 
the direction of the earnings figures and not in 
relation to the economic implication of the change. 
It is interesting to note that in the case of both 
groups the market once again took the same amount of 
time to negatively impound its reaction to an announce-
ment of a change to LIFO. 
8.6.3 The Effect of Time 
The securities examined in this chapter changed from 
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FIFO to LIFO at different times between 1975 and 1980. 
As more firms adopted the change so the average investor 
has become more aware of what the change involves and 
what it might mean to future dividends. Thus, it is 
of interest to examine whether there has been any 
change in the market's assessment as from the early LIFO 
switches to the more recent switches. 
Figure 8.10 (overleaf) presents the plot of the CAR 
for the pre-1979 change group and the post-1979 group. 
As mentioned before, the pre-week O period is very 
difficult to analyse and in the absence of clear proof 
to the contrary it must be concluded that both groups 
display fairly similar behaviour. Yet, for the post-
week O analysis certain differences are apparent. 
Both groups had the same initial positive reaction of 
the same magnitude for the same period. This reversed 
for both groups in week +2 (CAR +3%). The downward 
trend,however,persisted considerably longer for the 
pre-1979 change group and eventually bottomed out in 
week +11, having experienced a negative cumulative 
abnormal return of 10,8%. However, the post-1979 
change group bottomed in week +7, thereafter a series 
of positive returns were earned (as there were for the 
pre-1979 group after week +11). 
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This is a very interesting result for it implies that 
in the case of the most recent changes to LIFO the 
market reaction has still been negative, but far less 
severe. The net negative return between week O and 
week +7 for the post-1979 change group was around 4%, 
while the net negative return for the pre-1979 
change group between week O and week +11 was 7,8%! 
This implies that the market reaction has been almost 
halved in the most recent changes and, furthermore, that 
the information consumption process may be changing. 
The other very interesting aspect of this result is 
that the market impounded the information in the case 
of the post-1979 change group nearly 40% more quickly than 
in the case of the pre-1979 change group. 
The result is extremely encouraging for it appears as 
if the market is becoming educated with regard to LIFO 
and although it still seems to be deceived by the 
accounting numbers, it is impounding the information 
more quickly and less severely. 
This may be explained by the fact that, as more and 
more companies start changing to LIFO,the market becomes 
increasingly aware of the implications of such. 
However, traditional concern over the accounting 
earnings figures still seems to prevail. 
266 
8.6.4 The Effect of Non-Stationarity in the Market Model 
The beta coefficients used in removing the overall market 
effect were estimated using approximately 10 years of 
past data. It is possible that if the beta coefficient 
is not stable over time (which seems to be the case -
Affleck-Graves, Money and Carter (1981)), the use of a 
short-term beta estimate could result in a substantially 
different configuration of CAR's than that presented in 
Figure 8.7. 
To examine this possibility the beta coefficients were 
re-estimated and the analysis of the previous section 
repeated using only short-term periods of data, namely 
70 weeks prior to a 70 week exclusion period. No data 
after the exclusion period were used in view of the 
potential risk changes that may accompany a change to 
LIFO. The CAR's so derived are comparatively analysed 
with the CAR's based on the long-term data and the 
results presented in Figure 8.11 (overleaf). 
It should be noted that the graph of the long-term beta 
is merely a reproduction of Figure 8.7 for the reader's 
convenience. 
Little formal analysis is required. It is patently 
obvious that the two graphs are almost identical and 
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would certainly not lead to a different interpretation 
as to the impact of the announcement of a change to 
LIFO. Thus, the conclusion drawn is that results based 
on short-term data would not result in a significantly 
dissimilar configuration of CAR's. For this reason 
the potential non-stationarity of beta is not 
considered to be problematic in the current study. 
8.7 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The results present some very interesting information, 
and, taken as a whole, provide a certain insight into 
the process of information consumption by the JSE. To 
summarise, it appears that the announcement of a switch 
to LIFO has a substantial negative impact on share 
returns. This negative impact seems to be directly 
proportional to the extent to which the FIFO earnings 
are reduced by the new valuation method. Thus, it 
would appear that the market reacted to the accounting 
numbers rather than to the economic message inherent 
in a change to LIFO. 
Further, this negative impact is impounded into prices 
rather sluggishly. This factor, taken with the reaction 
to the accounting numbers which was counter-directional 
to the economic implications, suggests the double 
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inefficiency of the JSE. Not only was the market 
unable to see through the accounting numbers, but it 
took a long time to adjust to the announcement. 
However, there is a gleam of hope! The market seems 
in the case of the most recent changes to be impounding 
the informational content of a change to LIFO 
substantially more quickly and although still in sympathy 
with the earnings figures, the effect has been less 
drastic. Thus, the market appears to be 'learning' 
how to interpret the change to LIFO. 
It is important to note that an alternative interpret-
ation is possible. The negative abnormal returns 
observed in the post-announcement period may not be 
caused by the announcement itself,but may be a function 
of a selection bias. That is, only a certain type of 
firm may switch to LIFO, viz. firms in which management 
anticipate a cash crisis and a change to LIFO represents 
an effort to avert such. This interpretation implies 
that the informational value of LIFO cannot be 
ascertained. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the 
model was designed to obviate the effects of any 
confounding events and thus the important conclusion 
reached by the study is that the announcement of a 
change to LIFO does have a negative impact on the 
share price. Whether this is so because of the economic 
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implications of the change or because the investment 
public view the announcement of the change as an 
indication of a possible cash crisis, the model cannot 
determine. 
As far as generalised conclusions on market efficiency 
are concerned, again a situation specific inference can 
be drawn, namely that the market is informationally 
inefficient in respect of the announcement of a change 
to LIFO. It could be argued that as only 21 firms 
have been studied, inferences cannot be drawn as to 
the efficiency of the market as a whole. It is 
submitted, however, that as the 21 firms represent the 
universe of LIFO changers (at the cut-off date for 
this study) and as there are no barriers to the 
purchase or sale of these shares on the market, the 
existence of a group of over-valued (according to this 
nafve market) shares for a number of weeks is unjustified 
in an efficient market. It is submitted that to be 
efficient a market must impound all relevant 
information quickly and unbiasedly so that no shares 
are over- or undervalued according to the publicly 
available information set. 
Thus, the overall conclusions of this study are two-
fold : 
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Firstly, the efficient market hypothesis is not valid 
for the JSE. This evidence should be of value to 
future capital market researchers. However, the market 
is 'learning' to interpret the change to LIFO,but it 
cannot be determined whether this is as a result of a 
growing efficiency in the market itself or of a growing 
understanding of LIFO. 
Secondly, the evidence is that a change to LIFO has a 
negative impact on share returns directly proportional 
to the negative impact on earnings. Thus,the investing 
public appears to be more concerned with the magnitude 
of the accounting numbers than with the economic benefits 
which may accompany a change in accounting procedure. 
There are three areas in which further research into 
the market reaction to LIFO changes would be useful 
(1) The Monitoring of Future Changes 
Given that the more recent announcements received 
a less significant negative reaction, it would 
be of interest to continually monitor the 
market's reaction to LIFO changes. In the 
last year there have been a number of such 
announcements which should provide useful 
input data to future research. 
( 2) 
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The Investigation of Any Differential Reaction to 
'FLIP-FLOP' Announcements 
A number of the more recent changers to LIFO 
have exercised the so-called 'Flip-Flop' option. 
That is, they have reversed the effect of LIFO 
on consolidation by increasing stock values 
and profits of the group to a FIFO basis, 
whereas taxable income is based on the LIFO 
method. 
It would be interesting to establish whether 
the 'flip-flappers' are negatively discounted 
in view of the fact that reported earnings are 
not reduced. If this "Were the case, it would 
evidence a na1ve market which was fooled by 
purely bookkeeping entries. Alternatively, 
if there were no differential reaction,it may 
imply that the market viewed a switch to LIFO 
as bad news for a reason other than the negative 
impact on earnings. In such a situation, no 
inference could be drawn on market efficiency. 
(3) The Introduction of a LIFO Control Grouo 
This study (and others) use a control group of 
FIFO firms as a benchmark against which to measure the 
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reaction to LIFO. It would be extremely 
interesting to set up a control group of LIFO 
firms, i.e. in years other than the year of the 
change. This may be a more meaningful bench-
mark since the residual pattern observed may be 
peculiar to LIFO firms and not to first time 
users of LIF0.(4) This would necessitate an entirely 
different interpretation. 
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FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 8 
(1) This chapter is essentially a paper published by 
the author and his thesis supervisor in the 
Investment Analysts Journal, June 1983. The 
paper was based on an aspect of the author's 
Master of Commerce dissertation (see Knight and 
Affleck-Graves (1983)). 
(2) In a recent paper, Ricks (1982), using a different 
research design, reports the announcement of LIFO 
to have a negative effect on share prices. 
(3) The sign of the simultaneously released forecast 
error may be responsible for this difference. 
(4) A suggestion by William Beaver. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS TO PART 2 
This chapter serves as a brief synopsis of the conclusions 
drawn in the four studies reported in this part of the 
dissertation. 
Part 2 has focused on one specific aspect of the 
relationship between accounting data and the behaviour 
of share prices, viz. the reaction of share prices to 
company announcements. 
Chapter 4 provided a general background and description 
of various approaches to investigating the information 
content of accounting data. 
Chapters 5 through 8 report the results of four separate 
studies, the major conclusions of which are summarised 
below. 
Chapter 5 Annual Earnings Releases 
Using the API approach employed by Ball and Brown (1968), 
an asymmetrical market reaction to 'bad news' and 'good 
news' was detected: whereas the 'bad news' portfolio 
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performed abnormally badly in the year prior to the 
preliminary report, the converse did not apply to the 
'good news' portfolio. 
There was evidence of a positive reaction to both 
types of announcements, although the magnitude of the 
reaction did seem dependent on the sign of the annual 
earnings forecast error. The reaction to the positive 
forecast errors was easily twice as great as that to 
the negative forecast errors. As with the Ball and 
Brown (1968) results, there was an association between 
the sign of the earnings forecast error and the sign 
of the annual abnormal performance. 
Under the Absolute Residual Analysis approach, a 
significant information content was detected in all 
three official company releases in the following 
order of importance : (1) the preliminary report, 
(2) the interim report, and (3) the annual report. 
It was further concluded that the preliminary report 
provides a significant proportion of the firm's 
specific information impounded into share prices. 
Chapter o Half-Yearly Earnings Releases 
Extending the Chapter 5 analysis, earnings expectations 
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were modelled on half-yearly earnings. The results 
indicate that the second-half report which is 
cumulative has a significantly greater information 
content than the first-half report. 
However, pooling all half~yearly announcements, the 
asymmetry reported in the Chapter 5 API plots was not 
as apparent. There was, however, an indication of 
a certain market inefficiency in that there was a 
certain non-random residual drift in the weeks 
immediately after the announcements. Comparing the 
performance of investment strategies based on half-
yearly and annual earnings data, it was concluded 
that the half-yearly reports do provide an incremental 
information content. 
Chapter? The Information Contents of Dividends 
An attempt was made in Chapter 7 to determine the 
extent to which the simultaneous announcement of 
dividends confounded the analyses of Chapters 5 and 
6 • 
Using the Fama and Babiak (1968) dividend model, a 
similar result to that reported by Watts (1973) on 
the NYSE was reported. Dividends appear to transmit 
little information content and consequently there 
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will be no confounding effect in the aforementioned studies. 
These conclusions were supported by tests using two 
additional research designs. 
A by-product of the research reported in this chapter 
was evidence of an association, albeit weak at the 
individual share level, between the magnitude of the 
earnings forecast error and the magnitude of the annual 
abnormal share performance. This supports the 
conclusions of Chapter 5. 
Chapter 8 Market Reaction to LIFO Changes 
The final study reported in this part concluded that 
the JSE reacts naively to the announcement of an 
accounting policy change to LIFO. Using a similar 
methodology to that reported by Sunder (1973), the 
reaction appears to be significantly negative. 
Furthermore, the full impact appeared to be spread 
over a number of weeks. A most significant aspect of 
these results, however, is that although based on a 
different data set using different programs, etc., 
an initial positive reaction in the week of the LIFO 
announcement was apparent. This result and the 
result in Chapter 5 are, therefore,mutually supportive. 
Clearly, the sharp positive reaction in the week of 
the LIFO announcement is a general phenomenon associated 
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with all earnings announcements. The LIFO study 
confirms the Chapter 5 study in so far as a different data 
set and slightly different research design were used. 
A differential reaction to LIFO was,however,detected 
between high risk and low risk firms. Furthermore, 
the reaction is proportional to the size of the 
reduction of FIFO earnings. 
Finally, it was concluded that the market may be 
undergoing a certain learning process vis; vis LIFO 
in that the more recent changes induced a smaller negative 
reaction and the adjustment period was shorter. 
The chapter concluded that the JSE appears inefficient 
with respect to the informational content of the LIFO 
earnings announcement. 
Overall Conclusions and Implications 
It seems clear that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
does not display the same characteristics as the New 
York Stock Exchange vis a vis the association between 
accounting data and the behaviour of share prices. 
The local market seems to exhibit a certain inefficiency 
as evidenced by the LIFO reaction and the non-random 
280 
drift in price residuals after half-yearly earnings 
announcements. 
It seems that Johannesburg prices may not reflect a 
parti~ularly rich information system and this inform-
ation system seems significantly dominated by the 
published accounting data. 
The parallel with the NYSE lies in the findinn that 
dividend announcements do not appear to transmit any 
information. 
The major implication of these results, taken as a 
whole, is that there seems to be a significant 
responsibility on financial reporters to publish 
information more frequently (for example, quarterly 
results) and more timeously, i.e. as soon after the 
end of the reporting period as possible. 
It seems that the informational objectives of 
financial reporting are being met to the extent that 
decision useful information is perceived in the 
accounting data. To what extent the current report-
ing regime provides the optimal information set is 
an open issue. 
In a sense,the results may be interpreted as an 
indictment of the Investment Analyst community in 
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South Africa. One would expect serious analysis to 
pre-empt the information content of earnings from 
more timely media than the preliminary report. 
A major implication of these results for researchers 
and policy makers is the necessity for local research. 
Not all aspects of foreign research results are likely 
to hold in the South African environment and an excessive 
reliance on results from abroad could be hazardous. 
Finally, it is emphatically emphasised that the results 
of these studies and the various conclusions drawn are 
jointly conditional upon : 
(1) The market model from which the various price 
residuals were derived; 
(2) The earnings and dividend expectations model 
employed; and 
(3) The specific research designs used to 
manipulate the data. 
The third and final part of this dissertation will 
investigate another aspect of the association between 
published accounting data and the behaviour of share 
prices, viz. information and risk. 
P A R T 3 
ON INFORMATION AND RISK 
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The final chapter of this dissertation is presented as 
a separate part since the subject matter, although 
concerned with published accounting data and share 
prices, represents another dimension separate from the 
empirical work presented in Part 2. 
For the convenience of the reader, a certain amount has 
been duplicated to avoid a repeated reference to 
Parts 1 and 2. This deals mainly with a description 
of the models employed which, although described in 
Chapter 4, are summarised in Section 10.3.2.2. 
The objective of this part is to explore the potential 
relationship between information and market determined 
measures of risk. 
283 
CHAPTER 10 
ON INFORMATION AND RISK 
10.l CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter briefly reviews the empirical literature 
on the relationship between published accounting data 
and market determined risk measures. 
This review is followed by the construction of a 
research design, centred around the increased 
disclosure requirements of the 1973 Companies Act, 
to investigate the possibility that certain non-
disclosures may in themselves constitute a determinant 
of market risk. 
The results of an empirical study of the relation-
ship among four market risk measures (0 2 , B, R2 , B/R) 
and two financial information systems, represented 
by the annual turnover (sales) series and the annual 
funds statement series reported by individual firms, 
are presented. 
The major tentative conclusions are 
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(1) The voluntary disclosure of sales and a funds 
statement appears to have reduced the relative 
risk measured by B, implying that the non-
disclosure per se resulted in an increased 
risk. 
(2) The voluntary disclosure of sales alone appears 
to have reduced the risk measured by the other 
aforementioned three measures. 
(3) The non-disclosure of sales seems to dominate 
the non-disclosure of a funds statement as a 
determinant of risk, although the non-disclosure 
of both results in a higher level of risk than 
with either, separately. 
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10.2 BACKGROUND 
10.2.1 Objectives 
There is a wide body of opinion that the primary purpose of 
Financial Reporting is the provision of information useful 
to economic decision making and that a significant 
constituent of the primary user class is the equity 
investor. 
In the most general single-person settin~ useful information 
must have the potential to change the decisions (actions) 
that would prevail in its absence. For an 
information system to have informational value the expected 
utility of the optimal action in the post-signal setting 
must exceed that in the pre-signal setting. (l) Only 
some of the signals emerging from a system need alter only 
some of the prior probability estimates of potential outcomes. 
Mean-Variance Portfolio Theory provides a more specific 
individual investor setting. It can be shown that in such 
a setting the only firm specific parameter relevant to the 
equity investment decision is the systematic risk measure 
(Beta S). Logically therefore,only information which has 
the potential to change S estimates can be considered 
useful. 
(1) Footnotes appear at the end of the chapter, page 341. 
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The primacy of the equity investor among users of accounting 
information and the uniqueness of B in equity investment 
decisions highlight the relationship between firm specific 
information and systematic risk as the most significant in 
the financial reporting process. Insights into the economic 
determinants of B, the association between accounting data 
and B, and the role of information in the determination of 
B should be of interest to all associated with financial 
reporting. 
It is,therefore, not surprising that much research attention, 
both theoretical and empirical, has focused on these 
issues. 
Financial Economists seem to have been primarily interested 
in the economic determinants of B,while accounting researchers 
have tended to concentrate on the association between accounting 
data ands. This study aspires to contribute to these 
lines of research by investigating the possible role of 
information non-disclosures as determinants of B. 
10.2.2 Literature Survey 
The theoretical works on the economic determinants of B 
have focused primarily on the capital structure of the 
firm as a significant determinant. Hamada (1969, 1972), 
Rubinstein (1973), Conine (1980) and Bowman (1979) have 
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contributed to the development of an analytical framework 
to describe the relationship between Sand capital structure. 
This framework was first suggested by Hamada (1969) 
and represents a synthesis of portfolio (and capital 
pricing) theorywiL~ the Miller-Modigliani 
on corporate debt policy. 
(MM) propositions 
The framework suggests that systematic risk (S) is composed 
of two elements (1) systematic operating risk (S t) and 
asse 
(2) financial risk which increases with increased debt. 
Thus capital structure is a determinant of Sin that it 
determines financial risk. The suggested relationship 
between Sand capital structure is not simple and appears to 
be positive though non-linear and multiplicative. 
Lev (1974) developed an analytical argument which 
prescribed operating leverage (Fixed costs : Variable 
costs) as a determinant of systematic risk. Conine (1982) 
proposes a more general framework for the determinants of 
operating risk including operating leverage. 
The empirical works, howeve~ have to some extent been 
contradictory. Hamada (1972) presents evidence that capital 
structure contributes between 21% and 24% of the systematic 
risk across firms. Rosenberg and McKibben (1973), Logue 
and Merville (1972), Melicher and Rush (1974), Beaver, 
Kettler and Scholes (1970), Bildersee (1975), Belkaoui (1978) 
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and Dhingra (1982) all report evidence of a positive 
relationship between capital structure and B. 
Howeve~ the explanatory power of capital structure in the 
multiple regression-based studies by Thompson (1976), 
Breen and Lerner (1973) and Lev and Kunitzky (1974) was 
not significant. 
These studies neither support nor refute the 
proposed analytical relationship between Band capital 
structure. In fact, no attempt to evaluate directly the 
Hamada-Rubinstein framework is evident, probably indicating 
the difficulty of such an exercise. 
Lev (1974) provides evidence consistent with his proposed 
analytical relationship between Band operating leverage, 
that i~ as operating leverage is increase~ B increases. 
The work of Robichek and Cohn (1974) attests to the 
dependence of Son the macro economic environment. 
The studies on the association of market determined risk 
and accounting data, have been mainly correlation studies, 
both univariate and multivariate. Consequently, 
the works render evidence of the joint hypothesis 
that the market uses the accounting data in its risk 
estimation and/or t~at the market and accountina ~easures are ~ 
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being determined independently b~ and reflect the same 
real events. 
The accounting datum which has attracted the most attention 
in the literature is the so-called accounting Beta (B ) • 
ace 
This is a derived datum (i.e. not reported by firms) that 
measures the covariability of a firm's accounting returns 
with the accounting returns of all firm~ relative to the 
average variability of the accounting returns of all firms. 
In the literature, accounting returns have been defined as 
either 
(1) Book earnings before interest as a proportion of 
book assets (B asset); or 
ace 
(2) Book earnings after interest as a proportion of book 
equity (6 equity). 
ace 
Ball and Brown (1969) were the first to introduce this 
concept of B into the literature, 
ace 
vet their 
specification of the measure was not a true accounting B 
at all. They defined 'return' as book earnings attributable 
to common shareholders as a proportion of market capital-
isation. Their results, not surprisingly, indicate a 
high association between this measure and the market S. 
Beaver, Kettler and Scholes (1970) also found a high 
association between Band B {a la Ball and Brown). 
ace 
Gonedes (1973) pointed out the anomaly of using a hybrid 
290 
S and having redefined S in purely accounting terms ace ace 
reports a significantly weaker association between Band 
Beaver and Manegold (1975) criticised Gonedes' 
measurement errors and in a very comprehensive study 
tested the association between Sand the three accounting 
B's mentioned. While they report a significant association 
between the pure Bacc's and B, these are considerably less 
associated with B than the Ball and Brown hybrid. The 
Sacc equity appears to be more significantly associated 
with B than B assets. 
ace 
Beaver, Kettler and Scholes (1970) measured the association 
between a number of other accounting risk measures and B 
at both the firm and portfolio levels. All data were 
associated with S individually (i.e. a univariate approach). 
As would be expected, the association between portfolio 
averaged accounting risk measures and portfolio S was more 
significant than the corresponding association at the firm 
level. 
Bildersee (1975), using a multivariate association approach, 
reports that accounting data in conjunction with other non-
accounting decision variables, are better determinants of S 
than either category separately. 
Belkaoui (1978) and Dhingra (1982) carried out similar 
association tests on Canadian data and report results coincident 
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with the Arilerican studies. 
On the theoretical front, Bowman (1979) has developed an 
interesting analytical model relating market and accounting 
S's. Hill and Stone (1980) use a risk composition 
approach to explain Sin terms of accounting variables. 
All this research has been carried out in just over a 
decade and the advances, both theoretical and empirical, have 
be~~ formidable. However, while the results may provide 
invaluable insights intothe potential use of accounting data 
in the prediction of S, little insight has been achieved into the 
role of accounting information per se in the assessment 
of S by the market~ 
10.2.3 Information and Risk - Some Reflections 
The theoretical studies implicitly assume away the 
information aspect in so far as the assumptions of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the MM propositions 
are invoked. These include the notion of 
informationally efficient securities markets: in other words, 
security prices are said to reflect all relevant 
information and for this to hold, all incremental 
information to the set already available would need to be 
impounded into prices instantaneously and in an unbiased 
fashion. This hypothesis of efficient securities markets, 
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known as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), assumes 
by implication that there is a market for information which is 
frictionless. In such a setting, it is obvious that the 
market estimate of S would be the 'correct' one i.e. the 
true ex ante S estimated by the market in a rich 
informational setting (see Fama, 1970). Intuitively a 
real Scan be imagined as the S the market would estimate 
given a total description of all firms in the market. The 
EMH implies that the observed (ex post) market estimates 
(derived via the diagonal model) will perfectly reflect 
the underlying true S. The real events which determine 
the true Swill be adequately captured the 
available information set which in turn will be 
unbiasedly impounded into share prices. Accounting data 
occupy only a subset of available information and as 
indicated above any observed association between this 
subset and observed S could indicate (1) that the 
accounting data transmit information about the real events 
to the market, or (2) that the accounting data reflect the 
same real events as the data that do transmit information 
to the market. These intuitive relationships are 
illustrated in Figure 10.1 (overleaf). 
This portrayal of relationships is obviously artificial in 
the sense that no real Sexists separately from the 
information system describing the real events which 
determine 3. Thus in the extreme case of no information, 
Observed S 
Market 
Determines S 
A= Accounting Data 
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Information 
Publicly Available 
Figure 10.l 
Real S 
~~~-Real Events 
Determine B 
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the market would not price the share and thus no S 
estimate would be obtained. Tnis extrerre example is not really 
insightful L'"lto t,_~e relationship between information and risk 
except in so far as it illustrates the inextricable link between the two. 
At the other extremity, in a setting with complete information, 
the mapping between the real determinants of Sand the 
market estimates is without distortion. It is in this 
latter setting that most of the empirical and theoretical 
work has been couched by implication. Given the 
voluminous evidence supporting the semi-strong EMH on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American accounting 
researchers have assumed this mapping between real events 
and market estimates is non distortive. Consequently,the 
thrust of this research effort has been directed to 
examining the relation of the accounting subset to the 
overall set of available information. More specifically, 
the study of the relationship beb-veen accounting risk rreasures and 
market determined risk measures, as reviewed, has been 
concerned with the extent to which the accounting subset 
captures the real events (and therefore may be useful 
predictors of S) and the extent to which the market uses 
the accounting data. 
The efficient market's research has provided a clear 
and rich setting in which to assess the role of financial reporting 
and as such constitutes a most significant line of research 
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in accounting. If it is accepted that the market will use 
as wide an information set as possible and that relevant 
information is impounded into prices efficientl~ then what 
should be of concern to the financial reporter is the 
relationship between the accounting data and the overall 
information set. More specificall~ the objectives of 
financial reporting will only be achieved where the 
accountant has a comparative advantage in information 
production and accounting represents the most cost-effective 
alternative to describe the real events impinging on the 
firm. Thus research into the relationship between the 
accounting subset and all other information is of interest. 
It may also be oi: interest to consider certain data which 
are outside the publicly available information set and the 
extent to which this may distort the market's perceptions 
of the reality of the firm. 
Obviously if the market was unaware of the existence of a 
potential information system to which it was being denied 
access, the distortion would constitute the lost unique perspective 
of real events that affect B, which may never be detected. 
An interesting case is the situation in which the market 
is aware that it is being denied access to the system. 
Does the market estimate the perspective that would 
prevail through access to the system? Does the market 
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rate the firm as being rrore risl<'-J for the lost perspective? D:::ies 
the market rate the firm more risky for the non-disclosure 
per se? 
The balance of this chapter attempts to provide some further 
insight into these reflections. In contrast to other 
works in the literature, this study admits the possibility 
that certain information structures may distort the 
mapping between the real Band the market estimates. 
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10.3 EMPIRICAL STUDY 
10.3.1 Approach and Hypothesis 
It is rather difficult to construct experiments to evaluate 
and answer the questions raised in the previous section and 
any such experiments are likely to be imperfect for it is 
not normally possible to observe market reaction (change in 
risk estimates) to accounting systems from which it is being 
deprived access. This is so for three obvious reasons; 
(1) such systems may not exist; (2) given that such systems 
exist, the researcher is never sure that the market is aware 
of their existence and its denied access; and (3) having 
overcome the first two hurdles, it would be almost impossible 
to control for cross-sectional differences among firms. 
The disclosure requirements of the South African Companies 
Act, Act. No. 61 of 1973 (1973 Act) provides a potentially 
interesting vehicle to circumvent the problems indicated. 
The 4th Schedule of the 1973 Act substantially expanded 
the mandatory disclosure requirements of its predecessor, 
the 8th Schedule of the 1926 Act. However, certain listed 
companies voluntarily disclosed certain of these requirements 
prior to the passing of the 1973 Act. A natural setting 
thus prevails to control cross-sectional differences (see 
Figure 10.2). For reasons indicated in Section 10.3.2.l 
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below, the information systems chosen were those reflected 
by annual turnover and the Funds Statement. 
The fact that certain firms were voluntarily disclosing 
information prior to the 1973 Act indicates the market's 
awareness that it was being denied these data 
by the non-disclosure firms. The differential disclosure 
policies of firms with respect to certain items prior to 
the mandatory disclosure requirement of such information 
provides a useful control for cross-sectional 
comparisons of risk estimates. Thus, the impact of the enactment 
can be monitored by observing any differential risk 
ratings in the period after enactment. The arrows on 
Figure 10.2 reflect the cross-sectional and 
longitudinal comparisons that are possible and, indee~ are 
attempted in this study. 
The approach will be to evaluate changes in risk measures 
before and after enactment for various categories of 
disclosure/non-disclosure groups of firms and to compare 
the significance of any changes across categories. 
The following three categories of competing hypotheses 
are to be tested : 
Series A Hypotheses - An Increase in Risk 
If non-disclosure firms display an increased risk in the 
Pre 1973 Act 
Disclosure 
Firms 
Non-Disclosure 
Firms 
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I 
Figure 10.2 
Post 1973 Act 
Unaffected by 
Certain 
Requirements 
Affected by 
Certain 
Reoui.cements 
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post enactment period relative to disclosure firms, 
the result would be consistent with the following 
hypotheses 
(1) The market systematically underestimated the true 
risk of the firm in the pre-enactment period. 
(2) The market did not attempt to guess the 
implications of the lost information which, 
when once revealed, reflected a more risky 
reality than that described by the pre-enact-
ment information set. 
(3) The non-disclosure per se reduced the risk of 
the firm in the pre-enactment period. It is 
unlikely that the market would pay a premium 
for less information. 
Series B Hypotheses - No Change in Risk 
If there is no change in risk or no difference in the 
change experienced by the various groups, the following 
rather uninteresting hypotheses may be supportable : 
(1) The disclosures have no impact on risk. 
(2) The market derives the information from 
alternative sources. 
(3) The market is efficient in the strong form of the 
EMH and even inside information is reflected in share nr· 
"~ices. 
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Series C Hypotheses - A Reduction in Risk 
If non-disclosure firms are found to be rated as less risky 
after enactment relative to disclosure firms, the support-
able hypotheses would be 
(1) The market consistently overestimated the real risk 
prior to disclosures. 
(2) The market did not attempt to guess the implications 
of the lost information which,when once revealed, re-
flected a less risky reality than that described by 
the pre-enactment information set. 
(3) The non-disclosure per se resulted in an increased 
risk rating of firms by the market. That is, the 
market would be paying a premium for information. 
10.3.2 Methodology and Data 
10.3.2.1 Choice of Accounting Information Systems 
A comprehensive survey was undertaken on the disclosure 
policies of all companies for which share price data were 
available for the full 11 year period 1 January 1969 through 
31 December 1979 -95 companies in total. It was apparent 
from this survey that for most of the specific disclosure 
requirements of the 1973 Act, the majority of firms had 
similar disclosure policies in the pre-enactment period. 
Thus the cross-sectional control feature is lost for these 
particular items. 
302 
The criteria to select a disclosure requirement for 
inclusion in this study were : 
(1) At least 30 companies must have been disclosing the 
item voluntarily before the 1973 Act was promulgated 
(Disclosure firms}; and 
(2) At least 30 companies were not disclosing the item 
during the same period (Non-disclosure firms). 
It is necessary to have reasonably sized groups representing 
the differential disclosure policies in order to remove (by 
averaging} any non-common distorting characteristics in a 
group. 
it is 
Although 30 was necessarily arbitrary, 
unlikely to introduce any bias in the 
selection of disclosure items as for all requirements 
(other than the two selected} at least 90 of the 95 companies 
had similar disclosure policies. 
The only two items which met the above criteria were 
(1) The disclosure of annual turnover; (2 ) and 
(2) The presentation of a Funds Statement. (3 ) 
The following groupings were obtained (see Table 10.l 
overleaf} 
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TABLE 10.l 
Funds Statement Total 
(D) (ND) 
(D) 28 3 31 
Turnover 
(ND) 35 29 64 
Total 63 32 95 
Key 
D = Disclosed prior 1973 
ND = Not disclosed prior 1973 
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The critical issue in testing the hypotheses seems to be 
Would the 'information systems' provide a unique 
perspective of the firm to the market? 
to this question are: 
The two elements 
(i) does the variability (co-variability) of turnover (cash 
flow) affect risk? 
(ii) is the market able to assess the risk implied by these 
measures (if any) from alternative information sources? 
The answers are not obvious. Althoug::1 little theoretical work has 
been developed on the relationship between turnover and risk, 
Bowman (1979) presents an analysis of the relation-
ship between earnings covariability with market earnings and 
systematic risk (S). He argued that no obvious (direct?) 
relationship existed between total variability of earnings 
and B. As turnover is likely to be highly correlated with 
earnings,there is not likBly to be a direct link between 
turnover variability (or covariability) ands. Earnings 
were disclosed at all times by all firms in this study and 
given its relationship with turnover,it is unlikely that 
the disclosure of turnover would provide any incremental 
insight on risk. 
Although cash flow variability (or covariability) may be a 
determinant of S, fluctuations in the year to year cash 
position may well be used by the market as a surrogate where 
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a full funds statement is not provided. 
It is likely therefore, that any observed change in risk 
associated with a change in disclosure policy is attributable 
to the prior denial of access per se, rather than any new 
perspectives attained. 
10.3.2.2 Choice of Risk Measures 
Prior to the development of modern portfolio theory, ''risk" 
was not rigorously defined and tended to be dealt with in 
many investment texts in a loose, intuitive way. The 
seminal work of Markowitz (1952) formalised risk and 
defined the risk of a share as l:eing the variance (0~) of its 
l 
return (period to period price change). He showed that 
variance was a complete measure of risk under certain 
assumptions. These naturally restrict the use of 
variance to a setting where these assumptions are valid. 
It would appear that prices behave as if these assumptions 
are valid. 
Markowitz (1952) showed that the variance of return on a 
portfolio of assets could be dichotomised into a systematic 
element (non-diversifiable) and an unsystematic element 
(diversifiable). 
then notationally 
If equal weiahts are given to each asset, 
where 0 2 (R ) p 
0 (R.R.) 
l J 
= 
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Unsystematic 
( 1 /N) 0 2(R . ) + 
l 
Systematic 
(N-1) (R R ) 
N 0 .. l J 
is the variance of the return on 
the portfolio 
is the average variance of the 
return on N assets in the portfolio 
is the average covariance of each 
constituent's return with the return 
of every other constituent 
The unsystematic risk is composed of the variances of the 
constituents and is diversifiable because the contribution 
of this element to the total risk of the portfolio can be 
driven to zero by increasing the number of assets in the 
portfolio (N) . 
Systematic risk,on the other hand,cannot be driven to zero 
and is determined by the covariability among the returns of 
the constituent assets (i.e. shares). 
The total variance of a particular share (a~) is not of 
l 
obvious importance to the well diversified investor (i.e. 
unsystematic risk= O). Furthermore, the variance of the 
(1) 
return on a share is likely to be independent of the 
covariability of these returns with the returns of all other 
shares. 
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These insights provided by Markowitz have been pivotal to 
the development of modern finance. However, the 
application of the Markowitz model is severely limited by 
the formidable extent of parameter estimation - (N. (N+l)/2) 
estimates are necessary. 
Sharpe (1963) introduced a model (the diagonal model) which 
dramatically simplified the Markowitz approach. 
This model dichotomises the return of a share into 
systematic and non-systematic components, analogous to the 
Markowitzian decomposition of portfolio risk. These 
COIT!p)nents respectively reflect a comron rrovement with the average return 
of all shares and a unique movement specific to a particular 
share. 
R. = a. + B. R + E. 
1 1 1 m 1 
-
Cl. + E i l represents the individualistic component 
-B. R 
l m 
represents the systematic component 
The total variance of a share's return is thus equal to the 
variance of these two components~ ('>lotice that the variance 
of a = O. ) 
Therefore 
(2) 
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= 
and the total variance of the portfolio return would be 
where for ( 2) , ( 3) and ( 4) 
E ( E) = 0 
o(R ,E.) = 0 m i 
o (E. , E.) = 0 
l J 
-
R. = return on share i l 
R = return on all shares (market return) m 
E = a portion of a share's return independent 
of market return 
a. , S. = intercept and slope associated with the l l linear relationship of ( 2) 
o 2(E i) = mean of the variance of individualistic 
factors 
B = mean of the S's of each share in the 
portfolio 
o ~Rm) = the variance of market return 
As the number of shares in a portfolio increases, the 
variance of the portfolio's return tends to ( 3) 2 0 ~R ). 
m 
Clearly, the impact of an individual share on portfolio risk 
is measured by 3 ., not o~E .). 
l l 
The only firm specific parameter that should be of any 
concern to the diversified investor is which measures 
~i 
( 3) 
( 4) 
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the covariability of a share's return with the market return, 
relative to the variance of the market return. 
algebraically we can write 
a(R. ,R ) 1 m 
Thus, 
From this normative approach in portfolio analysis, Sharpe 
(1963) and others developed a descriptive (positive) 
approach to determine how shares are priced. This resulted 
in the famous Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which is 
a model describj,ng how shares are priced in equilibrium : 
= 
E = expected value operator 
Rf = the riskless rate of interest 
Intuitively, the price of a share is determined by 
expectations on the return on the market as a whole which 
will be affected by market wide-factors and S. which is J. 
firm specific. 
( 5) 
Thus, events at two levels would affect, by implication, expected 
share returns: (1) the economy wide level, and (2) the firm 
specific level. A clear omission is the industry level, 
~ut empirically this does not seem to be a serious 
misspecification on either the NYSE (King 1966) or the JSE 
(Visser 1982) . 
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Intuitively,therefore,one would infer the information 
requirement of an investor in a CAPM world as l:eing descriptive 
of 
(1) the economy as a whole; that is,information with 
the potential to change investor expectations of 
the average return on all investment opportunities; 
and 
(2) firm specific events which may affect the relationship 
between the share and the market as a whole, namely B. 
It is highly abstractive,but potentially insightful to the 
accountant to dichotomise firm specific information into 
B descriptive and B non-descriptive. Clearly,the latter 
would be of no consequence to decision making and,therefore, 
redundant. In order to achieve the objectives of financial 
reporting, the accountant should be prepared to produce 
only B descriptive information. In fact, it could be 
argued that, if the errors in S estimates of an uninformed 
investor are independent across firms, portfolio S 
estimates may be accurate without any firm specific 
information. This only implies that certain investors 
may have no private demand for firm specific information, 
not that firm specific information is of no value. 
It is currently not possible to categorise accounting data 
as 3 descriptive and B non-descriptive. An insight into 
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the exogenous (non-price) variables that change investor 
expectations, manifested as observable price reassess-
ments resulting in given ex-post 6 measures, should 
therefore be of value. 
The choice of 6 as the primary risk measure in this study 
is well supported theoretically and empirically. 
All the risk measures used in this study are founded on the 
Sharpe approach to portfolio analysis and all estimates are 
made ~loying ordinary least squares regression (OLS) which is 
consistent with the notions behind Sharpe's linear diagonal 
model (2). 
Using weekly price data, the measures all derive from the 
OLS regression 
= 
A 
a.. and 6. 
J. J. 
E .. 
J. 1: 
is the return on share i in period t. 
is the return on the 'market' in period t; 
the RDM 100 industrial index was used as a 
surrogate 
are the intercept and slope parameters of 
the linear relationship unique to share i 
is a disturbance factor or residual 
at time t 
indicates an estimate 
( 6) 
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To achieve a consistent estimation of the a. and B. parameters 
l l 
using the OLS technique, the following assumptions need to be 
validated 
( l) E(Eit) = 0 for all t 
-( 2) CT (E ·E. ') = 0 for it' it all t t t' (zero autocorrelation) 
-( 3) a2(Eit) = 02 for all t (homoskedasticity) i 
( 4} a(R -1-iE;-1-) 
rn'- .J..'-
= 0 
(1) and (2) are unlikely to constrain the application of OLS. 
Studies on the NYSE, e.g. Fama et al. (1969) have indicated 
a compliance with these assumptions. Random walk studies 
on the JSE by Affleck-Graves and Money (1975) indicate 
similar results to those obtained on the NYSE. Thus the 
similarity is likely to hold for these two assumptions. 
The third assumption describes a condition termed homo-
skedasticity (constant variance of residual errors) 
and when contravened, a condition of heteroskedasticity is 
said to prevail. A violation of the independence assumption 
of (4) is often evidenced by a condition of heteroskedasticity. 
Fama et al. (1969) conclude that the homoskedastic condition 
is well supported empirically on the NYSE. Affleck-Graves 
(1977) reports that the heteroskedasticity problem may render 
the market model (i.e. OLS) inapplicable on the JSE 
and, furt~er~ore, shows that the condition tends to 
result in underestimates of 3 using OLS and that R (the 
correlation coefficient ru and thus R2 tend to be over-
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estimated where this condition prevails. For this reason, 
Affleck-Graves suggests that the S.D. ratio or Beta 
quotient may be a useful surrogate for measuring systematic 
risk on the JSE. 
A 
In addition to S, total variance was chosen since this was 
the first definition of risk and may be of some interest to 
certain undiversified investors. In terms of the 
OLS approach,a measure of§ and total variance taken 
together would provide a derived view of the variance of 
A 
individualistic factors. Thus, if no change in Sis 
induced by various information structures however total 
variance is affected, it can be assumed that the information 
affects the unsystematic portion of a share's return. 
variance may, therefore, provide an interesting insight. 
The other statistic which should be of interest is the 
coefficient of determination (R 2 ). The R2 statistic 
Total 
measures the proportion of the variation in share returns 
to the variation in market returns and consequently indicates 
the proportion of total variance that consists of systematic 
risk. It is possible that this proportion is affected by 
informational factors. 
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Returning to Affleck-Graves' suggestion that the Band R2 
estimations may be distorted by the contravention of OLS 
assumptions ( 3) and ( 4 ), it was decided to use the 
Beta quotient as an alternative risk measure in this study. 
Clearly,there is a structural relationship between Band R 
A 
and therefore any informational effects on B or R would be 
A 
impounded trivially into the B/R statistic. Nonetheless, as 
developed below, the Beta quotient can be interpreted as 
an interesting 'stand alone' risk measure. 
As indicated above,under the acceptable assumption of normal 
distribution of share returns 
A 
B = 
and R = 
A 
B = 
Thus B = R 
o(R.R) 
1 m 
0 2 ( R ) 
m 
o(R.R ) 
1 m 
(0R.) (0R ) 
1 m 
o ( R. ) 
l 
Ro(R ) 
m 
a ( R.) 
l 
A ( R ) 
G m 
The Beta quotient can be viewed, therefore, as the standard 
deviation of the return of a share over the standard deviation 
of the return on the market. 
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Before leaving OLS and proceeding to the next section, 
note that the returns Rit and Rmt used in this study 
are defined as 
where R. t 1; 
P. t 1; 
= log P. t - log P. t 1 e 1; e 1; -
is the return on the share i in period t 
is the price of share i at the end of 
period t 
is the price of share i at the beginning 
of period t 
This measure of return is equivalent to a continuously 
compounded rate of return and is,therefore,considered most 
appropriate (Fama 1965). 
10.3.2.3 Procedures and Data 
Weekly share price data between February 1968 and November 
1980 are available at the University of Cape Town (UCT) for 
approximately 130 industrial companies quoted on the JSE. 
However, the longest continuous period between these dates 
for the greatest number of companies was the 11 year period 
from 1 January 1969 through 31 December 1979 for 95 of 
these companies. The study is restricted to these 95 shares 
and 11 years of data. 
The pre-enactment and post-enactment risk measures were 
based on the time periods set out schematically in Figure 10.3. 
1.1.69 
5 Years 
1.1. 70 
4 
1.1. 71 
3 
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31.12. 73 1.1. 75 
1.1. 72 
2 
1 
Pre-Enactment 
1.1. 73 
Adjustment 
Period 
Figure 10.3 
31.12. 79 
31.12. 78 
31.12. 77 
31.12. 76 
31.12.75 
Post-Enactment 
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Notice that the 1974 calendar year has been omitted for all 
estimates. This is to allow for an adjustment period 
after the promulgation of the 1973 Act. This Act became 
effective on 1 January 1974, but as the firms in the study 
have a variety of financial year end dates, they do not have 
a contemporaneous change in environment. It 
is certain that all price changes prior to 31 December 1973 
reflect the old disclosure regime and all price changes 
after 1 January 1975 reflect the new disclosure regime. 
Omitting 1974 data for all estimates ensures that comparisons 
are made on the correct basis. 
Five different period lengths were used to ensure that the 
results are not merely a function of an arbitrary estimate 
period. However, all paired t-statistics (see below) were 
based on matched pairs of 'before' and 'after' risk measures 
estimated over equal periods. 
For each of the 95 shares the four different risk measures 
were estimated for the 10 different time periods illustrated in 
Figure 10. 3 and thus 3 800 separate estimates were obtained, comprising 
1 900 matched pairs of pre-and post-risk estimates (475 
pairs for each risk measure). These 475 pairs were 
subjected to the ensuing statistical tests as five 
separate groups representing each of the five period lengths 
illustrated above. 
The 95 pairs of pre-and post-estimates for each risk measure 
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and time interval were then grouped according to their 
disclosure policies in the pre•and post-enactment period 
relative to the items of interest, that is, according to 
the groups identified in Table 10.l (page 303) above. For 
convenience, Table 10.l is rearran~ed and represented as 
Table 10.2 overleaf. 
These seven groups (note Groups 7 and 5 are identical) of 
paired estimates were subjected to the paired t-test to 
establish if the relevant risk rating for the group as a 
whole had changed significantly after the promulgation of 
the 1973 Act. Thus,120 t-statistics were computed and 
the results are presented in four tables (four risk 
measures) in an eight ~roups) x five (period lengths) format 
(see Tables 10.4 through 10. 7, pages 330 to 333). The eiqht oroups v.ere 
divided into four pairs according to Table 10.2 for intergroup 
comparisons. 
Formally the test statistic is described: 
where 
-b. 
l. j 
t• J 
and 
d· J 
dij 
a. 
l. j 
= 
= 
= 
d· - 0 J 
S.E.d. 
J 
! [ d .. 
n l.J 
b .. - a .. 
l.J l.J 
are,respectively, the risk estimate before 
and after t~e 19,3 ~ct for share i estimated 
over j years 
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Table 10.2 
Policy 
1. Turnover disclosed prior to 1973 
2. Turnover not disclosed prior to 1973 
3. Funds Statement disclosed prior 
to 1973 
4. Funds Statement not disclosed prior 
to 1973 
5. Funds Statement disclosed/Turnover 
No. 
31 
64 
63 
32 
disclosed 28 
6. Funds Statement disclosed/Turnover 
not disclosed 
7. Funds Statement disclosed/Turnover 
35 
disclosed 28 
8. The rest 62 
Pair No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
and 
A2 
ad. = 
J 
I:d .. 2 ]. J 
n-1 
= 
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standard error of the d. 
( I:d .. ) 2 ]. J 
n (n-1) 
J 
= Variance d. 
J 
Under the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
in pre- and post-risk estimates, tj has a student t-
distribution with a n-1 degrees of freedom. A 
significance level of 5% was used for all subsequent tests. 
n = number of shares in each group 
The hypotheses to be tested are given in Table 10.3 overleaf. 
This test statistic is parameter based and relies on the 
assumption that the underlying test data conform to a 
normal distribution. This assumption is acceptable as the 
risk estimates did exhibit normal or near normal 
distributions (test statistics not reported). 
The paired t-test is not a test of absolute differences in 
matched pairs and,therefore,increases and decreases within 
a group are allowed to set off one another. The result reflects the 
net trend for the group as a whole, while the averaging 
across firms reduces the possible bias of large magnitude 
estimates within a particular sample group. 
The null hypothesis is rejected in cases where the t-statistic 
exceeds the critical values of the student t-distribution with 
(n-1) degrees of freedom. 
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Table 10.3 
Hypothesis Condition Notation in Tables 4-7 
HO (b .. - a .. ) = 0 NC (no change) lJ lJ 
Hla (b .. - a .. ) < 0 c+ ( +ve change) lJ lJ 
Hlb (b .. - a .. ) > 0 C (-ve change) lJ lJ 
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In all 120 t-statistics were derived and the results are 
presented in Tables 4 through 7 in Section 10.3.3. Critical 
values are not reported,but for each t-test one of the 
symbols (NC, C+, C-) indicating the appropriate hypothesis, 
is reported. 
Summary of Procedural Steps 
A 
( 1) B/R for each share over the 10 time 
periods shown in Figure 10.3; 3 800 measures in total. 
(2) Thus for each share and each type of risk a pre-and 
post-enactment measure was obtained for each of the 
five time intervals illustrated in Figure 10.3; 1 900 
pairs in total. 
(3) The shares were then classified according to the matrix 
of Tables 10.l and 10.2. 
(4) The paired risk measures were grouped according 
to (3) and a paired-t statistic was computed for each 
group, each risk type and each time period. Thus, 
for each risk type 40 t-statistics were obtained, 
that is, eight classifications across five time 
periods. 
(5) The interpretation was then based on a comparison 
between the four pairs of classifications (Table 10.2) 
and the five time periods for each risk type. 
(6) The t-statistics represent the longitudinal or 
'through time' control and the paired classification 
represents the cross-sectional control. 
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10.3.3 Results and Interpretations 
10.3.3.1 Changes in Systematic Risk (B) 
The analysis in this section is based on the results 
summarised in Table 10.4 (page 330). 
The disclosure/non-disclosure of turnover does not appear 
to have any real effect on B. B appeared to be fairly 
stationary in the period before and after the 1973 Act for 
both disclosure and non-disclosure firms, based on estimates 
from 1 to 4 years. Based on five year estimates, it seems 
that while disclosure firms' B estimates remained unchanged 
the non-disclosure firms on average were rated less risky 
in the post-enactment period, thus indicating the 
possibility of accepting the C series of interpretations 
(refer Section 10.3.1). 
The results for the disclosure/non-disclosure of the funds 
statement are the same as for turnover for the one to 
three year estimates,that is, no change for both groups. 
Based on four year estimates, non-disclosure firms 
A 
exhibited no change in ~but the disclosure firms were 
rated more risky in the post-enactment period. Thus non-
disclosure firms were relatively less risky in the post-
enactment period. Based on the five year estimates, both 
groups were rated significantly less risky after the 
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passing of the Act. The results are, therefore, not 
that clear and it seems reasonable to accept the null 
hypothesis with respect to the funds statement. 
In fact, for both the above comparisons a rejection of the 
~ 
null hypothesis of change in B does not seem justified. Thus, 
neither the non-disclosure of turnover nor the funds statement 
when taken separately appear to affect market estimates 
of B. 
The third column for comparison on Table 10.4 is far more 
interesting. It seems that for firms with a disclosure 
policy vis a vis the funds statement, the disclosure or 
non-disclosure of turnover seems critical. The turnover 
non-disclosures were rated less risky in three of the five 
period lengths and for the other period lengths (viz. 
three and four years) B remained unchanged. Interestingly, 
based on the three and four year estimates, disclosure firms 
were rated more risky (B increases) w~ereas B remained 
unchanged for the other three period lengths. Thus it 
seems clear that in all cases the disclosure of turnover, 
given the disclosure of the funds statemen4 resulted in a 
relative downward risk rating. Moreover,t~e non-disclosure of 
turnove4 given the voluntary disclosure of the funds state-
ment, seemed to increase systematic risk. The C series of 
interpretations seem appropriate and the null hypothesis is 
rejected in favour of Hlb" 
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The fourth comparison on Table 10.4 has a similar pattern to 
the second comparison and it supports the conclusion that 
the disclosure or non-disclosure of turnover is only 
critical where the funds statement is disclosed. A testing 
of the converse, viz. establishing the effect of not disclosing 
a funds statement (given the disclosure of turnover), would be 
intriguing. However, the "disclose turnover/non-disclose funds 
statemen~' category only applied to three shares (see Table 
10.1), making such a test infeasible. 
~ 
A general pattern that emerges is that Bis more stationary 
over shorter periods which is consistent with the 
results of Blume (1975) and Baesel (1974) on the NYSE. 
10.3.3.2 Changes in Total Risk (o 2 ) (Variance) 
The analysis in this section is based on the results 
summarised in Table 10. 5 (page 331) . 
It is interesting to note that there was no significant 
change in total variance for any category for the one year 
measures. 
For three of the five period lengths, the non-disclosure 
of turnover group was rated less risk~ in terms of total 
variance in the post enactment period whereas 
disclosure firms were rated less risky in only the five 
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year category. Thus, the C series would seem feasible. 
The non-disclosure of turnover seems to result in a higher 
total variance. 
Although the non-disclosure of funds statement category 
_exhibited a significantly lower variance for two of the 
periods, the disclosure firms behaved likewise. The B 
series of interpretations would consequently be evoked, 
despite the null hypothesis being accepted in both cases. 
The third comparison is encouraging as the emergent pattern 
is identical to that between disclosure/non-disclosure of 
turnover (the first comparison). The inference to be 
drawn is that with respect to total variance there is little 
interaction between the disclosure of funds statement and 
turnover. 
The fourth comparison is identical to the third which must 
indicate that the disclosure of turnover dominates. 
This pattern is to be expected given the previous three cases. 
Therefore, one may conclude that the C series 
interpretations would apply to the turnover system and the 
B series to the funds statement system with respect to 
total variance. 
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10.3.3.3 Chanqes in the Coefficient of Determination (R2 ) 
The analysis in this section is based on Table 10.6 (page 332). 
As previously indicated, R2 is not in itself a risk measure. 
However, it provides a measure of the proportion systematic : 
total risk and, therefore,the proportion unsystematic : total 
risk. 
Table 10.6 is not dealt with on a pairwise basis initially, but 
rather in total for at this level an interesting result 
emerges. 
Initially one would expect these relationships to change 
more over longer than shorter periods. This trend is 
evident in the previous two sections. The interesting 
aspect of Table 10.6 is that the changes seem to be systematic, 
i.e. no change for years 1 through 3 (with two exceptions) 
and all reducing in year 5 with the anomaly being 
year 4 when only the non-disclosures are down rated. 
It seems that the longer the estimation period, the more 
chance of a downward revision in R2 in the subsequent 
period of equal length. The non-disclosures,howeve~ seem 
to be systematically more sensitive to these changes and 
'turn' before the disclosure firms. This implies that the 
disclosure of turnover tends to reduce the proportion of 
systematic risk to total risk. This view is more likely to hold 
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than the alternative interpretation that unsystematic risk 
increases as information is disclosed. 
This raises interesting questions on the relation between 
the various elements of risk and information which may 
provide a fruitful direction for future research. 
10.3.3.4 Changes in Beta Quotient (S/R) 
The analysis is based on Table 10.7 (page 333). Again, observing 
the results in totq no change is apparent for any 
category based on the one-year and five-year estimates but 
the quotient increased for all categories on the four year 
estimates. The only discernible differences between 
disclosure and non-disclosure firms were in the two and 
three year estimates. 
The disclosure of turnove~ agai~ seems to dominate. The 
disclosure firms' Beta quotient increases for the three 
year estimate and remains the same for the two year data. 
The converse is true of the non-disclosure firms, i.e. the 
quotient remains constant based on the three year data and 
decreases for the two year estimates. 
There is a fundamental weakness in using this risk measure 
since,as indicated above, the disclosure of turnover in 
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terms of the 1973 Act tends to reduce Sand R2 and 
thus, any change in the quotient may reflect merely the 
relative change in Band R, adding 
interpretation. 
little to the 
However, in view of the certain degree of heteroskedacity 
reported by Affleck-Graves (see Section 10.3.2.2), the Beta 
quotient may be a more useful measure of systematic risk. 
If the quotient is a better measure of systematic risk, it 
seems as though the information effects are actually less 
A A 
apparent than B, although a similar inference as that for B 
would seem appropriate. That is, the non-disclosure of 
turnover resulted in shares being rated more risky based on 
the quotient although less significantly so than with the S 
measure. 
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10.3.4 Tentative Conclusions 
Table 10.8 (overleaf) summarises the tentative conclusions 
drawn for each of the risk measures for each comparison 
pair (per Table 10.2). 
It is emphasised that a tabulation of these oonclusions should not be 
interpreted as providing a categorical conclusion. The 
table is presented merely for the convenience of 
reflecting on the tentative positions taken in the 
discussion. 
The C series of interpretations seem feasible for the 
information system reflected in successive turnover 
disclosures. Thus, the non-disclosure of turnover is 
associated with a higher risk ratinq by the market. This is 
particularly acute when this non-disclosure policy was 
pursued for turnove4 but a disclosure policy was 
implemented for the funds statement. An attempt is made 
below to distinguish the competing interpretations of 
this condition, namely the C series presented in Section 10.3.1. 
C(l) is an unlikely candidate since the market estimate 
errors in all probability would be averaqed out across 
so many firms. 
C(2) is more feasible than C(l). However, as indicated, 
in view of the importance of the co-variability of 
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Table 10.8 
Risk Pairs of Differential Disclosure Firms 
Measure l* 2 3 4 
s s s R s 
52 R s R R 
R2 R s R R 
S/R R s R R 
S = the required disclosure of the item had no 
impact on risk post 1973 
R = the required disclosure of the item reduced 
risk in the post 1973 period 
* See Table 10. 2, page 319, for groupings 
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earnings and given the disclosure of earnings by all 
firms at all times, the additional disclosure of turn-
over is not likely to improve estimates,considering 
the potentially high correlation between turnover and 
earnings. 
C(3) is the most likely candidate and it is submitted 
cautiously that the non-disclosure of turnover per se 
is a determinant of market risk. It is unlikely that 
non-disclosure revealed undesirable management attitudes 
towards information dissemination as these attitudes 
would presumably be unaffected by the disclosure 
requirement. That is, if the market was suspicious of 
management's propensity to suppress information, the 
mandatory disclosure would not allay the market's fears 
that other information was being suppressed. It is 
submitted that the non-disclosure of the information 
is a noise factor in the market estimates of risk and 
biases the measures upward. This result supports the 
intuitive notion that the market extracts a premium for 
needless uncertainty. 
As regards the funds statement non-disclosure, the B 
series of interpretations are the most appropriate. 
To an extent, this is a rather u~interesting result and 
it is impossible to distinguish the reasons. Thus, 
no inference at all is drawn. 
In concluding it must be emphasised that an overriding 
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factor which cannot be controlled with the proposed 
methodology, is the fact that the 1973 Act introduced 
certain regulations which may change the structure of the 
market environment. For example, a requirement to produce 
interim reports and provisional results may have changed 
the structure of the information market, with attendant 
disturbances. Another factor which may have affected the 
overall market for information was the section which deemed 
insider dealing to be a criminal offence. This may 
substantially change the flow of information into the 
market. In mitigation, it is maintained that, while conceding 
that the environment may have changed from the pre-enactment 
period to the post-enactment period, all other provisions 
will have affected firms equally and at the same time. The 
effects on the different firms would in all probability 
occur randomly across firms, thus dissipating any 
disturbance on the results obtained in this study. 
Finally, therefore, it is unlikely that these general 
factors would alter substantially the inference here drawn. 
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10.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter set out to explore the potential relationship 
between information and risk and in so doing provided more 
questions than answers. 
Its major thrust was to investigate the relationship between 
voluntary disclosures/non-disclosures and market determined 
risk. The two information systems reflected by turnover 
and the funds statement provided the accounting variables 
while variance of returns and S were the market risk measures 
employed. These risk measures were further investigated 
using two indirect measures of market risk, namely R2 and 
Beta quotient. 
The disclosure requirements of the 1973 Companies Act 
provided the methodological framework introducing a 
longitudinal dimension to the problem. 
The results are encouraging although the interpretation and 
conclusions must remain tentative. It would seem that 
the non-disclosure of certain 'known' information may in 
itself be a determinant of risk. Thus, it is possible that 
the mapping between real events and market risk measures 
may be distorted by various informational factors. 
Further research is obviously required, both theoretically 
and empirically, on the information market and its structure. 
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These results are also indicative of the usefulness of 
disclosure legislation. The paper has not concerned 
itself with issues of regulation, yet w~ere the publicising 
of information results in observable reduced risk estimates, 
some 'benefits' seem to exist. Whether these improve 
efficiency or whether Pareto optimality obtains, and whether 
these benefits outweigh any costs that may exist, 
remain open issues. 
Benston (1973) in a paper primarily concerned with the 
effects of the Securities Act ('33 and '34) indicated that 
the required reporting of a sales figure had little impact 
on 6. It is not apparent that this study controlled any 
other disclosure requirements necessitated in tenns of these acts. The 
purpose of the Benston paper was quite different and a 
comparison with the results and conclusions presented is 
h2nce not warranted. 
While these results may be viewed by some to be of 
historical interest only, an admonition may be sounded 
to financial disclosure policy makers ~ non-disclosure 
of information may be a lot more costly than 
believed! Thus, to achieve the objectives of financial 
reporting, it is important to consider not only the 
usefulness of the disclosed data,but the negative utility 
of not disclosing data. 
340 
The results are obviously data specific and provide evidence 
of relationships on the JSE. However, it is hoped that the 
results provide more generalised insights into and provoke 
research and debate on an altogether intriguing topic. 
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FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 10 
(1) In this paper a time series of firm specific data is 
considered to reflect an 'information system'. If 
disclosed each datum of the series, e.g. the annual 
turnover figure, can be regarded as a signal to the 
market. 
(2) The Act required the disclosure of the firm's annual 
turnover or the percentage change over the previous 
year's turnover. These policies are not distinguished. 
in this study. Very few firms disclose only percentage 
changes. 
(3) To be considered a disclosure firm with respect to the 
funds statement, it was sufficient for the firm to 
present any form of funds statement voluntarily. It 
was not necessary for this voluntary statement to 
comply exactly with the subsequent legislation. 
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AP PEN DIX I 
DISTRIBUTION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT AND ANNOUNCEMENT DATES 
Month Percentage firms with Percentage of Percentage of 
Financial year ending: Preliminary Interim Announce-
Announcements ments in: 
in: 
AR PA IA 
January 0.0 4. l 3.2 
February 5.7 13. 5 20.4 
March 17. 3 9.2 4.2 
April 0 4.8 4.8 
May 2.7 4.8 8.0 
June 25.6 12. 2 9.0 
July 1.4 7.5 5.2 
August 0.0 13.4 13. 5 
September 13. 9 10.8 9.3 
October 0.0 3. l 8.6 
November 2.9 9.8 11. 8 
December 30.5 6.8 2.0 
Total* 100 100 l 00 
* Total number of firms 41, total PA = 261 total IA = 261. 
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APPENDIX IV 
COMPANIES INCLUDED IN STUDIES** 
1. Abercom Investments Limited 
2. Aberdare Cables Africa Limited 
3. Adcock Ingram Limited 
* 
4. AECI Limited 
5. African Cables Limited 
* 
6. African Oxygen Limited 
* 
7. · Anglo Alpha Limited 
* 8. Anglo American Industrial Corporation Limited 
9. Anglo Transvaal Industries Limited 
10. Asea Electric South Africa Limited 
11. Associated Engineering S.A. Limited 
12. Associated Furniture Companies Limited 
* 13. Barlow Rand Limited 
* 14. Beares Limited 
* 15. Blue Circle Limited 
* 16. Bonrnore Investments Limited 
17. Bonuskor Beperk 
* 18. Boumat Limited 
19. Calan Limited 
* 20. Carlton Paper Corporation Limited 
* 21. Chemical Holdings Limited 
22. Claude Neon Lights (S.A.) Limited 
23. C.N.A. Investments Limited 
24. Cullinan Holdings Limited 
25. Currie Finance Corporation Limited 
26. Currie Motors (1946) Limited 
27. Die Afrikaanse Pers (1962) Beperk 
* 28. Dorbyl Limited 
* 29. Dunlop South Africa Limited 
30. Dunswart Iron & Steel Works Limited 
* 31. Edgars Stores Limited 
32. Ellerine Holdings Limited 
* 33. Everite Limited 
* 34. Federale Voedsel Beperk 
* 35. Federale Volksbeleggings Beperk 
* 36. 
* 37. 
* 38. 
* 39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
* 44. 
45. 
46. 
* 47. 
* 48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
* 52. 
53. 
* 54. 
* 55. 
56. 
* 57. 
58. 
* 59. 
* 60. 
* 61. 
62. 
* 63. 
64. 
* 65. 
66. 
67. 
* 68. 
* 69. 
70. 
Foschini Limited 
Frasers Limited 
Gallo (Africa) Limited 
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General Tire & Rubber Co. (South Africa) Limited 
Greatermans Stores Limited 
Gresham Industries Limited 
Grinaker Holdings Limited 
Gibb & Inggs Limited 
Huletts Corporation Limited 
Industrial & Corrnnercial Holdings Group Limited 
Irvin & Johnson Limited 
Kaap Kunene Beleggings Beperk 
Kohler Brothers Limited 
Lamberts Bay Holdings Limited 
Leac Limited 
LTA Limited 
Malbak Limited 
McCarthy Group Limited 
Metal Box South Africa Limited 
Metcash Limited 
Mitchell Catts Limited 
Murray & Roberts Holdings Limited 
National Trading Co. Limited 
O.K. Bazaars (1929) Limited 
Otis Elevator Co. Limited 
Pick~ Pay Stores Limited 
Placor Holdings Limited 
Plate Glass & Shatterprufe Industries Limited 
Premier Milling Limited 
Protea Holdings Limited 
Rembrandt Beherende Beleggings Beperk 
Rembrandt Group Limited 
Rennies Consolidated Holdings Limited 
Reunert & Lenz Limited 
Rex Trueform Clothing Co. Limited 
71 . 
72. 
73. 
74. 
* 75. 
* 76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
* 81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
* 88. 
* 89. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
* 95. 
Romatex Limited 
Russel Holdings Limited 
Sappi Limited 
358 
Scottish Cables (South Africa) Limited 
Seardel Investment Corporation Limited 
Sentrachem Limited 
South African Breweries Limited 
South African Marine Corporation Limited 
South West Africa Fishing Industries Limited 
Steelmetals Limited 
Stewarts & Lloyds of South Africa Limited 
Television & Electrical Holdings Limited 
The Argus Printing & Publishing Co. Limited 
The Sterns Diamond Organisation Limited 
The Tongaat-Hulett Group Limited 
The Union Steel Corporation of South Africa Limited 
Tiger Oats & National Milling Co. Limited 
Toyota (South Africa) Limited 
Trek Beleggings Beperk 
Truworths Limited 
W & A Investment Corporation Limited 
Wesco Investments Limited 
Willem Barendz Limited 
Williams Hunt South Africa Limited 
Woolworths Limited 
** This excludes the LIFO study of Chapter 8 - see Appendix V. 
* Indicates companies included in Part 2 and Part 3 studies. 
All companies in this appendix were included in the Part 3 study. 
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P.PPEtID IX V 
LIFO FIDMS INCLUDED IN CHAPTER 8 STUDY 
I I 
Date of % Reducticn I I --·----·-·-·-Finn Announcement of F.I.F.0.1 p I ean!lr).gs I - I 
~---_j 
I I I 
1 Anglo Alpha Cement Ltd 1 March 1979 6 0, 90 I I 
2 1 vr'T 1.-..u ........ _ Lirnited 11 March 1976 14 O, 80 l 
3 'l'he Natal Chemical 
I 
Syndic2te Li.mi ted 23 lrngust 1979 50 0,85 I 
4 Sec;rdel lnves '.:r,H.;.:lt Corp. I 
Limited 31 August 1979 20 l,00 I l 
5 Afric~n Cables Limited 1 October 1976 13 0 -~c: 
I 
f ..,~ 
6 Huletts Aluminiur.1 Ltd 1 June 1977 24 0,55 
7 N=1tional Bolts Limite:d 26 September 1975 50 0,35 
8 Ste·~:arts & Lloyds of 
s. l~. Lid.Le:d 22 Noverr.ber 1979 31 l,~5 
9 Vereenising Refractories 
Limited 20 February 1980 9 0, :,5 
10 Coates Brothers (S.A.) 
Li.mi ted 24 January 1980 2' ~ 0 ,GO 
11 t:0!1l8r Brothers Limited 15 Fe;::iruary 1980 14 0, 35 
12 Met.al Box s. ;~. Limited 1 June 1977 4 J. 0 ,60 
13 S&ppi Limited 9 March 1976 7 0,65 
14 Huletts Corporation Ltd 1 June 1977 5 0, 80 
15 Romatex Limited 30 April 1979 8 1,20 
16 Sterns Diamond 
Organisation Limited 13 June 1979 42 0 ,90 
17 Trek Be leggings Ltd 23 J,pril 1975 8 0,85 
18 Steelrnctals Limited 27 Sep terr.be r 1976 4 0,75 
19 Metal Closures Group 
S.A. Limited 7 Feb.!:"uar;l 1980 13 0, 70 I I 
20 Sl.1ncrush Limited 21 ?·1a:cch 1975 7 O, 50 I I 
21 B s Steel Furn.i ture l I & i Lo. Li;:ii ted L May 1979 11 l,00 I I _ _L _____ J 
2 ~1 :'f\Y 1984 
